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CHAPTER I
Introduction
Statement of the Problem
The subject of depression has puzzled and mystified people and, 
in general, has been an area of controversy for over 2, 0 0 0 years.
Yet in spite of the numerous theoretical papers regarding its 
etiology and psychopathology, there is a dearth of systematic 
studies aimed at testing hypotheses generated by the various 
theories. One reason for this may be that the earlier views, 
such as Freud's formulation of an internalized struggle between 
superego and ego, are too remote from observables in clinical 
material to be reduced to operational terms for testing.
During the last decade and a half, Beck (1967) has attempted 
to stipulate certain characteristics that appear to be at the 
core of the depressive constellation and which are also testable.
In the early 1960's, Beck (1961, 1963, 1964, 1967) conducted a 
series of studies of clinical depression which led to the 
development of a cognitive formulation of depressive symtomatology 
and an approach to the treatment of depression that dealt pri­
marily with cognitive factors. He postulated a "cognitive triad," 
consisting of a negative conception of the self, of the external 
world, and of the future as central to the depressive constellation. 
This view has received some support from a series of systematic 
investigations (Beck & Hurvich, 1959; Beck, 1961; Beck & Ward,
1
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
21961). Recently, Beck (1970, 1972, 1974, 1976) has theorized that 
emotions in general may follow from the meanings attributed to 
events and that emotional disturbances result when events are 
given distorted interpretations. He hypothesized further that 
many forms of psychopathology —  such as anxiety, phobias, 
obsessions, as well as depression —  may be associated with 
characteristic cognitive distortions and that these disturbances 
will respond to therapy aimed at the correction of these 
distortions. A depressed person, then, may be helped by changing 
his errors in thinking, i.e., his dysfunctional attitudes, rather 
than by concentrating on his depressed mood.
While conducting research with Aaron T. Beck, I realized that 
the lack of an objective method to quantify the relative presence 
or absence of these cognitive distortions was a basic limitation 
affecting efforts to test empirically the hypotheses inherent in 
this type of therapy. If reliable and valid means for measurement 
were available, a number of additional avenues for research dealing 
with the formal thought processes in depression would be opened.
The primary purpose, therefore, of this study was to design a 
written instrument aimed at identifying the common assumptions 
underlying the typical idiosyncratic cognitions of depressed 
individuals, as espoused within Beck's approach. A second-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3level goal of this research was to determine the relationship 
between these attitudes and depressive tendency.
The Cognitive View of Emotions
Within the clinical realm, analysis of phenomena from a 
cognitive information-based perspective is not new (cf. Kelly, 
1955; Rotter, Chance, & Phares, 1972); yet recent years have 
witnessed increasing emphasis on refining and operationalizing 
a "cognitive learning" approach (e.g., Bandura, 1969; Estes, 
1971; Staats, 1972). In addition, a rapidly accumulating 
body of evidence and considerable speculation suggest that 
this convergence toward a cognitive-behavioral perspective 
holds substantial clinical promise (Bergin, 1970; D'Zurilla & 
Goldfried, 1971; Goldfried, Decenteceo & Weinberg, 1974; 
Lazarus, 1967, 1971, 1976; Mahoney, 1974; Meichenbaum, 1972; 
Ullman, 1970). Arieti (1968), a psychoanalyst, has called 
cognition the "Cinderella" of the field of psychiatry. He 
emphasized that "a great deal of human life has to do with 
conceptual constructs. It is impossible to understand the 
human being without such important cognitive constructs as 
the self-image, self-esteem, self-identity, identification, 
hope, or projection of the self into the future" (p. 1637).
Until recently, researchers and therapists have regarded 
affective and cognitive development as relatively independent
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4of one another. According to Singer (1973), however, the intimate 
relation between affect and cognition is rooted in the infant's 
early efforts at accommodating to its novel and everchanging 
environment. He assumes, with Tomkins (1962), and Izard (1971), 
that environmental novelty activates the interest affect, which 
in turn sustains efforts at exploration and accommodation. Mastery 
or successful accommodation reduces excitement and activates joy, 
whereas a complex mass of unassimilable material may produce 
startle, distress, or fear. Thus, affective and cognitive processes 
are intertwined from the very beginning of life. As man interacts 
further with his environment, an elaborate set of cognitive functions 
emerge which enable him to achieve greater control over his feelings, 
actions, and environments. Man1s ability to appraise, to interpret, 
and to ascribe evaluative labels to his behavior and/or his feelings 
gives, in large measure, meaning to his affective-behavioral states.
Rensberger (1977), reporting for the New York Times, summarizes 
the cognitive position as follows:
"Freud got it the wrong way around, some psychiatrists 
are now asserting. Emotional disorders do not cause 
people to think in bizarre, illogical patterns 
typical of mental illness. Rather, it is illogical 
or otherwise defective thinking patterns that cause 
emotional or behavioral problems." (p. A21)
Just as Freud's momentous discovery consisted of revealing the 
unconscious processes in a person's affective life, the affective- 
unconscious, so now we must go below the surface and reveal the
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5unconscious processes in a person's cognitive life, what we may call 
the cognitive-unconscious (Weiner, 1975). Fairly conclusive 
evidence is now available that a person's attitude toward any 
object can be seen as a function of his beliefs about the object 
and the evaluative aspects of those beliefs (Fishbein, 1967)- 
Several contemporary theories treat emotion in essentially this 
same way; i.e., as response or as a complex of responses determined 
by cognitive processes. These recent theories seem to have stemmed 
from pervasive ideas about human nature which can be traced through 
Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Diderot, Kant, and other philosophers 
such as Epictetus, who in the first century A.D. wrote in The 
Enchiridion, "Men are disturbed not by things, but by the view
which they take of them." The major ideas inherent in these 
approaches are: (1) Man is first and foremost a rational being;
(2) Rationality is basically good, emotionality basically bad;
(3) Reason (cognitive processes) should be used as a control and 
as a substitute for emotion (Izard, 1577).
The classic theory in the field of emotions is the formulation 
of William James (1884), that " ... bodily changes follow directly 
the perception of the exciting fact, and our feelings of the same 
changes as they occur i£ the emotion." In this assertion James 
(1884) avoids assuming that cognition intervenes between the object 
stimulus and the bodily response. But this stimulus-response 
theory is expressed in terms of the following sequence: object to
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6perception of object to bodily state to feeling of bodily state, 
•h'th the perception of the object and the awareness of the 
feeling involve cognitive states and assessments. Perception is 
never direct but always interpreted in terms of one's prior 
learning, beliefs, language, and assessments. Even sensation may 
be modified by cognitions. The theory, therefore, presents more 
than a behavioral stimulus and a behavioral response and is really 
a "covert cognitive" theory of emotions (Shibles, 1974).
George A. Kelly (1955) thought of emotion as behavior that is 
either loosely defined or not a word-bound construction. His 
theory postulates that each individual has available a number of 
personal constructs for cognizing and perceiving events. The 
foundations of Kelly's theory are summarized by the statement 
that "A person's processes are psychologically channelized by 
the ways in which he anticipates events" (Kelly, 1955). This 
personal construct psychology emphasizes the individuality of 
a person's system of construing events. The salience of a 
COxiSuTUCt dimension in a person's system is determined by its 
utility in anticipating behavior or events and thus it has a 
direct association with behavioral prediction. How we "feel" 
may be the other side of how we "know."
Ellis (1962) theorizes that emotions and self-evaluative 
thoughts are virtually one and the same thing. Emotion is not 
the opposite of thinking. Rather it is partially comprised of
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7thinking or reason. What we call "emotion" seems to include 
mainly: (1) A certain kind of forceful thinking —  a kind
strongly slanted or biased by previous perceptions or experiences; 
(2) Intense bodily responses, such as feelings of pleasure or 
nausea; (3) Tendencies toward positive or negative action in 
regard to the events that seem to cause the strong thinking and 
its emotional concomitants (Ellis & Harper, 1975). Emotions 
differ from feelings in involving more cognition. For Ellis, 
without cognition or self-talk there would be few emotions, 
since emotion implies reason.
Arnold (1960, 1968), in support of Ellis, characterizes 
an emotion as a felt tendency toward an object (behavioral- 
motoric component) judged suitable or unsuitable (cognitive 
component), and reinforced by specific bodily changes 
according to the type of affect (physiological-bodily component). 
The emotion proper is the nonrational attraction or repulsion 
that follows upon the appraisal of something as good or bad 
for the perceiver. Ellis and Arnold's views are consistent 
with social-psychological definitions of attitude. Attitude 
also is considered a tendency to evaluate an object or symbol 
in a certain way (Katz & Stotland, 1959), with an affective as 
well as a predispositional response or behavioral component 
(Lott, 1973). Specifically, Ellis maintains that certain 
individuals tend to think irrationally and that these
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8irrational beliefs produce various forms of emotional upset- As 
seen from a social-leaming viewpoint, these irrational views 
take on the status of a persistent and well-learned set with 
which certain individuals approach life situations. As suggested 
by Dollard and Miller (1950), our early social learning experiences 
teach us to label situations in varying ways. Emotional re­
activity may result at times from the label attached to certain 
events, not the situation that is labeled.
The patient's private world has not been regarded as a useful 
area of inquiry to the behaviorists (Watson, 1914; Skinner, 1971). 
This is because thoughts, feelings, and ideas that are accessible 
only to the person experiencing them are not valid data for these 
theorists; only behavior that can be directly observed by an 
independent outsider is used in explanation. However, research 
in behavior therapy techniques has highlighted the fact that 
environmental events per se, although important, are not of 
primary importance; rather what the client says to himself 
about those events influences his behavior (e.g.. Mahoney,
1974; Meichenbaum, 1974; Steiner, 19/0). Recently, it. has 
been hypothesized that, in humans, conditioning does not occur 
automatically and is in fact cognitively mediated (Bandura,
1974; Brewer, 1974) . To account for behavior solely in terms 
of external rewards and punishments overlooks the fact that 
human beings can be rewarded and punished by their own thinking,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
9"even when this thinking is largely divorced from outside rein­
forcements and penalties” (Ellis, 1962). Lazarus, Averill, and 
Opton (1970) expanded this view by stating, "The individual —  
cognitively filters stimulus information, and the resulting 
appraisal determines whether the situation is evaluated as 
relevant, threatening, frustrating, etc." They add that 
cognitive processes "create the emotional response" and shape 
it into recognizable affect. This recent development of 
cognitive theories within the ranks of behavior therapy has 
to be classified as one of the more intriguing developments 
in contemporary clinical psychology. Adler (1964) summarizes 
this cognitive approach to emotions when he said:
"In a word, I am convinced that a person1s 
behavior springs from his ideas ... It is 
very obvious that we are influenced not by 
'facts' but by our interpretation of facts 
... Everyone possesses an 'idea' about him­
self and the problems of life - a life- 
pattern, a law or movement - that keeps fast 
held of him without his understanding it. 
without his being able to give any account 
of it." (pp. 19, 26-27)
The Evaluation of the Concept of Depression
As a distinct and distressing state in man, depression was 
known at least as early as 1500 years before Christ. In the 
Old Testament's Book of Job we have what is essentially a self- 
reporting inventory of a classical clinical depression. Conse­
quently, we have a condition that has prevailed at least since 
Biblical times. Yet, in spite of all of our scientific efforts,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
10
to this day no agreement exists as to diagnosis, epidemiology, 
classification, causes or effectix 3 therapies for this "illness" 
(Fieve, 1971).
The condition that today we label "depression" has been 
described by a number of ancient writers under the classification 
of "melancholia." In 400 B.C. Hippocrates rendered the first 
clinical description of melancholia when he observed depression 
in women and labeled it hysteria because he felt its source was 
the uterus ("hyster" in Greek). Later this bleak mood became 
known as melancholia after the black bile secreted by the gall 
bladder, thought to be the provoker of sadness. Opposed to 
melancholia were excitements, designated by the term "mania," 
and explained by the influence of yellow bile. Two centuries 
later, the Greek writer Aretaeus ascribed melancholia to 
flatulence or anger, grief and dejection. He linked some 
depression to manic states and noted that logical thought 
processes were not impaired in depression (Becker, 1574). 
Furthermore, the cardinal signs and symptoms used today in 
diagnosing depression were found in most of these ancient 
descriptions: disturbed mood, self-castigations, self-
debasing behavior, wish to die, physical and vegetative 
symptoms, and delusions of having committed unpardonable 
sins (Beck, 1967). The field did not advance beyond this 
19th century phenomenology until Kraepelin (1913) presented
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the first schematic classification of all psychiatric illnesses. 
Despite his narrow focus on prognosis as the essential criterion 
for categorization, Kraepelin's (1913) attempt proved to be most 
successful.
In the early part of this century, Freud and his co-workers 
emphasized the significance of psychodynamics in personality de­
velopment and in the expression of psychopathologicai symptoms. 
Enlarging on an insight of his disciple, Karl Abraham, Freud 
(1917) in his classic paper, Mourning and Melancholia, played 
an extraordinary significant role in contributing to the psycho­
dynamic understanding of depression. He considered depressive 
illness not only from the point of view of a reaction to life 
situations but also from the standpoint of the intrapersonal 
or intrapsychic events that constituted this reaction. Freud 
assumed that a particular behavior has its roots in the uncon­
scious and that any irrationalities observed on the conscious 
level are only manifestations of the underlying unconscious 
drives. In general, according to this psychoanalytical 
orientation, depression represented the introjection of hostility 
resulting from the loss of an ambivalently loved object (Abraham, 
1911; Freud, 1917) or a reaction to separation from a significant 
object of attachment (Spitz, 1942; Klein, 1945; Robertson & 
Bowlbv, 1952; Bowlby, 1960).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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More recent reformulations of the original psychoanalytical 
model have concentrated on object loss and its consequence on the 
ego. Bibring (1953) emphasized a loss of self-esteem as the 
crucial element in depression. His views contrasted with those 
of the earlier psychoanalytic theorists in that he placed more 
emphasis on ego psychology (conscious response to events) than 
on unconscious conflicts between ego and superego (Mendels, 1970). 
According to Bibring (1953), the basic mechanism of depression is
" __  the ego's shocking awareness of its helplessness in regard
to its aspirations" (p. 39). Depression supervenes when the ego 
is cognizant of its goal and simultaneously aware of its helpless­
ness to attain it. The ego suffers a narcissistic injury and 
collapse in self-esteem. Depression then appears when one cannot 
live up to one's ego ideals.
The ego-psychological approach is carried to its fullest 
implications in Beck's (1967) cognitive model of depression, which 
emphasizes another intrapersonal component of depression. The 
vicissitudes of self-esteem in depressive illness are considered 
from a perspective that conceptualizes depression in a new and 
provocative way (Mendelson, 1975). Generally, the thought dis­
order that depressed patients manifest has been considered to 
be a consequence of a basic disturbance in mood. However, Beck 
(1967) has suggested that it is a primary disturbance in thinking 
that causes the development of the disturbed mood state. He
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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proposed "that the typical depressive affects are evoked by the 
erroneous conceptualizations." An altered style of cognition, 
characterized by negative expectations, is said to be the basis 
of depressive mood states. Beck thus sees these intrapersonal 
distorted cognitions as playing an etiological role in what has 
been generally thought of as an affective disorder.
"This notion of the primacy of affect over cognition 
in psychopathology presents an interesting paradox: 
for normal subjects, the conceptualization of 
a situation determines the affective state, but 
in psychopathology, the affective state determines 
the cognition.
On the basis of clinical observations and 
subsequent research, this author has postulated 
that in abnormal condirions such as depression 
and anxiety the direction of the reaction is 
from cognition to affect, just as it is in 
normal responses (Beck, 1963). The difference 
between normal and abnormal reactions lies in 
the degree of correspondence between the con­
ceptualization and the veridical stimulus 
configuration. In psychopathological states 
perseverative faulty conceptualization leads 
to excessive or inappropriate affective 
disturbance." (Beck, 1971)
Leaming-theory approaches to the analysis of depression were 
hinted at by Skinner (1953) when he described depression as a 
general weakening of the response repertoire of an organism, a 
weakening presumably brought about by extinctions. In general, 
the behaviorist views depression as a set of maladaptive 
behavioral responses which are elicited by uncontrollable 
aversive stimuli or by loss of reinforcement, and additionally 
maintained by the rewards of the "sick role" (Lewinsohn, 1974;
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Seligman, 1974; Ferster, 1965; Lazarus, 1968). However, it was 
not until Seligman and his associates (Seligman & Maier, 1967; 
Seligman, Maier & Geer, 1968) began their experimental work, 
connecting the powerless aspects of dependency and depression, 
that the leaming-theory approach gained impetus. They showed 
that dogs receiving a large number of inescapable electric 
shocks ultimately learned to become passive and accept the 
electric shock in apparent helplessness. These animals, once 
having learned that their behavior was useless in one experimental 
situation, gave up without exploring alternatives in a new 
experimental situation where their behavior could have had an 
effect. Seligman's model may be useful in conceptualizing the 
type of affect-cognition-action sequence that leads to what a 
numbe.r of other theorists (e.g., Bibring, 1968; Beck, 1967) 
have recognized as symptoms of depression, i.e., feelings of 
hopelessness or helplessness. Learned helplessness is net only 
a stimulus-specific behavioral state; it may well represent an 
induced trait, the expectation that one's efforts are generally 
futile. After drawing a number of parallels between the charac­
teristics of "learned helplessness" and depression, Seligman (1968) 
suggested that successful therapy occurs when the patient believes 
that his responses produce gratification, that he is an effective 
human being.
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Attempts at reconciling these diverse theoretical positions 
have been sporadic and incomplete. Psychodynamic explanations 
of psychopathology weight early experience factors more heavily, 
whereas behavioral explanations stress current situational 
determinants more heavily. Cognitive approaches to psycho­
pathology, however, may prove to be useful integrators of these 
disparities. A greater emphasis on the individual's descriptions 
of internal events can lead to a more complete view of human 
psychopathology and the mechanisms of behavioral change. By 
using introspective data, the cognitive theorist has access to 
the patient's thoughts, ideas, attitudes, dreams, and daydreams. 
These ideational productions provide the cognitive theorist with 
the raw materials with which he can form concepts and models 
(Beck, 1970). It is important, however, for the therapist to 
distinguish among symptom, technique, and underlying attitudes.
For example, the symptom may be affective, such as crying spells, 
sadness, loss of gratification, loss of sense of humor, apathy.
The therapeutic approach may be behavioral, for example, mobilizing 
the patient into more activity and positively reinforcing certain 
types of activity. The underlying attitude, however, is the 
component that needs to be changed ultimately if the totality 
of the depression, for example, is to be influenced. Thus, the 
goal is cognitive modification (Beck, 1976).
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Definition of Depression
Despite the fact that research dealing with depression has 
increased quantitatively, investigations into the causes of this 
condition continue to remain unsolved. A major reason for this 
slow progress stems from the fact that the term "depression" is 
used in many ways: To describe a normal mood state (e.g.,
grief); a symptom (e.g., sadness that is seen in many psychiatric 
disorders); a syndrome (characterized by dejection, hopelessness, 
psychomotor retardation, etc.); a disease; an illness; or any 
combination of these. Furthermore, different schools of thought 
use dissimilar dialects, thereby hindering communication to an 
even greater extent. Friedman (1974) , in an attempt to present 
a schematic way of viewing "depression" has proposed that the 
term be employed in three ways: As an affect, as a clinical
state, and as a character style. Within this framework, the 
concentration of this paper is on depression as defined by the 
first two classifications of this tripartite division:
1. To refer to a basic feeling of sadness which is a part of 
the fabric of life and which is noted in states of grief and periods 
of disappointment (i.e., the affect of depression), and,
2. To refer to a complex of symptoms, including the affect 
of depression, but also other affects such as anxiety or guilt, 
and motivational, vegetative, and cognitive disturbances (i.e., 
the clinical depressive state).
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In previous studies by Beck (1961, 1963, 1964, 1967), depression 
has been defined in this way, as a psychopathological dimension 
rather than as a discrete nosological entity. This concept of 
depression should be distinguished from the use of the term to 
designate specific diagnostic categories, such as "neurotic 
depressive reaction" or "manic depressive reaction," which are 
frequently considered to have a specific onset, course, prognosis, 
and etiology. As a psychopathological dimension, depression may 
be observed in association with other psychopathological states 
such as "schizophrenic reaction" or "anxiety reaction," as well 
as in cases receiving a primary diagnosis of depression (Loeb,
Beck, & Diggory, 1971). Viewed in this way, depression is 
identifiable in many diverse types of patients.
Beck's Cognitive Theory of Depression
A promising strategy in the exploration of both psychopathology 
and normal functioning is the study of an individual's cognitions —  
the person's manner of perceiving, construing, anticipating and 
evaluating events, behaviors and their consequences (Kelly, 1955; 
Mischel, 1973; Mahoney, 1974). While cognitive theories have been 
postulated (Ellis, 1962; Lazarus, Averill, & Opton, 1970; 
Meichenbaum, 1976), these theorists attempt to account for the 
development of emotional responses and affective disturbance in 
general. The most precise delineation of a theory focusing upon 
the relationship between cognition and depressive affect occurs
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in the writing of Beck (1963, 1964, 1967, 1974, 1976). In contrast 
to many historical and popular views, Beck's (1967) thesis is that, 
"The affective response is determined by the way an individual 
structures his experience." Rejecting the notion that man is 
governed by powerful unconscious forces over which he frequently 
has little control. Beck locates the basic problem of emotional 
disturbances in man's misconceptions about himself, his irrational 
beliefs and faulty assumptions about reality. Depressive affect 
and behaviors are considered secondary manifestations of depressed 
cognitions; depression is seen as a thought disorder.
Although Arnold (1960), experimental psychologists such as 
Richard Lazarus (1966), and clinicians such as Albert Ellis (1962), 
have clearly marked the association between thinking and emotion, 
they have not delineated the particular kinds of appraisals that 
lead to specific emotions. In fact, the vast literature in 
personality and social psychology hardly touches on the question 
of what ideational content in response to a noxious stimulus or 
a threat produces sadness, anxiety, or anger. Granting that the 
initial appraisal may be a global "bad for me," Beck (1976) 
claims that the individual's unique interpretation of the noxious 
stimulus determines his emotional response. Beck's theory 
delineates the idiosyncratic content of cognitions relevant to 
specific clinical syndromes, whereas Ellis offers a more general
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hypothesis about the predominance of irrational self-talk as a 
reflection of neurotic behavior and thinking.
By analyzing recorded interview materials of depressed and 
nondepressed patients in psychotherapy. Beck (1963, 1964) found 
that depressed patients tended to distort their experiences in 
an idiosyncratic way; that is, they misinterpreted specific 
irrelevant events in terms of personal failure, deprivation, 
or rejection, or they tended to greatly exaggerate or over­
generalize events that bore any semblance of negative infor­
mation about themselves. From this, Beck theorized that 
"certain cognitive schemas become prepotent during depression, 
dominate the thought processes and lead to cognitive distortions" 
(Beck, 1964). Furthermore, Beck believes these cognitions (i.e., 
any mental activity that has verbal content) to be automatic 
and involuntary and to seem plausible to the patient. The 
meaning that an individual attaches to an object or a 
situation affects how he feels. In other words, the depressed 
person feels sad and lonely, for example, because he erroneously 
thinks he is inadequate and deserted. His thinking may appear 
as highly irrational, but it makes sense within the patient's 
conceptual framework. The relationship between cognition and 
affect or emotion is based largely on prior learning and 
association. One's irrationality leads to one's emotional 
problems. This is demonstrated by the philosophy espoused by
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the character, Don Juan:
"The world is such and such or so-and-so only 
because we tell ourselves that that is the way 
it is ... You talk to yourself. You're not 
unique at that. Everyone of us does that.
We carry on internal talk —  In fact we 
maintain our world with our internal 
talk." (Casteneda, 1972)
Beck (1967) assigns primary etiological importance to an 
altered style of cognition characterized by three negative 
views: of the self, of the environment, and of the future.
This negative "cognitive triad" presumably results in and 
accounts for other manifestations of depression —  such as 
a lack of motivation, low activity level, dysphoria, etc.
In this view, depressives' cognitions lead to the misinter­
pretation of experiences and subsequently to other responses 
that are logical consequences of such misinterpretations. 
Maladaptive behaviors are emitted which are consistent with 
the cognitions of the depressives who are thus locked into 
an internally consistent, self-fulfilling cycle.
The three cognitive constructions referred to as the 
"cognitive triad" are:
1. The view of self. The depressed patient's cognitive 
schemas that relate to self-assessment consist of seeing himself 
as deficient, inadequate, or unworthy. He will often attribute 
his unpleasant feelings and experiences to some kind of physical,
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mental, or moral defect within himself. He will then consider 
himself worthless because of his presumed defects and will 
"reject" himself.
2. The view of the world. The depressed person tends to 
see his world as making exorbitant demands on him and as 
presenting obstacles that cannot be surmounted. He interprets 
his interactions with his environment in terms of defeat and 
failure, deprivation, or disparagement.
3. The view of the future. The depressed person's negative 
cognitive patterns relating to the future become evident in his 
view that his current difficulties or suffering will continue 
indefinitely. Thus, he anticipates unremitting hardship, 
continued frustration, and never-ending deprivation. Such 
schemas essentially amount to a pervasive, hopeless attitude.
The hallmark of the cognitive triad is that the negative 
evaluations comprise unrealistic, distorted, and illogical ways 
of thinking, which do not correspond to reality. It is as though 
the depressed individual has been b o m  with eyes that see only 
with great distortions but give the illusion of seeing sharply 
and clearly. These distorted and illogical ways of thinking are 
manifested in the depressed person's tendencies to make extrava­
gant use of the following proccoooo: Itiaggeration or misinter­
pretation of events; the making of extreme, absolute judgments 
when certain situations occur; overgeneralizations from a single
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incident; focusing on one particular detail out of context and 
ignoring the more salient features of a situation; drawing 
inferences in the absence of, or even contrary to evidence; 
and extracting personally relevant meanings from unpleasant 
situations.
This view represents a radical departure from psychodynamic 
theories of affective disorders in that it emphasizes the role 
that disturbances in thinking play in determining emotional 
states (Beck, 1971). The cognitive approach to depression and 
psychopathology does not assume that a well-adjusted individual 
necessarily thinks logically and solves problems correctly 
(Beck, 1967). What is assumed is that, to understand and 
correct maladaptive behavior, the idiosyncratic meaning that 
people ascribe to their experiences must be uncovered (Kovacs 
& Beck, 1978). These cognitions are termed "idiosyncratic" because 
they reflect a faulty appraisal, ranging from a mild distortion 
to a complete misinterpretation, and because they fall into a 
pattern that is peculiar to a particular psychopathological 
state. The focus of therapy is on altering or removing those 
idiosyncratic evaluations that are dysfunctional or maladaptive, 
with the expectation that the remaining symptoms and behaviors 
characteristic of depression will be alleviated. An important 
factor in treatment when trying to change misconceptions is the
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emphasis on insight, a cognitive process consisting of identifying 
thoughts, feelings, and wishes and making psychological connections 
among them (Beck, 1976).
The Concept of Schemas
How does an individual form the concepts that predispose him to 
depression? Early in life, a child develops many attitudes about 
himself and his surroundings- Some of these concepts are realistic 
and facilitate healthy adjustments, while others deviate from 
reality and make the individual vulnerable to possible psycho­
logical disorders. These relatively abstract and generalizable 
rules regarding certain regularities in the relationships among 
events are called "schemas." According to Beck (1964) schemas 
are conceived as relatively stable cognitive structures (in 
contrast to a cognitive process, which is transient), which 
channel thought processes, irrespective of whether or not these 
are stimulated by the immediate environmental situation. When 
a particular set of stimuli impinge on the individual, a schema 
relevant to these stimuli is activated. The schema abstracts 
and molds the raw data into thoughts or cognitions. Once 
established, the schemas serve as a guide to behavior and as 
a framework that influences the way in which relevant new 
information will be assimilated. Beck (1967, p. 288) said, "It 
is postulated that the schema determines the specific type of
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affective response. If the schema is concerned with self­
depreciation, a feeling of sadness will be associated with
i t  An analogous relationship between the content of the
schema and the corresponding feeling holds for the other 
affects." Eventually, a single association may call up an 
entirely negative (or positive) experience response. Beck 
(1971) has described this process as follows:
"These schemas may remain latent for many 
years but, activated under certain stress­
ful conditions, supersede more realistic 
concepts. The indiscriminate and repetitive 
application of these idiosyncratic schemas 
leads to a continual affective arousal.
The 'snowballing' phenomena observed in 
these conditions can be understood in 
terms of a feedback model. The affective 
responses to the cognitive distortions are 
in turn processed by the idiosyncratic 
cognitive systems and lead to further 
idiosyncratic cognitions. Thus, a 
continuous cycling of cognition - affect - 
cognition is established."
When viewed in this sense, "schema" certainly constitute a Kantian
notion: We sense the world in terms of our categories. There is
no sensation without cognition and no cognition without sensation.
One might also say there is no emotion without cognition and
sensation because, in the assessment view, emotion comprises
both.
The process of "constructing" involves: first, hypothesis
generation; second, testing of these hypotheses; third, feedback
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from these tests; and finally, reformulation or adjustment of the 
original hypotheses. The individual must conceptualize the 
world in a structural framework, however primitive it may be, 
before he can react to it and within it. This acceptance of 
an internal unit (a cognition, a plan, a mediator, a schema) 
as what is learned provides a different orientation to the 
field.
In depression, specific idiosyncratic schemas assume a 
dominant role in directing the thought processes. Though the 
schemas may be latent during the nondepressed period, they 
are activated by particular kinds of circumstances and become 
progressively more potent as the depression develops. Circum­
stances are not expected to produce a depression unless the 
person in question is particularly sensitive to the situation 
because of his specific predepressive constellation. Whereas 
the average person might experience such a trauma and still be 
able to maintain interest in other aspects of his life, the 
depression-prone person experiences such a constriction of 
his cognitive field that he experiences negative ideas about 
every aspect of his life. The phenomenology of normal and 
pathological moods may overlap considerably. Most moods 
entail poorer discrimination between subjective and objective 
reality. But in normal moods the individual has greater 
awareness of what events have induced the mood and better
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recognition that changed perceptions are temporary effects of the 
mood. Moreover, qualitative and quantitative aspects of the mood 
are more appropriate to the mood-eliciting events. Events that 
are incompatible with the mood are perceived and responded to more 
realistically, which may lead to a shift or termination of the mood.
By contrast, pathological moods are less appropriate to reality in 
relation to all of the factors (Becker, 1974). In psychopathological
conditions, the reaction to the stimulus situation is determined to
a much greater extent by internal processes which distort the stimulus 
situation. The increased frequency and degree of cognitive dis­
tortions as the depression develops may be attributed to the
progressive dominance of the idiosyncratic schemas. Normally, 
the cognition resulting from the interaction of the schema with 
the stimuli is expected to be a reasonably accurate (veridical) 
representation of reality (Piaget, 1947). However, as these 
idiosyncratic schemas become more active, they are capable of 
being evoked by stimuli that are less congruent with them. Now, 
instead of a schema's being selected to "fit” the external details, 
the details are selectively extracted and molded to "fit" the 
schema. The result is inevitably a distortion of reality.
When the idiosyncratic schemas are especially active as in 
severe depressions, particular items congruent with the depressive 
schemas are selected from the stored material. These items then 
form part of the typical depressive sequences of associations and
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ruminations. According to Beck (1971) :
"The model for affect instigation is based on 
certain assumptions. First, irrespective of 
the veridical properties of a stimulus 
situation, an individual's reaction to the 
situation depends upon his appraisal (or 
conceptualization) of the situation.
Crucial properties of the stimulus are its 
connotations, meanings, and significance 
for the perceiver.
Second, the cognitive content or 
meaning is chained to a particular affect.
As the cognitive content changes, the affect 
changes in consonance with it. Affect-pro­
ducing ideation may occur in response to a 
specific external stimulus or may occur in 
a sequence of associations in the ‘stream 
of consciousness.' The affect is congruent 
with the cognitions.
During the course of a person's 
development, a particular cognitive content 
may establish a pathway to a specific affect.
Some of these cognition-affect chains appear 
to be universal. Others are idiosyncratic 
for a particular society or a specific 
individual."
A cycle is formed wherein each negative judgment reinforces the 
negative self-concept, which in turn facilitates a negative 
interpretation of subsequent experiences. In the terminology 
of formal logic, the schema equals the major premise; the 
external event equals the minor premise; the cognition equals 
the conclusion, the affect follows from the conclusion. If 
this major premise is invalid, then the conclusion will be 
invalid, even though the logical operations may be flawless.
By observing a recurrent erroneous conclusion, then, one can 
infer the content of the idiosyncratic schema. Thus, schemas 
may be thought of largely as statements that we make to ourselves
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and to others- To understand a depressed individual then, we need 
to get inside his conceptual system and see the world through his 
eyes. Beck (1976) gives the following example:
"An instructor, in a casual way, told two students 
(Miss A and Miss B), who were carrying on a side 
conversation in his seminar, 'If you have anything 
to say, share it with the rest of us or else be 
quiet.' Miss A responded angrily that she had 
simply been trying to clarify a point." (p. 43)
In this example, the major premise (schema or attitude) when stated
as a rule is: "All corrections by a person in authority are
criticisms." The minor premise (external event) is: "The teacher
is correcting me." Miss A concludes, "Therefore, the teacher is
criticizing me." Eer emotional response was anger. Miss A
doesn't actually state the initial premise to herself; however, it
is already a part of her cognitive organization. Whether or not
she has a concrete thought about the situation, she is aware of
the conclusion.
The depressed patient also shows certain patterns of illogical 
thought. These systematic "errors" of thinking, which lead to 
distortions of reality, can be categorized according to the ways 
in which they deviate from logical or realistic thinking. These 
illogical processes, typical of depressed individuals within 
Beck's (1967) approach, include:
1. Arbitrary inference: The process of drawing a conclusion
when there is no evidence to support the conclusion or when the 
evidence is contrary to the conclusion.
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2. Selective abstraction; The process of focusing on a detail 
taken out of context, ignoring other more salient features of the 
situation, and conceptualizing the whole experience on the basis
of this element.
3. Overgeneralization: The pattern of drawing a general 
conclusion on the basis of a single incident.
4. Magnification or minimization; Errors in evaluation that 
are so gross as to constitute distortion.
5. Personalization: The patient's proclivity to relate external 
events to himself when there is no basis for making such a connection.
6. Dichotomous Reasoning: overly rigid and simplified perception 
of events as good or bad, right or wrong, etc.
Empirical Findings
Unfortunately, evidence- in support of Beck5 s formulations 
has been largely anecdotal or indirect (Beck, 1967; 1970; 1971). 
However, some studies have explored the experimental manipulation 
of other variables relevant to depression. Loeb, Feshbach, Beck,
& Wolf (1964) randomly assigned a group of depressed and non­
depressed patients (determined by scores on the Beck Depression 
Inventory) to an experimentally-induced superior and inferior 
performance condition. Prior to and immediately following the 
experimental task, the patients rated their own moods. Results 
showed that the psychiatric patients in the superior performance 
group were more self-confident, rated themselves happier, and
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perceived others as happier than did patients in the inferior 
performance group. Depressed patients were more sensitive to 
task performance than nondepressed patients in estimating how 
they would do in a future task. The depressed patients also 
showed greater changes in self-ratings of their mood with task 
performance.
In a subsequent study by Loeb, Beck, £ Diggory (1S71), depressed 
patients (determined by a dual criterion, score on the Beck 
Depression Inventory and an independent psychiatric rating) were 
found to be significantly more pessimistic about their performance 
than were a matched control group of nondepressed patients. However, 
the depressed patients performed as well as the control group. On a 
second task in this manipulation, the previous experience of 
"success" (defined by sorting 20 cards in any of seven trials) 
or "failure" had different effects on the actual performance of 
the two groups: Success improved the performance of the depressed
group, whereas failure improved the performance of the nondepressed 
group. Friedman (1964) also demonstrated that, when given cognitive 
tasks to perform, even the most regressed depressed patients do as 
well as nondepressed controls, despite their severe feelings of 
incapacity. He interprets this finding as being in accord with 
Bibring's (1953) theoretical conception of depression as an ego 
phenomenon, involving lowered self-esteem and subjective feelings 
of helplessness and hopelessness.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
31
Hammen and Krantz (1976) reported the results of a study 
comparing the changes in self-ratings of depressed and non­
depressed females as a function of feedback on a performance 
task. The depressed subjects (determined by scores on two 
measures of depressed mood) were found to evaluate their 
personal qualities significantly more negatively than the 
nondepressed subjects. In response to an experimental 
manipulation (i.e., positive feedback about their performance, 
negative feedback, or no feedback), the depressed subjects 
typically demonstrated strongly negative reactions to failure 
as compared with the neutral condition. The depressed subjects 
became more pessimistic in the prediction of their future 
performance following the negative feedback.
Hammen and Glass (1975) found that inducing depressed 
college students to increased participation in enjoying 
(reinforcing) activities did not necessarily reduce their 
depression. Rather, the relation between mood and reinforce­
ment may depend to an important extent on cognitive factors, 
because the data suggested that depressed subjects who 
increased their activities tended to evaluate them more 
negatively than other subjects. This finding seems contrary 
to that of Lewinsohn and his colleagues (Lewinsohn, 1974; 
Lewinsohn & Graf, 1973; Lewinsohn & Libet, 1972), who 
postulated that depression results from a reduction in
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positive reinforcement. It is, however, in agreement with Beck 
(1963), who believes that depressed mood and its attendant 
cognitions result in reductions in reinforcing activities rather 
than the reverse association.
Velten (1968) used a group of statements designed to be 
"depressing" and controlled for the subjects' pretreatment mood 
level and suggestibility. He found that depressed mood in female 
college students was induced by the depressing statements. 
Weintraub, Segal, & Beck (1974) also found a time-specific 
relationship between cognition and mood, i.e., male under­
graduates who thought more negatively felt more "depressed."
They further stated that "the negative attitudinal set, rather 
than depressed affect, may be the primary factor in depression." 
This result is also in agreement with Hammen and Krantz's (1976) 
finding that depressed persons tend to systematically select 
dysfunctional cognitions that maintain if not enhance depression 
and hopelessness-
These research findings suggest new approaches for treating 
depression and new ways in which the depressed person can learn 
to help himself. As a result of these studies, some psycho­
therapists are now concerned with the kinds of statements that 
people make to themselves or with which they "think." One such 
new approach, based on Beck's assumptions, is called "cognitive- 
behavioral therapy;" it suggests that the individual's problems
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are derived largely from certain distortions of reality based on 
erroneous premises and assumptions. These incorrect conceptions 
have originated in defective learning during the individual's 
cognitive development. Man can learn erroneous, self-defeating 
notions, and he is capable of unlearning or correcting them as 
well. Regardless of the origin of these notions, the formula 
for treating them is simple: The therapist helps the patient
to unravel his distortions in thinking and to learn alternative, 
more realistic ways to formulate his experiences.
Of particular significance to this basic question of how 
undesirable affect can be served from cognition is the widely- 
known work of Schachter and his colleagues. Schachter's (1964,
1966) research supports the contention that the emotional content 
of a reaction can be modified or eliminated if the cognitions 
related to the emotional reaction are changed. Such a contention 
presupposes that emotional experiences always include cognitive 
aspects. Three propositions constitute the essence of Schachter's
(1971) approach:
1. Given a state of physiological arousal for which an 
individual has no immediate explanation, he will "label" this 
state and describe his feelings in terms of the cognitions 
available to him ...
2. Given a state of physiological arousal for which an 
individual has a completely appropriate explanation ..., no
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evaluative needs will arise and the individual is unlikely to 
label his feelings in terms of [any] alternative cognitions 
available ...
3. Given the same cognitive circumstances, the individual 
will react emotionally or describe his feelings as emotions only 
to the extent that he experiences a state of physiological 
arousal.
In other words, both physiological arousal and cognitive 
evaluation are necessary, but neither is a sufficient condition 
for the production of emotional states (Mandler, 1975). This 
two-factor theory of emotions, although not fully explaining 
the link between negative cognitions and depressive affect, 
suggests that affective experience is a joint product of 
cognitive labeling and physiological arousal.
In an early experiment, Schachter and Singer (1962) injected 
students with adrenaline and asked them to report their experiences. 
Seventy-one percent reported having certain physical sensations, 
the rest described "as-if" emotions; e.g., "I feel as if I were 
afraid." The researchers found that the cognition that one has 
and the kind of linguistic labeling that one does determines 
which emotion is experienced. Subjects who were aware that the 
cause of their arousal was adrenaline reported no emotions. The 
same physiological arousal may be experienced as joy or as anger 
(or as any other emotion), depending on the cognitions available
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in the situation. The data suggest that if a state of physiological 
arousal is induced, and if the individual has no immediate expla­
nation for it, he will then label his state in terms of the environ­
mental-cognitive information available at the time. Conversely, 
if the state of physiological arousal is completely explained in 
terms of antecedents, such as an injection, then the individual 
will not use other environmental-cognitive information to label 
his internal state (rdandler, 1975). The conclusion is that an 
emotion is neither a physiological event determined by factors 
under the skin nor is it determined by environmental events 
impinging upon the person. Rather, it is the result of a 
complex evaluation of internal and external pieces of information 
and is particularly affected by a person's attributions of the 
causality, intent, and extent of these factors.
The relative independence of physiological and cognitive factors 
demonstrated by these experiments is somewhat overshadowed by the 
necessary artificiality of the experimental situation, as physio­
logical arousal is rarely artificially induced, but, instead, 
caused by environmental events. Schachter's thesis can be 
applied to a depressed state as follows: If a person suffers
a loss, he will become emotionally aroused and will scan his 
environment for cues. Then, when he notices that he has suffered 
this loss, he will interpret the loss as the cause of the dysphoria. 
This circular approach reflects the limitations of this particular
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experimental design when it is applied to a natural state. 
However, Schachter and his colleagues' interests lay in the 
relation between certe"^ artificially induced states of 
physical arousal and cognition.
This approach assumes that there exists a close relation­
ship between the affective and cognitive organizations in the 
person. The obvious implication for the psychotherapist is 
that, if his clients can be induced to perceive differently 
situations that produce disruptive feelings or emotions, he 
can alter their affect in a therapeutic fashion. In other 
words, the bonds between cognition and a given maladaptive 
emotion or feeling can be severed if the cognition is changed 
(Arnold, 1968). If the meaning of what is perceived determines 
the emotion experienced, and if the therapist can help the 
client to change his perception or understanding of the 
significant events in an emotion-provoking situation, then the 
affective response will also be changed. Likewise, Beck has 
suggested that one can get to the emotional disorder through 
the person's thinking. The individual's reports of his ideas, 
feelings, and wishes provide the raw materials for the cognitive 
model. It is a descriptive, empirical, observational method to 
deal with what people actually say and do. A depressed person, 
then, may be helped by changing his errors in thinking (i.e.,
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his dysfunctional attitudes) rather than by concentrating on 
his depressed mood.
In general, cognitive psychotherapies (e.g., Rational- 
Emotive Therapy, Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy, etc.) have been 
developed for treating a wide variety of disorders. These 
treatments are alleged to change faulty conceptions and self­
signals; yet, for Beck’s approach to depression, no satisfactory 
measure of these alleged cognitive changes is available. An 
instrument to measure the basic premise or rule underlying 
the cognition would assess whether cognitive changes occur 
and may predict which patients would respond to such treatments. 
Review of Existing Measures
Several attempts have been made to develop instruments to 
assess change in the thinking patterns of clients, particularly 
with regard to changes in irrational thinking patterns. However, 
a review of these existing measures indicates that a satisfactory 
instrument is not yet available (Lane, Bessai, & Bard, 1975; 
Mahoney, 1977). Bessai (1976) reviewed nine instruments that 
have been developed to assess irrational thinking. However, 
she (p. 13) concluded that "the properties of these scales 
reveal numerous inadequacies, including: Items that deal with
feelings and symptoms rather than beliefs, insufficient number 
of items, inadequate subject and item ratios, and failure to 
investigate potential factorial complexity."
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Argabrite and Nidorf (1968) devised a 15-item, five-point 
rating scale to investigate the possibility of the irrational 
beliefs being used as a measure of neurosis. Each item on the 
scale was anchored at one end by a description of a rational 
belief and at the other end by its corresponding irrational 
belief. They administered the scale to 204 college students, 
but only reported the means, standard deviations, and ranges of 
their scores. No other information about test development was 
given.
Jones (1968) designed a 100-item, five-point, factor-analyzed 
instrument (The Irrational Belief Test) to quantify the relative 
presence or absence of irrational beliefs in individuals. Originally, 
Jones wrote 40 items for each of 10 major irrational beliefs within 
the Ellis framework. Then, based on judges' decisions, he reduced 
this to 20 items per scale. These 200 items initially were 
administered to 131 college students, and the data were factor 
analyzed, resulting in 100-item, ten-point scale instrument. In 
addition, a cross validation was performed on a sample of 178 
college students, 72 state mental hospital patients, and 177 
volunteers from the general adult population. These data 
demonstrated high factorial validity; a strong negative relationship 
between scores on the scale and education level; and no discrimi­
nation with regard to age, sex, or intelligence.
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A few issues emerge from a detailed analysis of the procedures 
employed by Jones in validating the Irrational Belief Test. Ap­
parently, the subject sample for the final factor analysis was 
too heterogeneous; i.e., it is difficult to draw valid conclusions 
from a sample comprising junior college students, seniors in 
college, mental hospital patients, and adults from the general 
population. Furthermore, results from the factor analysis 
produced 15 factors, yet only 10 were used (Factors 1-8, 12, 
and 14); and 41 of the 100 items were not included in the scale 
on which they had their highest loading. In fact, nine of the 
41 items were placed on the scale on which they had one of the 
five lowest loadings. Of these 41 items, 14 had loadings of 
less than .10, and 13 had loadings of less than .20 on the 
factors on which they were placed. Such evidence leads the 
reader to question whether such a study involved abuse of the 
subjectivity inherent in factor analysis. Trexler and Karst
(1972) claim that this Irrational Belief Test could be con­
sidered a measure of vocabulary acquisition (i.e., whether the 
subject merely has learned the language associated with 
Rational-Emotive Therapy) rather than a measure of the 
construct of irrationality.
Hartman (1968) developed the Personal Belief Inventory, a 
60-item, self-administered, six-point (totally agree to totally 
disagree) rating scale, derived from Ellisonian theory, for
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assessing specific levels of irrational thinking. Final item 
selection (from a pool of 135 items) was based on correlations 
between the mean score for each item and total test scores in 
a sample of 500 college students. Reliability (internal 
consistency and stability) was investigated first in a sample 
ox 30 college students in a test-retest situation, five days 
between testings (test-retest = .89, split half = .95) and 
then in another sample of 85 college students with one week 
between testings (test-retest = .91; split half = .90).
Hartman (1968, p. 7) claimed that these results " ... have 
empirically shown the Personal Beliefs Inventory to possess 
a high level of validity and reliability and to be extremely 
sensitive to irrational thinking." This claim is suspect 
because of the following flaws: (1) The sample sizes for
the reliability studies seem rather small; (2) If one is 
truly assessing irrational thinking, one would expect 
stability to be tested over a longer period of time; five 
to seven days for a test-retest investigation seems too 
short; and (3) Nd validation, cross-validation, or tests of 
significance were reported.
Bard (1973a) developed the Self-Rating Scale for Ration­
ality, a measure consisting of 20 statements of rational and 
irrational values set in a Likert-scale format. These items 
were said to have been derived from the writings of Ellis; yet
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specific item selection procedures were not explained. No data 
were presented on reliability or validity of the scale, other 
than a statement that each of the items was reviewed by Albert 
Ellis (face validity). In a discussion of this scale. Lane, 
Eessai, & Bard (1975) questioned the stability of these scores. 
Furthermore, the low correlations of the Self-Rating Scale of 
Rationality with other rationality scales, together with the 
inconsistency of the relationships with other measures, call 
into question the construct validity of the instrument. Bard 
(1973b) also admitted to not knowing what a high rationality 
score actually means; in fact, it may be "a greater familiarity 
with the text, A Guide to Rational Living," which the subjects 
were required to read.
MacDonald and Games (1972) developed the Ellis Scale, a 
nine-point, nine-item irrational beliefs rating scale. Items 
included 9 of the 11 major irrational beliefs according to 
Ellis' theory, with total scores ranging from 9 to 81. This 
instrument, however, appears to constitute merely an indication 
of one's endorsement of each of Ellis' 11 irrational beliefs.
In addition, because of the way in which this scale is 
structured, there is no way either to examine the factorial 
composition or to investigate empiricallv the assumed unidi­
mensionality of the construct "irrationality," as is implied 
within this scale.
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The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (Hathaway, & 
McKinley, 1942) is the most widely used test in the self-rating 
category. It consists of 568 items that are scored as "true" 
or "false." A number of scales designed to measure the degree 
of psychopathology and to differentiate broad categories of 
psychopathology have been derived, for example, depression, 
hypochondriasis, conversion hysteria, masculinity-femininity, 
and several validity scales (Mendels, 197 0). The depression 
scale in particular, consisting of 60 items, includes 49 items 
that discriminated hospitalized manic depressive patients from 
normals and 11 items that discriminated the former from other 
psychiatric patients. However, Dahlstrom and Welsh (1962) 
pointed out that a high score on the D Scale (Scale 2) does 
not necessarily indicate a primary diagnosis of depression, in 
that patients with other conditions (such as schizophrenia) may 
be depressed and have a high D score. In addition, the scale 
has been criticized for its factor complexity (O'Connor, Stefic,
& Gresock, 1957) and lack of dimensionality (Dempsey, 1963; 1964).
Hut even more important to this study, the scale does not purport 
to be a trait measure of one's beliefs, which would be the appropriate 
type of instrument needed for an empirical validation of Beck's 
theory.
The review of these existing measures indicated that "no one 
scale seems to be sufficiently comprehensive and well-developed
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psychometrically and theoretically to warrant using it as a starting 
point" (Lane et al., 1S75). According to Baisden (1975), "—  it 
appears that further research is indicated in developing an instrument 
to assess the degree to which an individual holds the irrational 
beliefs or engages in the irrational thinking." Mahoney (1977) agrees 
with these two viewpoints and delineates some major tasks facing a 
cognitive-learning perspective, including both the development of 
more reliable methods for assessing cognitive phenomena and the 
refinement and extension of knowledge regarding the causal impact 
of cognitive phenomena on other categories of experience (behavior, 
feelings, etc.).
There seems to be consensus that, at the present time, not 
only is there insufficient research on the hypothesis that the 
changing of faulty beliefs or misconceptions will alter affect, 
but also there are no adequate instruments for detecting the 
crucial clusters of misconception. The existing measures (of 
cognitions or beliefs reviewed) appear to reflect general 
feelings not beliefs (i.e., schemas or unspoken general rules 
that form the logical underpinnings of cognitions); and a number 
of methodological criticisms of each of the tests have been 
raised. The need for additional instruments may be caused by 
differences in theoretical viewpoint and definitions among the 
theorists. Since Beck's (1967) theory revolves around the
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notion of traits, or formulas by which an individual interacts 
with his environment, a written instrument reflecting this 
stability in thinking is needed.
Personality theory and research increasingly distinguish 
between affective states and traits (Cattell & Scheier, 1961; 
Spielberger, 1966). The terms "state" and "trait" are dis­
tinguished primarily in terms of the duration of an emotional 
experience. An affective state refers to the momentary, here- 
and-now feeling status of the individual, as exemplified by 
the statement that "Mr. Jones is depressed now." States may 
last from seconds to hours, and they vary widely in intensity 
as a function of the "traumas" that impinge on the organism. 
The level of a depressive state (illness) may be measured by 
self-report scales such as the Beck Depression Inventory 
(Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961). By contrast, 
a depressive trait refers to relatively stable individual 
differences in depression proneness, i.e., to differences 
among people in the disposition or tendency to perceive a 
wide range of situations as "depressing" and to respond to 
these situations with differential elevations in state 
depression. These traits usually are reactive and remain 
latent until activated by the dysphoria associated with a 
specific traumatic situation, a concept very similar to
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Beck's "schema.” If a self-report instrument were available to 
measure the level of a depressive trait, a first step in testing 
Beck's cognitive model would be achieved.
Purpose of the Research
The purpose of this research was in part methodological and 
in part substantive. Methodologically, I hoped to validate as 
measureable constructs the ideas that Beck has proposed as 
"cognitive distortions" and to develop a written instrument 
that is sufficiently reliable and valid for research purposes 
to measure the extent to which persons hold these maladapative 
beliefs. The term "maladaptive" is applied to ideation that 
interferes with the ability to cope with life experiences, 
unnecessarily disrupts internal harmony, and produces inap­
propriate or excessive emotional reactions that are painful 
(Beck, 1976). In other words, I attempted to design a scale 
aimed at identifying the common assumptions underlying a series 
of cognitions. These assumptions or beliefs act as schemas by 
which the individual's world is construed, a conceptualization 
very similar to that i-y- the pioneering research by Jean Piaget 
on the development of thinking patterns in children. These 
beliefs are unspoken, abstract regulations by which the individual 
has judged his own worth and direction and which he may apply to 
others. Often these assumptions can be inferred by looking for 
common themes in a series of cognitions. For example, recurrent
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cognitions of being a failure when examined sight reveal desands 
for perfection on each occasion. When this ideal is not met, the 
individual decides that he has failed and that he is, therefore,
"a failure." The underlying assumption might be stated as 
"Unless I am doing a perfect job all the time to the best of 
my ability, I am a failure." Once this particular attitude or 
concept has been formed, it can influence subsequent judgments 
and become more firmly set. As the concept is structuralized, 
it remains permanently with the individual, even though it may 
be dormant. In these cases, it is reactivated when the individual 
is confronted with certain internal or external stimuli related to 
this belief. Once reactivated, the "depressogenic" schemas 
generally replace more appropriate ways of organizing and 
evaluating information. If this concept of the schema is to 
serve adequately as an experimental variable, techniques must 
exist for its identification and measurement. Therefore, the 
p r imary  goal of this research was to design an objective 
method for quantifying the relative presence or absence of 
these maladaptive beliefs. The substantive aspect of this 
research, in the event the primary goal had been attained, 
was to determine the relationship between these attitudes and 
depressive tendency, as a preliminary investigatior. of Beck's 
position.
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Research Hypotheses
As a means of structuring both the accumulation of data and 
its statistical analysis, I formulated three broad research 
hypotheses and their rationales:
1. There will be a significant positive correlation between 
scores on a measure of depressive affect and scores on the proposed 
scale designed to measure dysfunctional attitudes. It is hypothesized 
that the greater the degree of endorsement of the dysfunctional 
attitudes, the more frequent and/or the more severe the psychopatho- 
logical symptomatology to be expected. This is based on Beck's (1976) 
finding that the force and prominence of maladaptive thoughts appear 
to increase in measure with the severity of the patient's disturbance.
2. Test-retest correlations for scores on the cognitive measure 
will be significantly higher than those for the affective measures; 
that is, negative beliefs are more persistent over time than 
depressed feelings. The depressive-prone individual will endorse 
the same maladaptive attitudes, even when he's not feeling depressed 
as these beliefs have became a part of his organizing and evaluating 
information.
3. Dysfunctional attitudes in normal subjects will be antecedent 
to psychopathological symptomatology. This is the basis of the 
cognitive approach to affective disorders; i.e., the typical feeling 
or emotional state of the individual appears to be a consequence of 
the way he structures reality.
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Construction of the Dysfunctional Attitude Scale 
Many instruments have been proposed for measuring psycho­
pathology, including inventories, interviewing methods, and 
physiological indications. In this study, I present data on 
the validation of a new instrument, the Dysfunctional Attitude 
Scale (hereafter abbreviated "DAS"), designed to assess the 
beliefs by which a person perceives, evaluates, judges, and 
gives meaning to a variety of situations. According to Beck:
"—  people apply rules (formulas, equations, 
premises) in regulating their own lives and 
in trying to modify the behavior of other 
people. Moreover, they label, interpret, 
and evaluate according to sets of rules.
When these rules are framed in absolute 
terms, are unrealistic, or are used 
inappropriately or excessively, they 
frequently produce maladjustment. The 
ultimate result is often some kind of 
disturbance: anxiety, depression, phobia,
mania, paranoid state, obsession. When the 
rules lead to difficulties, they are by 
definition maladaptive." (1976, p.246)
The DAS was developed to identify these maladaptive or dysfunctional
rules.
Test Format
One of the major assumptions involved in the construction of 
attitude scales is that there will be differences in the belief 
and disbelief systems of those with "favorable" attitude towards 
some psychological object and those with "unfavorable" attitudes 
(Edwards, 1957). In an attempt to reflect this, the test format
48
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of the Dysfunctional Attitude Scale is that of the typical self- 
report attitude or value scale- For each belief or attitude (the 
items), seven response categories are presented: totally agree,
agree very much, agree slightly, neutral, disagree slightly, 
disagree very much, totally disagree. On an a priori basis, the 
author determined whether a disagreement or an agreement response 
indicates an adaptive or maladaptive reaction to the belief in 
question, i.e., whether or not the belief produces unnecessary 
discomfort or suffering or leads to self-defeating behavior. 
Scaling is on a modified Likert (1932) model, with the adaptive 
end of the scale being assigned an arbitrary value of one, the 
next category two, etc., and with zero being used for omits on 
each item as a code for missing data. Thus, a "disagree-type" 
response to an adaptive item was made equivalent to an "agree- 
type" response to a maladaptive item. This Likert response 
format allows finer distinction by subjects than the traditional 
two-choice format (for example, agree-disagree). Velicer and 
Stevenson (1978) found that use of this finer-grained response 
format in the development of personality scales leads to a more 
• precise definition of scales and a greater explained portion of 
the total variance. They say, "Research employing scales con­
structed in this way would be more likely to obtain meaningful 
relationships to other variables, and the items involved in 
these relationships would be more accurately identified" (p. 295).
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Each individual earns a score (1-7) for every item, and his 
total Dysfunctional Attitude score is simply the sum of his item 
scores. For each item, a score of 1 corresponds to the most 
adaptive way of responding to that item and a score of 7, the 
most maladaptive. The individual's total score, therefore, 
represents a combination of the number of depressogenic beliefs 
he endorses and the strength with which he believes each of them. 
The higher the total score, the more distorted is the individual's 
way of thinking. The fundamental assumption involved in scaling 
by the method of equal-appearing intervals is that the intervals 
into which the statements are rated are, in fact, equal. There 
is nothing contained within the procedure of equal-interval scaling 
to provide a check on Lhis assumption. An empirical study by 
Hevner (1930) did indicate, however, that when the same stimuli 
were scaled both by the method of paired comparisons and the 
method of equal-appearina intervals, the relationship between 
the two sets of scale values was approximately linear, except 
at the two extremes of the equal-appearing interval continuum 
(Edwards, 1957).
Initial Item Selection
I wrote an initial pool of items, with the goal that they 
should reflect the maladaptive statements found to be character­
istic of depressed patients in therapy. The items were primarily 
clinically derived. A number of clinicians sent me lists of those
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verbalizations and thinking patterns most characteristic of their 
depressed patients. These patterns had been based on data obtained 
from observations made during psychotherapeutic interviews. The 
patients had been adjudged depressed by two criteria: score on
the Hamilton Rating Scale of Depression (Hamilton, 1S60), a 
clinical measure, and score on the Beck Depression Inventory 
(Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961), a self-report 
measure. Since Beck (1967) has noted that "each nosological 
group showed an idiosyncratic ideational content that distinguished 
it from each of the others," I tried to target in on those verbal­
izations which occurred most frequently in this patient population. 
The content represented in these depressive cognitions was pre­
dominantly negative in tone and self-referential in direction, 
reflecting the preoccupation of the depressed individual with 
self-derogatory and self-blaming thoughts; e.g., "Either I am 
one hundred percent successful in everything or I am a failure." 
Moreover, because the depressed patient projects into the future 
his notions of real or imagined loss, the items selected deal 
with his pessimistic and hopeless attitude, as well as his 
belief that his current discomfort is unending and unalterable.
The ideational content leading to anxiety, sadness, euphoria, 
or anger is similar to the ideational content responsible for 
anxiety reactions, depression, mania, and paranoid states, 
respectively. The difference is that in psychopathology the
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ideational content represents a distortion of a.realistic situation, 
whereas the normal cognitive responses encompass a reasonable 
approximation of the reality situation (Beck, 1976)-
Depressogenic schemas have a number of additional character­
istics which may explain that, while everyone has schemas that 
relate to self-assessment and interpersonal relationships, not 
everyone gets depressed. One defining characteristic is in­
flexible or absolute rules of conduct and evaluation, which 
becomes manifest in the patient's language in the form of 
rigid quantifiers (i.e., "all," "always," "never"), categorical 
imperatives ("must," "ought," "have to"), and preemptive class 
assignments ("nothing-but"). These rules were demonstrated by 
such items as "I should be happy all the time," "I cannot be 
happy unless most people I know admire me," "I am nothing if a 
person X love doesn't love me." In addition, the depressed 
patient's characteristic, stereotypic conclusions and assess­
ments contain certain systematic "errors" of thinking (Beck,
1967). Therefore, in the final wording of the statements, I 
attempted to simulate thinking errors that typically lead to 
and/or aggravate depression. These typical depressive cognitions 
can be categorized according to the ways in which they deviate 
from logical or realistic thinking. The patient's appraisal of 
reality may not be distorted, but his system of making inferences 
or drawing conclusions from his observations is at fault.
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Illogical processes, typical of depressed patients witnxn Beck's 
(1967) approach, and described by the DAS items include:
1. Arbitrary Inference: Drawing a conclusion when evidence 
is lacking or supports a contrary conclusion, i.e., "If I perform 
a selfish act, this means I am a selfish person." This is one's 
tendency to conclude something (usually of a personally denigratory 
nature) from a situation that is essentially neutral or impersonal. 
One fails to realize that there are more probable explanations for 
particular situations.
2. Magnification of Minimization: Exaggeration or under­
estimation of the meaning of an event, i.e., "I should set higher 
standards for myself than other people." Here a person exaggerates 
difficulties and limitations and minimizes achievements and 
capabilities.
3- Selective Abstraction: Abstracting a detail out of 
context, and thus missing the significance of the total situation; 
i.e., "If a person is indifferent to me, it means he does not like 
me." This occurs when an individual, corrected for one minor 
aspect of his work, immediately jumps to the conclusion that 
everything he does is inadequate; he cannot be easily dissuaded 
from this idea.
4. Dichotomous Reasoning: Overly rigid and simplified
perception of events as good or bad, right or wrong, etc.; i.e.,
"I must be a useful, productive, creative person or life has no
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purpose." Here, the individual sees life as black or white, with 
no other alternatives in between.
5. Overgeneralizations; Unjustified generalizations on the 
basis of a single incident; i.e., "People will probably think less 
of me if I make a mistake." This usually involves an overall 
conclusion based on a single, often minor, experience or incident.
The ultimate goal was to obtain an approximately equal 
representation of adaptive and maladaptive beliefs as a means 
of controlling for acquiescent response set. However, valid 
adaptive statements proved to be more difficult to write than 
maladaptive ones. I constructed a preliminary version of the 
DAS, consisting of 85 items, and administered it to a group of 
residents in psychiatry at the University of Pennsylvania, who 
were apprised of the purpose of the test and who provided their 
opinions regarding the face validity and comprehensibility of 
the items. Each resident was instructed to pick the items that 
he felt most accurately described and measured the attitudes 
inherent in the espousal of Beck's approach. I also asked them 
to evaluate the logic of each item; i.e., to separate out those 
items which were truisms (i.e., "If I go up to a stranger on the 
street and punch him in the mouth, he will get angry";, as 
opposed to the required beliefs (i.e., "I may be able to 
influence other people's behavior, but I can't control it").
In addition, 50 individuals (33 females and 17 males) enrolled
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in a graduate course in adolescence at the University of Pennsylvania 
were asked by their professor to complete the scale, commenting on 
any ambiguities or technical problems. Product-moment correlations 
were obtained from these data (item-item and item-total correlations). 
Then, I eliminated those items that did not seem to be tapping the 
same faulty thinking processes. This revised draft was given to 
Aaron T. Beck, whose writings stimulated the creation of these 
items, for review. Further modifications in wording were made, 
and additional items were constructed, resulting in a total of 
100 items.
A crucial decision to be made involved the dimensionality 
of the instrument. I chose to treat the DAS as a "single scale 
psychological instrument" (Horst, 1968), that is, to have a 
single total score for each person and to "ignore" the fact 
that this score may be based on a number of different malad­
aptive beliefs. Based on Beck's (1967) postulate of a 
"cognitive distortion," I constructed a number of items which, 
when taken as a set, should indicate depressogenic attitudes.
Even though each specific item may cover a different belief 
or maladaptive way of viewing various situations, it becomes 
a necessary component in reflecting one's tendency to employ, 
in general, adaptive or maladaptive attitudes. In addition, 
in considering the temporal stability of responses, I was not 
so much concerned with the stability of a person's response to
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a single item. With enough items, the stability of a total score 
may be adequate, even though responses to individual items may 
fluctuate over a period of time.
Refinement of the Scale
A sample of 275 undergraduates (100 males and 175 females) 
at the Pennsylvania State University were administered the 100- 
item version of the DAS by a member of the Department of Psychology. 
The major criticism voiced by these volunteers was the amount of 
time needed to complete this number of items. Therefore, in an 
attempt to balance brevity and reliability, I factor-analyzed 
the data obtained from this population and employed an adaptation 
of a method described by Gulliksen (1950, pp. 207-210) to construct 
two parallel forms.
Initially, data from the 100-item DAS were intercorrelated. 
Factor-analytic procedures were then applied in an attempt to 
determine the minimum number of factors that could adequately 
account for the resultant correlation matrix. This is in 
agreement with Xerlinger and Pedhazur (1973) who say:
"Factor analysis is a method for reducing a 
large number of variables (tests, scales, 
items, persons, and so on) to a smaller 
number of presumed underlying unities 
called factors. Factors are usually 
derived from the intercorrelations among
variables __ factors are constructs,
hypothesized variables that reflect the 
variance shared by tests, items, and 
scales and responses to them, and, in 
fact almost any sort of stimuli and 
responses to stimuli." (pp. 360-361)
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Results indicated that ten factors (or, latent variables) were 
extracted (see Tables 1 and 2) from the 100 items of the DAS. 
However, as already stated, I had decided to treat the construct 
of cognitive distortions in a unidimensional way at this time, 
and therefore I concentrated on the first factor extracted, 
which identifies the most general dimension and accounts for 
the maximal common variance among all the items. An in-depth 
factor analytic study will be carried out at a later date to 
determine the more minor dimensions accounting for subsets of 
the items.
The factor analytic results were used to construct two 
parallel forms of the DAS. According to the procedure I 
employed (Gulliksen, 1950), each item was represented by a 
point on a scatter diagram, the abscissa of which represents 
the mean score on the item (or its "popularity" in the sample), 
and the ordinate represent is factor loading on Factor I, the 
general factor (before rotation) of the analysis. This 
procedure is congruent with that used in item analysis of 
cognitive tests (Henrysson, 1971); the popularity index corresponds 
to the "difficulty index" and the factor loading corresponds to the 
"discrimination index." Each item having a factor loading of less 
than .15 (19 items in total) was ignored. Then, the remaining 
items plotted in the same approximate region were paired, (see 
Figure 1). Two additional items which could not be paired off
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29
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- 0.019
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0 .2 7 4  - 0 .1 8 0
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0.202
- 0 .3 5 7
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31
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-0 .1 6 8
0 .3 0 5
-0 .2 8 0
0 .1 2 7
- 0.000
- 0 .2 2 5
- 0 .3 5 1
- 0 .2 6 2
0 .3 5 9  0 .0 2 9  
- 0 . 1 9 5  0 .0 2 3
-0 .0 2 6
-0 .0 5 3
- 0 .0 6 6
0 .1 5 0
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- 0 .0 4 2  I
33
36
0 .6 3 5
-0 .0 2 9
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0 .0 3 1
0.120
0 .1 3 2
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- 0 .1 6 7
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0 .2 8 8
- C . 150 
0 .0 9 8
35
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-0 .2 9 6
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0.212
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37
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0 .0 3 9
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0 .0 6 4
0.201
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0.011
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0 .0 6 9
- 0 .0 1 6
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0 .3 8 7
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0 ,2 1 6
0 .0 7 1  
- 0 .106
- 0 .2 2 4
- 0 .0 8 9
0 .0 0 5  - 0 .1 0 0  
- 0 .0 2 7  -0 .2 0 1
0 .1 8 3
0 .1 5 7
-0 .3 6 7
0 .0 6 *
0.  200 
0 . 143
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66
0 .1 9 3
0 .2 7 6
0 .2 3  2 
- 0 .3 0 5
0 .2 8 5
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0.000
- 0.002
9 .1 3 9
- 0 .0 9 3
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69
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0 .5  70 
-0 .2 5 1
0 .0 1 6  
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Table 1 (cont.)
Facto\s
Itema 1 2 3 4 5  6  7 8 9  10
50
51
0 .4 1 4  0 .4 2 9  0 .1 9  7 0 .0 6 5  - 0 .1 5 0  -0 .1 3 5  O.'lSO -0 .2 8 0  - 0 .0 1 5  -0 .0 6 3
----- 9 .5 2 3 -= 0 .2 6 5 — U « lS 5 _ = H » 1 6 5 _ rJ .llS _ = 0 .f l6 0 .-:O .B lS  tO .U O l J l .2 0 l_ t 8 .0 6 8
0 .5 2 6  0 .1 0 5  0 .1 2 2  0 . I l l  - 0 .0 3 1  - 0 .2 6 0  0 .0 8 6  - 0 .0 8 9  0 .0 3 2  -0 .1 7 35 2 
5J
55 0 .6 8 7  0 .4 9 4  - 0 .0 5 7  - 0 .0 1 6  0 .0 7 5  - 0 .3 6 0  0 .0 0 9  - 0 .1 1 5 - 0 - 0 5 8  -0 .0 d 6  
------U .290  _ 0 .0 2 8  - 0 .1 3 3  - 0 .2 4 6  0 .1 9 3  0 .0 2 9  - 0 .0 1 2  0 .1 9 9  - 0 .1 7 6  0 .0 3 6
56
57
0 .3 7 9  - 0 .3 6 5  - 0 .2 2 6  0 .0 3 6  - 0 .0 7 9  0 .1 6 9  0 .1 6 8  0 .0 4 8  0 .0 6 4  0 .C 2 7
58
59
0 .4 1 8  0 .1 3 3  - 0 .2 8 9  0 .2 1 1  - 0 .0 0 8  -0 .0 8 6  0 .1 4 2  0 . 1 1 7 - 0 . 0 5 0 * - 0 . I 18 
0 .5 3 7  0 .2 1 5  - 0 .1 1 7  0 .1 1 2  -O .O C f - 0 * 7 0 9  0 .0 7 7  * 0 .0 4 7  - 0 .0 4 0  * 0 .0 1 8
6 0
61
0 .2 6 9  0 .5 0 9  0 .0 3 9  - 0 .1 0 9  0 .0 6 7  - O .O lf  0 .1 5 2  -0 .1 1 9  - 0 .1 3 5  0 .2 0 0  
0 .1 1 1  0 .1 6 9  - 0 .3 9 7  - 0 .1 2 9  - 0 .2 1 6  0 .0 4 0  0 .0 6 5  0 .0 9 7  0 .1 9 7  - 0 .0 2 3
62 - 0 .2 6 0  0 .1 6 7  0 .1 3 9  - 0 .0 5 2  0 .4 2 0  0 .3 6 0  -0 .2 6 8  - 0 .3 0 8  0 .0 7 6  0 .0 5 0  
0 « ltB  - 0 - 0 1 4  0 «252  -O -0 2 7  -O -O O f 0*271  n . |?o  . n a.iQn -o  lAr.
66
65
0 .0 7 6  - 0 . 3 9 0 - 0 . 3 4 6  - 0 .0 3 5  - 0 .0 6 7  0 .2 5 3  0 .0 5 4 "  0 .0 5 1  0 .1 0 3 '  0 .0 7 1
66
67
0 .3 4 2  - 0 .3 1 9  0 .0 9 2  - 0 .1 0 4  -0 .1 1 9  0 .0 0 3  -0 .0 6 7  0 .0 Z 4  -0 .1 6 9  - 0 .0 0 8  
0 .2 7 9  0 .5 1 3  0 .1 2 0  0 .1 2 9  - 0 .0 7 8  -0 .1 4 1  0 .1 2 2  - 0 . IH 2  - n . n in  .n .n T 4
68
69
- 0 .1 4 8  0 .3 0 1  - 0 .3 0 6  - 0 .1 3 5  - 0 .1 1 4  - 0 .0 2 6  -0 .2 4 5  0 .1 7 2  -0 .1 7 3  -0 .1 5 6
70
71
- 0 .0 6 1  0 .0 7 1  - 0 .1 6 7  0 .  H Z  - 0 .4 0 6  -0 .1 8 6  -0 .0 7 4  0 .2 0 7  -0 .1 6 8  0 .3 6 3
72
73
0 .3 1 6  0 .3 0 5  - 0 .3 0 2  * 0 .1 0 4  0 .0 2 9  0 . i 7 2  0 .0 3 6  0 .2 0 9  0 *1 2 ?  - 0 .0 2 3  
------0 *4 0 2  - 0 .1 1 5  0 .2 7 7  0 .0 4 7  * 0 .0 9 3  0 .0 4 1  * 0 .0 4 3  * 0 .1 7 7  0 .0 7 1  -O .m  7
76
75
-0 .0 3 2  0 .4 1 5  - 0 . 2 ) 3  - 0 .0 9 1  - 0 .1 3 6  0 .0 6 5  -0 .1 5 2  0 .1 6 7  0 .0 8 7  - 0 .2 0 8
76
77
0 .4 6 4  - 0 .1 2 9  0 .1 7 7  -C .1 4 2  0 .0 1 4  -0 .1 0 1  -0 .2 9 9  - 0 .1 0 5 ” 0 .0 2 /" - 0 .0 2 »
?S
70
0 .4 * 5  0 .0 9 2  - 0 .1 2 1  0 .1 3 4  0 .0 6 6  - 0 .0 2 9  '0 . 1 3 8 "  0 .3 0 7  0 .  l i i t  ' - 0 . 052  
-----0 .3 9 5 — 0 . 0 4 1 , 0 . 1 3 3 - 0 . 1 1 3  0 .2 6 4  0 .2 7 2  0 .1 7 6  0 . 0 9 7 - 0 . 7 7 4 - 0 . 7 7 5
BO
... 81
0 .2 3 6  - 0 .C 8 3  0 .0 5 2  -C .2 2 S  0 .1 2 9  - 0 ,1 4 5  0 .2 5 5  0 .2 0 6  0 .1 6 6  -0 .0 2 5
82
83
-0 .1 2 0  0 .4 1 4  - 0 .0 1 1  - 0 .1 9 1  - 0 .2 4 0  -0 .0 2 1  -0 .1 8 1  0 .1 1 7  0 . 0 2 0 - 0 . 2 3 0
0 *
85
0 .0 8 9  0 .2 5 6  0 .2 5 9  - 0 .0 0 5  - 0 .0 8 2  0 .1 5 8  0 .1 8 9  0 .0 9 9  0 .1 9 7  0 .1 4 1  
-----D .345  - 0 .1 9 1  0 ,3 4  1 - 0 .0 7 8  -0 .0 U 2  0 .0 7 0  0 .1 1 3  - 0 .0 6 5  0 .0 3 5  - 0 .0 8 8
86  
__ 87
0 .5 4 6  0 .0 8 9  -O .S 7 ?  0 .1 5 !  - O . S i ;  - 0 .1 0 5  0 .2 5 4  0 .0 4 9  - 3 .0 0 3  -0 .2 0 7
08
89
0 .5 2 8  0 .1 7 5  -  0 .0 6 5  - 0 .0 1 2  0 .1 2 1  0 .1 1 1  -0 .0 8 3  -0 .0 0 0 ~ ~  0 .2 1 5  -0 .1 8 0
9 0
51
0 .1 8 0  - 0 .2 4 7  - 0 .2 7 5  0 .0 8 0  0 .2 8 3  0 .0 0 5  0 .1 6 1  - 0 .0 7 3  -0 .0 6 3  0 .0 2 7  
0 .1 9 5 - 0 .0 6 1  0 . 1 5 2 - 0 . 1 4 5 - 0 . 1 4 3  0 . 2 7 7 - 0 . 0 1 8 - 0 . 1 2 6 - 0 . 1 8 4  0 .7 4 4
92
93
0 .3 6 2  0 .4 1 3  -  0 .0 7 2  -  0 .2 2 6  0 .0 7 6  0 .0 1 0  0 .0 3 3  -0 .0 9 1  -0 .1 1 4  -0 .0 9 4  
0 .2 1 5  0 .0 4 8  0 .1 1 4  - 0 .0 2 4  - 0 .2 0 0  0 -2 1 6  0 .1 6 1  - 0 .1 6 3  - 0 .1 3 2  -0 .0 3 1
55
95 0 .3 6 5  0 .4 6 7  0 .0 2 3  0 .2 7 8  - 0 .0 1 8  0 .0 8 8  0 .1 2 1  - 0 .1 2 0  0 .0 3 8  0 .0 9 8  ' 0 .4 0 5  - 0 .1 1 8  0 .1 6 0  - 0 .2 1 3  - 0 .0 1 4  0 .0 0 9  -0 .1 7 6  - 0 .0 6 7  0 .p ) 8  - 0 T 117
96
... ?7
0 .1 9 4  0 .2 4 5  - 0 .3 5 5  0 .0 4 3  0 .0 3 1  0 .2 2 0  -0 .1 8 0  0 .2 2 8  0 .0 8 0  0 .0 5 7  
------0 . 3 0 1 _ - 0 .3 U  0 .1 2 6  - 0 .1 4 8  - 0 .0 0 5  - 0 .2 5 8  0 .0 4 7  0 .2 0 2  0 .0 1 1  0 .0 9 9
58
9 9
0 .5 1 0  - 0 .1 8 4  - 0 .1 0 5  0 .2 7 5  - 0 .0 2 2  0 .0 5 7  -0 .0 3 7  -O .O od 0 .0 0 9  - 0 .0 7 6  
0 .3 2 8  - 0 .2 9 5  - 0 .2 3 3  0 .0 8 3  0 .2 8 9  -0 .0 9 2  0 .0 9 7  0 .0 5 5  0 .1 d 9  -C .0 7 7
100 0 .2 6 0  0 .0 8 1  - 0 .4 7 8  -  0 .3 9 0  -  0 .1 0 6  0 .1 1 0  0 .0 4 6  - 0 .0 4 0  0 .1 5 4  - 0 .0 2 6
% of var. 2 0 . 0  1 1 . 2  5 . 0  4 . 0  3 7 6  3 . 3  3 .2  2 . 9  2 . 7  2 . 6
*  S e e  T a b le  3 f o r  t h e  w o rd in g  o f  e a c h  i t e m .
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T a b le  2
R o ta te d  O r th o g o n a l F a c t o r  M a t r i x  
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-0 9 .
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J .2 1 2  _ 0 . 153_S.419_z5. 273 _r0.
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0 .0 8 3  0 .1*18 0 .4 8 4  0 .0 5 1  - 0 .
0 .0 5 7  0 .0 1 3  0 .0 6 4  0 .0 6 1  o
0 .0 2 2  0 .0 2 8  0 . 0 3 2 - 0 . 6 4 2 - 0
- 0 .  3 ? L _ = 8 .9 M  _ JU 1 S  2 _ = 9 , 3 0 4  0 .  
0 .X 6 3  0 .3 9 9  - 0 .1 7 3  - 0 .1 0 5  - 0 . '
M 2 _ = 4 s _ H l .= o ,o io  -o.,
0 .0 0 8  0 .3 0 2  - 0 .4 1 2  - 0 .0 3  7 0.< 
0 .0 3 3  0 .2 3 2  - 0 .1 5 4  - 0 .4 7 0  -0
0 69  - 0 .0 9 0  0 .1 2 6  -0 .0 5 7
9 82  .. 0 .0 4  7 . r 0 .  0&2 .. 0 .0 6 5
045  0 .2 1 0  0 .4 2 3  -0 .0 4 1
.4.46_ 0 . l l t _ r i ) « 2 0 2  .  0 .9 2 6  
0 78  0.08(1 0 .0 3 9  0 .1 1 4
1 04  0 .0 2 2 __ 0 .6 0 4 -0 .0 1 3
189 0 .0 1 9  - 0 .1 7 5  0 .0 4 0
0fi4_=J!,34«_5,t>il-^a,2*5
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2 11  -Q .|9 2 _  = 0 ,0 9 9  = 0 .1 2 9  
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046 -0 .0 4 1  0 .0 2 0  - 0 .0 2 8  0
9 10
.rO»08i_rO.P41__
- 0 .0 2 4  0 .0 9 4
- 0 . 0 06 0 .0 1 3
-0 .0 0 7  0 .5 7 4
= 0 .0 9 3  = 0 .1 3 4  _ 
- 0 .1 6 2  0 .0 7 1
_ 0 . 100 _=Q .06J__
- 0 .1 0 6  0 .0 4 9
0 . 041 -3 .1 4 3
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1 6
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rsk  1*5__ a , 9 9 L _ e , 9 3 1 _ 0 .  |Q 4 -
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0 .1 6 8  -0 .1 0 5  0 .0 7 3  0 .1 3 3  0 .0 4 7 '
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0 .0 2 4  = 0 .0 1 1  0 .2 3 9  -0 .0 1 7  - 0 .0 0 3
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0. 006 
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2 4
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2 8
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.2 .1 3 1
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0.100
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0.012
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-0 .1 1 4
0 .2 44
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-0 .0 9 1  - 0 .1 6  9  0 .0 4 3
0 .0 0 2  - 0 .0 2 0  -0 .0 9 1
-0 .1 4 1  0 .1 2 1  -0 .0 2 4
■0.562 - 0 . 0 3 7 __0 .0 1 7 ,
0 .1 1 7  - 0 .1 0 7  O .idO  
0 .0 1 1  - 0 .2 9 9  -O .
-0 .1 1 7  
JJ.085  
0 i3 5 2  
0.112 
0 .0 4  5 
0
0 .  492 
0 .0 4 5  
0 .0 4 8  
0 .0 5 4  
0 .1 4 0 ’  
O . 216_ 
0 l0 5 2  
0 .1 6 2  
O J l2 3 *  
0 .1O 4  
0 .1 9 5  
0.
0 .1 1 7
_0.p28_  
0 .0 4 3  
_ 0 .0 6 0 _  
61045  
0 .1 0 2
004 .0 5 5  - 0 0 7 2  -0 .0 6 4
0.212 
0 .2 8 5  
0 .2 4 1 '  
0 .0 9 2 _  
-0 .0 5 9
3 4
_ 15
36
3 8
_22_
4 0
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42
4 3
4 4
45
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_4I_
4 8
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0 .  127  
•0 .0 1 9
-0 .0 0 3  - 0 .0 0 8  - 0 .2 8 4
 0 .0 6  7 - 0  .  33 1
0 .1 3 7  0 .5 3 9  - 0 .0 4 4
iil 0.024 0.Q71
0 .0 7 1  0 .1 0 8  0 .0 2 0  0 .0 7 7
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0 .0 5 5 _
0 . * 3 l
0 .1 3 0
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-2.*12- Q.135 
- 0 .1 2 0  0 .6 5 2  0 .0 3 1
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0 .0 3 9
0 .0 6 6
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O.Olo
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O.OiS"
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•0 .0 3 6
•0 .1 3 9
•0 .0 2 6
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T a b le  2 ( c o n t . )
Factors |
1 2 3 4  5 6 7  8 9  10 [
. 50
51
52
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were eliminated. One member of each pair was then randomly assigned 
to a given subtest, with the constraint that the "reversed items" 
were approximately balanced between the two scales. One item 
which had a high factor loading and popularity index but could 
not be paired off was placed on both versions of the DAS. Table 
3 presents the item statistics for the 100 items of the DAS along 
with the resultant shortened version of the scale that each item 
was placed on.
To verify that the two statistically-derived forms of the 
DAS were in fact parallel, another testing was arranged. Seventy 
undergraduates (20 males and 50 females) enrolled in a child 
development course at Montgomery Community College volunteered 
to participate. They initially received Form A of the DAS; one 
week later Form B was administered by the instructor of the course. 
The correlation between the total scores on Form A and Form B was 
.79. The mean score for Form A was 113.01 and for Form B, 113.73. 
Coefficient alpha (Cronbach, 1951) reliabilities of the two forms 
(DAS-A and DAS-B) were .86 and .87, respectively.
It is important to emphasize that I had decided a priori to 
treat the construct of cognitive distortions in this general manner. 
In writing the items I set down the essential rubies of the domain 
of Beck's theory to enable me to distribute equitably emphasis to 
the various classificatory subdivisions and to identify important 
attributes. However, the question was not so much whether by such
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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a priori efforts the best set of attributes in some absolute sense 
has been formulated as whether a set has been found which would 
enable me to cover most of the essential dimensions of depressogenic 
cognitions, even if these were confounded, overlapping, or otherwise 
not as clear-cut as later research might help to make them. I feel 
that the two 40-item forms of the DAS met this criterion and 
therefore, constituted the final versions selected for the in-depth 
validation study. A reproduction of the two forms of the DAS as 
finally administered may be seen in the Appendices E and F.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Table 3
100-Item form of the Dysfunctional Attitude Scaloi 
Keys, DAS Assignments, Means, S.D.'a, and Loadings3
Key for
adaptive
response
DAS
form
assignment Item Mean S.D.
Factor I 
loading
Agree
Disagree
Disagree
Agree
Disagree
Agree
Disagree
Agree
Agree
Disagree
Disagree
1. I can find happiness without being loved by another 5.19 1.74 .16
person.
2. People will probably think leas of mo if I make a 2.99 1.41 .47
mistake.
3. People who have the marks of success (good looks, 2.70 1.55 .46
fame, wealth) are bound to be happier than people
who do not.
4. There is no value in getting upset about making 4.00 1.54 .13
mistakes.
5. It is best to give up your own interests in order 2.64 1.43 .30
to please other people.
6. Criticism need not upset the person who receives 2.85 1.33 .17
the criticism.
7. I must be a useful, productive, creative person 5.26 1.53 .17
or life has no purpose.
0. I can find greater enjoyment if I do things 2.53 1.52 .14
because I want to, rather than in orde.r to please 
other people.
9. Dy controlling the way I interpret situations, I 2.94 1.39 .02
can control my emotions.
10. I should be happy all the time. 3.24 1.62 .23
11. Turning to someone else for advice or help is an 1.83 1.24 .34
admission of weakness.
01
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Table 3 (continued)
! Key for 
adaptive 
response
DAS
form
assignment Item Mean S.O.
Factor I 
loading
Disagree A 12. If people consider me unattractive it need not 
upset me.
4.10 1.58 .36
Disagree A 13. If you cannot do something well, there is little 
point in doing it at all.
2.35 1.36 .34
Agree A 14. I can be happy eVen if I miss out on many of the 
good things in life.
3.33 1.60 .23
Disagree B 15. If someone performs a selfish act, tills means he 
is a selfish person.
2.73 1.22 .29
Disagree A 16. What other people think about me is vory Important. 4.03 1.45 .35
Agree - 17. An unpleasant event does not make me sad. T make 
myself sad by what I tell myself.
4.03 1.69 -.06
Disagree A IB. If I ask a question, it makes mo look inferior. 2.05 1.35 .43
Disagree B 19. If a person is indifferent to me, it meaiiB he 
does not like me.
3.22 1.36 .48
Disagree B 20. People should prepare for the worst or they will 
be disappointed.
3.07 1.61 .31
Agree A 21. Happiness is more a matter of my attitude towards 
myself than the way other people feel about me.
2.54 1.39 .33
Disagree A 22. People should have a reasonable likelihood of 
success before undertaking anything.
3.30 1.52 .33
Disagree B 23. I should be able to please everybody. 2.00 1.34 .39
Agree - 24. If I demand perfection in myself, I will make 3.06 1.93 -.01
myself very unhappy.
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Table 3 (continued)
Kay for DAS
adaptive form Factor I
response assignment Item Moan S.D. loading
Agree
Agree
Agree
Disagree
Agree
Disagree
Disagree
Agree
Disagree
Agree
Disagree
Disagree
Disagree
25. Even though a person may not be able to control 
what happens to him, ho can control how lie thinks.
26. It is possible to gain another person’s respect 
without being especially talented at anything.
27. You can be a happy person without going out of 
your way in order to please other peoplo.
20. It is shameful for a person to display his
weaknesses.
29. It is not necessary to stop myself from doing 
something for my own welfare simply because it 
might displease another person.
30. If a person lias to be alone for a long period of
time, it follows that he lias to feel lonely.
31. A person should try to be best at everything he 
undertakes.
32. I can take responsibility only for what I do, not 
what other people do.
33. People who have good ideaB are more worthy than 
those who do not.
34. Just because I believe I deserve something, I have
no reason to expect that I will get it.
35. If a parson is not a success, then his life is 
meaningless.
36. Hi others dislike you, you cannot be happy.
37. Taking even a small risk is foolish because the 
loss is likely to bo a disaster.
3.14 1.71
1.75 1.17
2.90
2.00
2.53
4.70
3.55
2.60
3.37
1.70
1.12
3.03 1.45
1.45
1.91
1.70
1.34
1.70
2.07 1.30
.12
.30
.26
.35
.08
.32
.05
-.08
.44
-.03
.51
3.44 1.78 .41
2.07 1.02 .34
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Table 3 (continued)
Key for
adaptive
response
DAS
form
assignment Item Mean S.D.
Factor I 
loading
Agree - 3B. It is not necessary to become frustrated if one 
finds obstacles to getting what he wants.
3.26 1.43 .21
Disagree A 39. If I do not do as well as other people, it means 
I am an inferior human being.
1.90 1.15 .54
Agree B 40. I may be able to influence other people's behavior 
but 1 cannot control it.
1.96 1.06 .24
Disagree A 41. I should be upset if I make a mistake. 3.62 1.49 .39
Disagree 0 42. If I make a foolish statement, it means 1 am a 
foolish person.
1.73 0.00 .49
Disagree I) 43. A person cannot change his emotrional reactions 
even if he knows they are harmful to him.
3.42 1.63 .19
Disagree B 44. I should always have complete control over my 
fuelings.
3.55 1.62 .20
Disagree 11 45. My life is wasted unless I am a success. 2.30 1.56 .56
Disagree B 46. If puople whom I care about do not care for me, 
it is awful.
5.07 1.55 .30
Disagree A 47. If I fall at my work, then I am a failure as a 
poison.
2.21 1.31 .60
Agree B 4U. I can enjoy myself even when others do not like me. 3.97 1.64 .26
Disagrue A 49. If I don't set the highest standards for myself, I 
am likely to end up a second-rate purson.
3.04 1.74 .30
Agree B 50. I do not need other people's approval for me to bo 3.64 1.71 .41
happy.
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Table 3 (continued)
Key for
adaptive
response
DAS
form
assignment Item Mean S.D.
Factor I 
loading
Disagree A 51. If I do not do well all the time, people will not 
respect me.
2.16 1.13 .52
Disagree B 52. A person should think less of himself If other 
people do not accept him.
2.10 1.05 .52
Agree B 53. One should look for a practical solution to 
problems rather than a perfect solution.
2.44 1.28 .17
D19ugree A/B 54. My value as a purson depends greatly on what 
others think of me.
3.72 1.74 .49
Disagree B 55. If I do well, it probably is duo to chaugei if I 
do badly, it is probably my own fault.
2.20 1.32 .29
Disagree B 56. A person should do well at everything he undertakes. 2.03 1.53 .38
Disagree A 57. If someone disagrees with me, it probably 
indicates ho does not like me.
1.64 0.81 .42
Disagree B 50. The way to got to like you la to impress them with 
your personality.
3.70 1.76 .42
Disagree A 59. I cannot bo liappy unless most people I know admire 
me.
2.95 1.41 .56
Agree A 60. My own opinions of myself are more important than 
other's opinions of mo. .
2.70 1.50 .27
Disagree - 61. If I do not treat people kindly, fairly and con­
siderately, I am a rotten person.
4.66 1.69 .11
Disagree - 62. People should be criticized for making mistakes. 4.93 1.47 -.24
Agree A 63. It is possible for a person to be scolded and not 2.89 1.42 .17
yet upset.
Table 3 (continued)
Key to
adaptive
response
DAS
form
assignment Item Mean S.D.
Factor I 
loading
Disagree - 64. If I try liard enough I should he a'olo to excel 
at anything I attempt.
4.69 1.71 .00
Disagree A 65. It is difficult to be happy unless one Is good 
looking, intelligent, rich and creative.
1.0B 1.19 .51
Disagree A 6b. I cannot trust other people because thoy might be 
cruel to me.
2,17 1.30 .39
Agree A 67. I do ’.ot need the approval of other people in 
order to be happy.
3.71 1.01 .20
Disagree - 6B. It is necessary to have the help in order to cope 
with life’s problems.
5.20 1.45 -.15
Agree - 69. It is not possible for a person to accomplish 
everything he wants.
3.33 1.76 -.07
Agree - 70. There’s no value in criticizing myself for my 
mistakes.
5.52 1.10 -.06
Disagree A 71. It is awful to be disapproved of by people 
Important to you.
5.03 1.34 .20
Disagree A 72. If you don’t have other people to lean on, you 
are bound to be sad.
3.01 1.55 .32
Agree B 73. People will like me even if I am not successful. 2.25 0.94 .40
Disagree - 74. A person cannot survive without the help of 
other people.
5.10 1.57 -.03
Dlsagiee - 7b. I should get higher standards for myself than 
other people.
4.09 1.41 .21
Disagree A 76. If other peoplu know what you are really like,
• 1__  ..111 L1.1..I. 1___ _ _
2.00 1.11 .46
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Table 3 (continued)
Key for
adaptive
response
DAS
form
assignment Item Moan S.D.
Fautor I 
loading
Agree A 77. Making mistakes is fine because I can learn 
from them.
2.16 1.20 .30
Disagree B 70. If I put other people's needs before my own, they 
should help me when I want them to do something 
for me.
3.62 1.59 .42
Disagree B 70. Whenever I take a chance or risk I am only looking 
for trouble.
2.20 0.90 .40
Disagree A 00. If a person avoids problems, the problems tend to 
go away.
1.56 0.04 .24
Disagree B 01. I have to impress new acquaintances with my charm, 
intelligence, or wit or they won't like mu.
2.39 1.26 .64
Agree - 02. People can learn to be completely independent. 4.03 1.01 -.12
Disagree B 03. People should be criticized for their mlstakos. 3,50 1,55 .23
Agree - 04. No onu can hurt me with words. I hurt myself by 
the way I choose to react to their \/ords.
3.46 1.03 .09
Agree B 0B. Others can care for me even if they know all my 
weaknesses.
1.61 0.90 .35
Disagree B 06. I should try to impress other people if I want 
them to like me.
2.75 1.39 .55
Disagree A 07. if I fail partly, it is as had as being a complete 
failure.
2.06 1.16 .40
Disagree A 00. I am nothing if a person I1 love doesn't love me. 2.59 1.51 .53
Disagree B 09. Puople will reject you if they know your weaknesses. 1.91 0.97 .47
I
Reproduced 
with 
perm
ission 
of the 
copyright ow
ner. 
Further reproduction 
prohibited 
without perm
ission.
Table 3 (continued)
Key to
adaptive
response
DAS
form
assignment Item
Factor I 
Mean S.D. loading
Disagree
Agree
Disagree
Agree
Agree
Disagree
Disagree
Disagree
Disagree
Disagree
Disagree
90. A porson should be able to control what 
happens to him.
91. I can reacli important goals without slave 
driving myself.
92. My happiness depends more on other people than 
it does on me.
93. One can got pleasure from an activity regardless 
of the end result.
94. A person doesn't need to be well liked in order 
to be happy.
95. If a person I love does not love me, it means 
I am unlovable.
96. Being isolated from othors is bound to lead to 
unhappiness.
97. If a person asks for help, it Is a sign of 
weakness.
90. If I am to be a worthwhile porson, I must be
truly outstanding in at least ono major respect.
99. I ought to be able to solve my problems quickly
and without a great doal of offort.
100. To be a good, moral, worthwhile person, I must
help everyone who needs it.
3.80 1.50
3.30
3.20
2.40
3.23
1.64
4.11
1.69
3.17
3.00
3.77
1.50
1.50 
1.30 
1,47 
0.93 
1,78 
0.96 
1.67 
1.40
1.51
.10
.20
.36
.22
.37
.41
.19
.36
.51
.33
.26
vl
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CHAPTER III
The Validation of the Dysfunctional Attitude Scale 
The purpose of the present study was to further assess the 
appropriateness of the DAS-A and DAS-B for quantifying the extent 
to which individuals hold beliefs that predispose them to 
depression. Specifically, this study examined the reliability 
and validity of both forms of the DAS, primarily in terms of 
the instrument's internal consistency, stability, and degree 
to which it correlates with scores on several other brief 
psychological tests designed to measure personality factors 
that theoretically appeared closely related to the construct 
of dysfunctional thinking.
Methodology
Instruments
Three additional instruments were used in this validation 
study. They included the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck,
Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961), the Profile of Mood 
States (McNair, Lorr, & Droppleman, 1971), and the Story 
Completion Test (Hammen & Krantz, 1976). These instruments 
were chosen because they purported to measure cognitions 
related to the maladaptive beliefs of deprsssives, or because 
they were measures to which the DAS could be compared when 
testing the validating hypotheses. More specifically, the 
Beck Depression Inventory was chosen to test the hypothesis
73
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of a positive correlation between depressive affect and endorsement 
of dysfunctional attitudes. The Profile of Mood States was added 
in an attempt to determine whether the depressogenic beliefs 
assessed by the DAS are in fact unique to depression rather 
than characteristic of emotional upset in general. Since this 
scale gives data on moods other than just depression, it became 
important to investigate the relationship between these distorted 
attitudes and anxiety, fatigue, etc. Finally, the Story Completion 
Test was included as a means of testing the congruent validity of 
the DAS, since this scale purports to measure depressive-distorted 
responses by employing a different type of format.
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI). This scale (Appendix B) 
consists of 21 items, each referring to a symptom or attitude 
that reflects an overt behavioral manifestation of depression.
The BDI was designed to include all symptoms integral to the 
depressive constellation, and at the same time, to provide for 
grading the intensity of each. It was not designed to distinguish 
between diagnostic categories. Every item or symptom category of 
the BDI presents, for choice of response, four self-evaluative 
statements reflecting the intensity or severity of the symptom 
or attitude. For example, the individual chooses one of the 
following four sentences:
0. I do not feel sad.
1. I feel sad.
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2. I am sad all the time and I can't snap out of it.
3. I am so sad or unhappy that I can't stand it.
Depending upon severity, each statement is assigned a value from 0 
to 3. By assigning this numerical score for each symptom, the 
scoring system takes into account the number of symptoms reported 
by the individual. In addition, the intensity of each symptom
is registered by assigning graduated numerical values to each 
statement within a category. The individual's total score, which 
can range from 0 to 63, represents a combination of the number 
of symptom categories he has endorsed and the severity of the 
particular symptoms.
Each of the items was chosen on the basis of its relationship 
to the overt behavioral manifestations of depression; they do not 
reflect any theory regarding the etiology or the underlying psycho­
logical processes in depression (Beck, 1967). The 21 symptom-
tude categories are:
1. Mood 12. Social Withdrawal
2. Pessimism 13. Indecisiveness
3. Sense of Failure 14. Distortion of Body Image
4. Lack of Satisfaction 15. Work Inhibitions
5. Guilty Feeling 16. Sleep Disturbance
6. Sense of Punishment 17. Fatigability
7. Self-Dislike 18. Loss of Appetite
8. Self-Accusations 19. Weight Loss
9. Suicidal Wishes 20. Somatic Preoccupation
10. Crying Spells 21. Loss of Libido
11. Irritability
Rehm (1976) , in reviewing available instruments for the
assessment of depression notes about the BDI:
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"In general its psychometric properties are very
good, with its discriminant validity especially
notable. It is probably most suited to clinical 
populations but also seems to be useful with 
subclinical populations —  The nature of the 
questions on the BDI probably make this instru­
ment most useful as a selection criterion for 
behavioral research or as a pre- and post­
assessment measure." (p.140)
In a sample of 606 cases, an estimate of the reliability of the 
BDI was calculated by means of the split-halves method, with a
resultant coefficient of .93 (Beck & Beamesderfer, 1974). The
concurrent validity of the BDI was supported by a number of 
studies comparing the test scores with clinicians' global ratings 
of depth of depression. In Beck's (1961) validation study, the 
inventory was found to correlate .65 with the clinicians' ratings; 
in a drug study by Nussbaum, Wittig, Hamlon, & Kurland (1963) the 
correlation was .66; in a British study by Metcalfe & Goldman 
(1965) the correlation was .62.
The BDI has been well validated on both psychiatric and general 
medical patients (Metcalfe & Goldman, 1965; Schwab, Bialow, & 
Holzer, 1967b) and is easily administered in about 10 minutes.
Its scores correlate well (.75) with those from the Hamilton 
Rating Scale for Depression (Schwab, et al., 1967b) and with 
pretreatment (.75) and posttreatment (.69) scores on the 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, D-Scale (Nussbaum 
et al., 1963). In addition, there is strong support for the 
construct validity of the BDI (see Beck & Beamesderfer, 1974 
for a summary).
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Attempts have been made to classify depressive phenomena by 
the use of factor analysis. In his own studies, Beck (1961) 
obtained three factors from the BDI which he labelled: (1)
"Negative view of self and future," which was heavily loaded 
on sense of failure, expectation of punishment, self-dislike, 
self-accusation, and suicidal ideas; (2) "Physiological," 
which was heavily loaded on insomnia, anorexia, weight loss, 
and loss of libido; and (3) "Physical withdrawal," which was 
heavily loaded on work inhibitions, fatigability, and somatic 
preoccupation. Other researchers have found anywhere from 
one general factor (Delay, Pichot, Lemperier, & Mirouze, 1963) 
to 10 factors (Pichot, Piret, & Ayde, 1966).
As a screening device to detect depression among psychiatric 
patients, Beck (1961) found a cut-off point of 13 to be appropriate. 
For screening among medical patients, Schwab, Bialow, Brown, & 
Holzer (1967a) found that a cutting score of 10 was appropriate.
Profile of Mood States (POMS). This scale (Appendix C) is 
a 65-item, five-point adjective rating scale designed to measure 
subjective aspects of affect both economically and rapidly.
The present form is a refinement of a total of 100 different 
adjective scales by means of repeated factor analyses. The 
authors claim that "persons with at least a 7th grade education 
have little or no difficulty in understanding the POMS" (McNair, 
Lorr, & Droppleman, 1971).
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Instructions to the POMS read: "below is a list of words that
describe feelings people have;" for each word the respondent selects 
one of five responses that best indicates how he has been feeling 
"during the past week including today." The five possible responses 
are not at all, a little, moderately, quite a bit, and extremely. 
These intensity modifiers are rated on a four-point scale, with 
weights ranging from zero (not at all) to four (extremely). In 
the development of the POMS, six factors were extracted and 
replicated in a series of studies on a total of approximately 
2,000 male and female subjects, mainly psychiatric outpatients, 
but including some nonpatients (McNair, et al., 1971). The six 
factor-analytically derived mood states are Tension-Anxiety, 
Depression-Dejection, Anger-Hostility, Vigor-Activity, Fatigue- 
Inert ia, and Confusion-Bewilderment. To obtain a score for each 
mood factor, the sum of the responses is obtained for the 
adjectives defining the factor. All items defined in each 
factor are keyed in the same direction, except for "Relaxed" 
in the Tension-Anxiety Scale and "Efficient" in the Confusion- 
Bewilderment Scale. These items receive negative weights in 
calculating the factor scores. The possible score ranges for 
the six factors are:
Factor T, 0 - 3 6  (9 items); Factor D, 0 - 60 (15 items);
Factor A, 0 - 4 8  (12 items); Factor V, 0 - 3 2  (8 items);
Factor F, 0 - 2 8  (7 items); Factor C, 0 - 2 8  (7 items).
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Both internal consistency and test-retest reliabilities have 
been estimated for the six factors (McNair & Lorr, 1964). 
Internal consistency reliabilities (KR-20) range from .74 to 
.92, and test-retest correlations range from .61 to .69, the 
latter based on scores before and after four weeks of treat­
ment. Further support for the reliability of the POMS comes 
from the similarities of factor structure and loadings found 
in a number of studies (Lorr, Bastcn, & Smith, 1967; Lorr,
McNair, & Weinstein, 1963; McNair & Lorr, 1964).
The POMS has been used in short-term psychotherapy studies, 
both as a predictor and criterion (Haskell, Pugatch, & McNair, 
1969; Lorr, McNair, & Weinstein, 1963; Lorr & McNair, 1965).
In one study (Lorr, McNair, Weinstein, Michaux, & Raskin, 1961), 
a control group of 45 normals showed no significant changes on 
any of the mood measures after an eight-week interval, indi­
cating that the POMS may be unaffected by a "repeated measure" 
response set.
The manual also provides data on selected samples of normal 
college students who contributed normative data of nonpatients. 
Because so little variance was found to be associated with sex 
in factors measured with the POMS among normal subjects (340 
men and 516 women college students), tentative norms are 
presented for males and females combined (McNair, Lorr, & 
Droppieman, 1971). However, in both males and females, Vigor,
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Depression, and Tension discriminated most clearly between students 
and patients. In general, the score distributions for college 
samples are considerably more symmetric than those found in the 
patient samples (McNair et al., 1971).
Story Completion Test (SCT). To measure depressive cognitive 
processes, Hammen and Krantz (1975) constructed the SCT (Appendix 
D) , six hypothetical story introductions of potentially problematic 
situations common to college students. Following each story are 
presented multiple-choice questions (a total of 23 for the six 
stories) pertaining to the central character's feelings, thoughts, 
and expectations. The reader is forced to select from among four 
various response alternatives the one that most approximates his 
assessment of the character's likely response to the given 
situation. The rationale behind this technique is similar to that 
for certain other projective tests, such as the TAT and Beck's 
Focussed Fantasy Test (Beck, 1961). The way in which the reader 
structures an ambiguous stimulus is assumed to reflect his own 
perceptions of himself and of external reality.
The four response options to each question were carefully 
tailored to include one of each of the following: Depressive-
distortion, depressive-nondistorted, nondepressive-distorted, 
and nondepressive-nondistorted. "Distortion" is defined here as 
logically unjustified conclusions which are drawn from available 
information. Three of the six stories in the questionnaire have
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mainly social-interpersonal thanes, and the other three have 
predominantly achievement-competence themes. As an example, 
in one story Peggy is depicted as a member of an organization 
who has been encouraged by friends to run for presidency. She 
eventually loses the election. The reader is instructed to 
"put yourself in Peggy's place, and try to imagine as vividly 
as you can what she thought and felt." The first item is:
"When you first heard you'd lost, you immediately:"
a. Feel bad and imagined I've lost by a landslide, 
(depressive in tone - distorted in terms of 
logical inference based on information provided 
in the story.)
b. Shrug it off as unimportant. (nondepressive-distorted)
c. Feel sad and wonder what the total counts were, 
(depressive-nondistorted)
d. Shrug it off, feeling I tried as hard as I could, 
(nondepressive-nondistorted)
Analyses revealed that neither sex of the subject nor story theme
appears to be a determinant of distortion level.
Each story was developed to contain specific examples of 
Beck's (1967, 1970) categorizations that exemplify depressed 
individuals. "An effort to construct the depressed-distorted 
response options to depict equal numbers of categories of such 
distortions as arbitrary inferer^e, selective abstraction, 
overgeneralization, maximization of negative or minimization 
of positive, proved unsuccessful" (Krantz & Hammen, in press).
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However, the distortion responses are all examples of some type 
of distortion described by Beck.
Coefficients of internal consistency are only moderately 
high (.61 to .79) but according to Krantz and Hammen (in press), 
they may reflect the lack of homogeneity of the items and the 
short length of the questionnaire (only 23 items). Content 
validity has been shown by interjudge agreement of at least 
80% on the four scoring categories for each item. Moderate 
congruent validity (r = .31) with Byrne's Repression-Sensi- 
tization Scale (Byrne, 1964), which also measures distortions 
in a somewhat different sense, has been established (Krantz 
& Hammen, in press).
Data from a number of samples strongly support the hypothesized 
tendency of more depressed persons to give a greater number of 
replies. Hammen and Krantz (1976) found that depressed women 
had significantly greater depressed-distortion scores than did 
nondepressed women (F^  (1,61) = 8.24, p  < .01). In another 
study (Hammen & Peters, 1978) students were given instructions 
to role-play a depressed or a nondepressed person and then to 
complete the questionnaire as they imagined a depressed student 
would answer. Depressed-role-players gave a significantly 
higher proportion of depressed-distorted responses than did 
students asked to respond in a nondepressive fashion (F (1,49) =
5.46, p. < .05), it should be noted that the students were not 
given information about depressive cognitions.
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Dysfunctional Attitude Scale (DAS). As discussed in Chapter II, 
the test format employed in the DAS was that of the typical self- 
report attitude scale. A modified Likert (1932) method of scaling 
was used, with summative scoring over a seven-position response 
scale for each item. The DAS (Appendices E and F), comprising 
two statistically-derived parallel forms of 40 items each (DAS-A 
and DAS-B), measures specific distortions in thinking as 
discussed by Beck (1967). Even though individual item scores 
are available, I decided that the DAS is to be primarily a single 
scale instrument, i.e., one that yields a single total score.
For both Forms A and B, the possible range of scores is from 
0 to 280.
For utility in administration, scoring and processing 
of data, the DAS may eventually be presented to subjects in the 
form of a reusable test folder with a separate answer sheet 
capable of being processed by the IBM Optional Scanner. In 
addition, either of the 40 item forms of the DAS should involve 
a testing time of less than 15 minutes.
Subj ects
From September to December, 1977, after two years of item 
writing and pilot testing, I attempted a rigorous validity 
study on the DAS-A and DAS-B. Originally 356 subjects volunteered, 
but one individual was excluded from the analyses as he was involved 
in therapy at the initial testing. This sample was composed of
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undergraduates enrolled in an introduction to psychology course 
at the University of California in Los Angeles (71%) and 
graduate students enrolled in an educational psychology course 
at either Beaver College or the University of Pennsylvania (29%).
Demographic characteristics are presented in Table 4.
There was a predominance of females (73%), and most of the 
respondents were Caucasian (70%). Ages ranged from 16 to 55, 
with the majority falling between 16 and 21 (Median age was 21). 
Seventy-nine percent of the sample were single. In addition, 
seven percent of the undergraduate students had part-time jobs, 
while all of the graduate students were employed. Application 
of Hollingshead's Two-Factor Index of Social Position (1965) 
to the 101 graduate students revealed a high concentration 
(89%) of respondents from the higher socioeconomic groups 
(I and II on this five-point scale). The mean reported 
grade-point average was 3.41.
At the time of initial testing, 14% reported having had 
contact with a professional (physician, social worker) within 
the month prior to completing the test battery, four people 
had had previous inpatient psychiatric treatment approximately 
40 months ago, and 9% more reported some form of outpatient 
treatment around 17 months earlier. Of the individuals who 
revealed a history of former therapeutic treatment, 79%
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rated their experience as being a success. Table 5 presents 
the clinically relevant background characteristics.
Procedures 
Admi nistration of Instruments
All of the testing was carried out by group administration 
under the supervision of the course's professor. Each subject 
was given a packet of instruments containing a questionnaire 
requesting demographic information and data pertaining to 
prior and present psychiatric treatment and the four test 
instruments, i.e., the POMS, the DAS-A or DAS-B (pretests 
will hereafter be referred to as DAS-A^ or DAS—B^), the BDI, 
and the SCT. The examiner instructed the participants in 
the proper procedure to be followed in taking each instrument. 
Eight weeks later a very similar packet of information was 
administered to the subjects: demographic and clinical data,
the BDI, the POMS, and the DAS-A or DAS-B (posttests will be 
referred to as DAS-A2 or DAS-B2 hereafter). Since the SCT 
was used primarily for the investigation of congruent 
validity of the DAS, it was not readministered in the 
post-testing.
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Table 4
Demographic Characteristics of the Sample 
(n = 355)
Variable Frequency Percent
Sex
Male 97 27.3
Female 258 72.7
Race
Black 31 8.7
White 249 70.2
Latin American 10 2.8
Other 65 18.3
Age (years)
16-21 241 68.0
22-27 52 14.6
28-33 31 8.7
34-39 14 3.9
40-45 11 3.1
46+ 6 1.7
Marital Status
Single 279 78.6
Married 64 18.0
Cohabitation 3 0.9
Divorced 9 2.5
Religious Background
Atheist 14 3.9
Agnostic 28 7.9
Protestant 89 25.1
Catholic 80 22.5
Jewish 85 24.0
Other 59 16.6
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Table 4 (continued)
Variable Frequency Percent
Last Grade Completed
Partial High School 4 1.1
High School Graduate 163 45.9
Partial College 82 23.1
College Graduate 55 15.5
Graduate Professional 51 14.4
Training
Occupation
Student 254 71.5
Unskilled Blue Collar 3 0.8
Clerk, Secretary, Office 7 2.0
Worker
Teacher 81 22.8
Professional 10 2.9
Employment
Employed full-time 84 23.6
Employed part-time 45 12.7
Not applicable (students) 226 63.7
Grade-Point Average
1.0 - 1.9 2 0.6
2.0 - 2.9 20 5.6
3.0 - 3.9 138 38.9
4.0 26 7.3
Not applicable 169 47.6
(1st semester Freshman)
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Table 5
Clinically Relevant Background Characteristics of the Sample
(n = 355)
Variable Frequency Percent
Contact with a professional 
within the last month
No 305 85.9
Yes 50 14.1
Prior inpatient psychiatric 
treatment (4-36 mos. prior)
None 351 98.9
One experience 1 0.3
More than one 3 0.8
Success of prior inpatient 
treatment
Successful 4 1.1
Unsuccessful 0 0.0
Not applicable 351 98.0
Prior outpatient therapy 
(4-96 mos. prior)
None 322 90.7
Single evaluation 4 1.2
One therapy session 6 1.6
More than one 23 6.5
Success of outpatient therapy
Successful 26 7.3
Unsuccessful 7 2.0
Not applicable 322 90.7
Presently involved in therapy
No 355 100.0
Yes la NA
a Dropped from all analyses.
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In an attempt to get data on both forms of the DAS used as 
a pre- and posttest, a counterbalanced design (see Figure 2) was 
set up. The entire group of 355 subjects was divided into 
approximately two random halves, one half taking DAS-A^ 
followed by DAS-B2 (n = 185), the other half taking DAS-E^ 
followed by DAS-A2 (n = 170). Formulae for linear equating 
(Thorndike, 1971, p. 573) cf the two forms were applied to 
the obtained data.
Processing of the Data
As the test booklets were received, the author handscored 
the data and copied them on to IBM Coding Sheets, from which 
they were then keypunched on to cards by operators at Uni-Coil, 
the main computer center at the University of Pennsylvania.
Every subject was given a unique identification number, and 
cards were sequence-punched to allow ready identification 
and prevent possible mishandling errors. The on-line storage 
system at Uni-Coil was employed to set up a disk as a means 
of storing the data.
Each individual had four cards of data, two for the initial 
testing data and two for the posttest eight weeks later. Output 
from the scoring program provided: (1) 40 item scores and one
total score for the DAS, with a code indicating whether it was 
DAS-A or DAS-B; (2) 21 item scores and one total score for the 
BDI; (3) six subscale scores for the POMS; (4) 23 item scores
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and one total score for the SCT; and (5) 15 (see Tables 4 and 5) 
demographic variables for each testing. The only exception to 
this rule ncis that the SCT was administered solely during the 
pretest and was therefore not represented in the posttest data 
output.
The Statistical Programs for the Social Sciences (SPSS), a 
"canned" program which is a part of the Uni-Coll Statistical 
Library, was employed for most of the data analyses. Product- 
moment correlations and descriptive statistics were secured by 
specific programming or as part of the computer output from 
some of the other analyses. An additional program was written 
by Andrew Baggaley, Professor of Education, University of 
Pennsylvania, to compute the standard error of the difference 
between two coefficients of correlation, which was needed as 
part of the cross-lagged panel design, a statistical procedure 
inherent in the design of the experiment.
Demographic Variable Relationships
Age, sex, and level of education were correlated with DAS, 
BDI, POMS, and SCT scores, and the values were investigated for 
significant relationships. In addition, t tests were performed 
to investigate the significance of differences between mean 
scores on the instruments by gender and education level (based 
on median split).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Figure 2 
Design of the Research
Group Pretest Measures Posttest Measures
BDI
POMS: T-Scale 
D-Scale
Group A V-Scale
(ri = 185) A-Scale
F-Scale
C-Scale
DAS-A-
SCT
Demographic Questions 
Clinical Questions
BDI
POMS: T-Scale
D-Scale
A-Scale
F-Scale
C-Scale
das-b2
Demographic Questions 
Clinical Questions
Group B 
(n = 170)
BDI
POMS: T-Scale 
D-Scale 
V-Scale 
A.-Scale 
F-Scale 
C—Scale
DAS-B^
SCT
Demographic Questions 
Clinical Questions
BDI
POMS: T-Scale 
D-Scale 
V-Scale 
A-Scale 
F-Scale 
C-Scale
DAS-A2
Demographic Questions 
Clinical Questions
a Posttest measures were administered 8 weeks after the initial 
testing.
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Psychometric Properties of DAS-A and DAS-B 
Reliability
One of the most important qualities that a measurement 
device should possess is reliability, which can encompass the 
extent to which the test is consistent in measuring whatever 
it does measure, dependability, stability, and relative freedom 
from errors or measurement (Thorndike, 1971). Frequently the 
reliability of a test refers to the degree to which the items 
measure the same underlying characteristic (homogeneity or 
internal consistency), although quite often the term is also 
applied to calculations of temporal stability and equivalence 
between forms. Both internal consistency and temporal 
stability coefficients were calculated for DAS-A and DAS-B.
Two methods of evaluating the internal consistency of 
both forms of the scale were used. First, the data of 355 
subjects were analyzed, and the scores for each of the 40 
items were compared with the total scores on the DAS. This 
analysis was performed for DAS-A and DAS-B when used as both 
a pre- and a posttest. The second method employed was 
coefficient alpha, a generalization of the KR-20 formula, 
developed by Cronbach (1951) for use when the items are not 
scored dichotomously.
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Inherent in the counterbalanced design was the fact that 
parallel forms of the DAS (DAS-A and DAS-B) were administered 
to the subjects at two different testings. These two forms 
were empirically derived to measure the same characteristics, 
but they comprised different questions. To test whether 
these two forms sampled the same domain, correlations were 
calculated between the scores on the two administrations of 
the DAS, eight weeks apart (i.e., DAS-A^ was correlated with 
DAS-B2 and DAS-B^ was correlated with DAS-A2 )- This procedure 
reflects both changes in scores due to trait instability and 
changes in scores due to item specificity. However, because 
the DAS-A and DAS-B consisted of different items, a linear 
scaling approach (Thorndike, 1971) was employed to equate 
the scores from the two forms. A test-retest correlation 
was then performed to test the difference in magnitude 
between the coefficient obtained by correlating these 
equated scores (pre-post) and the one obtained prior to 
converting the scores.
Validity
I regarded the degree of validity to be the most important 
aspect to be tested. Validity can be defined as the degree to 
which a test is capable of achieving certain aims (Mehrens & 
Lehmann, 1973). Predictive use is dependent upon criterion- 
related validity, and descriptive use is dependent upon content
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and construct validities. For the sake of simplicity, validity 
of the DAS will be discussed under two main categories, 
corresponding to the categories used in the APA's Standards for 
Educational and Psychological Tests (1966). These categories, 
however, are far from independent.
1. Content Validity was emphasized as an important (though 
not sufficient) characteristic of the items, since there is now 
substantial empirical evidence for the importance of the content 
validity of inventory items (i.e., Duff, 1965; Goldberg & Slovic, 
1967; Norman, 1963; Wiggins, 1966). Since content validity is 
related to how adequately the content of the test samples the 
domain about which inferences are to be made, there is no 
commonly used numerical expression for it. Instead, it is 
determined by a thorough inspection of the items. The content 
validity of the DAS has been described in depth in Chapter II.
2. Construct Validity refers to the degree to which scores 
on a measure permit inferences about underlying traits. When 
measurement is attempted in a new domain where no external 
criterion for validation exists, it is necessary to establish 
validity in terms of the relationships of scores on the new 
measure with theoretical constructs. As Cronbach and Maehl 
(1955) and Cronbach (1971) pointed out, the most relevant 
information dealing with personality variables is obtained
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from an assessment of construct validity, which involves the 
testing of various hypotheses in an experiment that uses the 
test as a criterion measure.
One of the most appropriate methods of establishing construct 
validity is through factor analysis. Therefore, items on the 
DAS were intercorrelated. The data were then subjected to a 
principal-components factor analysis, with varimax rotation 
to simple structure. A general factor of "distorted 
thinking" was hypothesized; i.e., one that involves primarily 
negative self-evaluative cognitions and related behavioral 
manifestations. In addition, it was assumed that the other 
resulting factors could be interpreted within Beck's theory 
(see Chapter II).
In addition, the construct validity of a measure is 
determined by setting up a number of hypotheses regarding the 
personality variable (dysfunctional thinking in this case). If 
the hypothesis is confirmed in an experiment using the test as 
a criterion measure, the validity of the instrument is supported.
Four research hypotheses were tested in this investigation 
of dysfunctional thought processes: (1) There is a positive
relationship between depressive affect and endorsement of 
dysfunctional attitudes, i.e., individuals who have a tendency 
to think more negatively (endorse more dysfunctional attitudes) 
are likely to feel more depressed than persons whose thinking
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reflects the absence of these negative cognitive processes.
(2) Test-retest (stability) correlations for scores on the 
cognitive measure are significantly higher than those for the 
affective measures; i.e., cognitive patterns are more persistent 
over time than depressed mood. (3) The presence of depressogenic 
schemas is more associated with depressed mood than with other 
mood disturbances (i.e., anxiety, as measured by the POMS).
(4) There is a directional relationship leading from changes 
in thinking to changes in affect, i.e., the greater capacity 
for dysfunctional attitudes (depressogenic distortions in 
thinking) is causally prior to a greater level of depressive 
affect. However, because the population being studied is 
primarily a non-therapeutic "normal” college sample, displaying 
various other life-stress situations which are not controlled 
for, the results may indicate a bidirectional relationship 
instead of one pattern of directionality dominating. Within 
Beck's framework, though, the common-sense expectation is 
that the causal hypothesis of changes in cognition leading 
to changes in affect is more plausible than the reverse 
sequence of changes in affect leading to changes in cognition.
Much of this analysis is based on the application of a 
relatively novel and powerful quasi-expsrimental method of 
causal inference, the "cross-lagged panel correlational 
technique" (Campbell, 1963; Campbell & Stanley, 1963; Crano,
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Kenny, & Campbell, 1972; Kenny, 1975; Pelz & Andrews, 1964; 
Rozelle & Campbell, 1969), which allows the inference of 
causal relations from correlational data. According to this 
technique, panel data can be analyzed to indicate which of 
two variables A and B, each measured at Time I and Time 2, 
is more likely to have causal priority over the other. If 
A determines B, rather than the reverse, then the cross­
lagged correlation A^B2 should exceed B^A2 (see Figure 3).
In employing this method, I decided to let variable A 
represent the DAS score and variable B either the BDI or 
the POMS. The remeasurement interval was set at eight 
weeks.
It was expected that the correlations between variables 
A and B at pre- and posttesting (the simultaneous correlations) 
would both be positive and of about the same magnitude (the 
magnitude depending on errors in measurement and the extent 
to which other factors affect B). The test-retest correlations 
for variables A and B (lagged correlations) similarly should be 
high if the tests employed are reliable and the time lag between 
testing sessions is not extreme, as this will reflect the 
consistency in each variable over time.
Hypothesis #1 was tested by examining the resultant 
simultaneous correlations; hypothesis #2 by examining the test- 
retest correlations; and, hypothesis #4 by examining the
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cross-lagged correlations; i.e., the diagonals. The Pearson- 
Filon test, a statistical procedure described by Peters and 
Van Voorhis (1940), was used in each of these analyses to 
test the difference between the two coefficients of correlation 
that have no array in common.
In addition, because the value of the DAS for psycho­
therapists and for diagnostic personnel may lie in its 
capability for identifying specific features of distorted 
thinking, tests of the DAS' discriminative power were also 
performed. DAS total scores (DAS-A and DAS-B) were compared 
among subjects grouped according to levels of: (1) depression,
as measured by the BDI; and (2) mood state or affect as 
measured by the POMS. I hypothesized that both forms of the DAS 
are sensitive enough to discriminate among the groups when 
blocked on the aforementioned variables. Statistical significance 
of these results was tested by one-way analyses of variance.
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A, A.
Figure 3. Cross-lagged panel correlation paradigm (A and B are 
variables and 1 and 2 are times.)
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CHAPTER IV 
Results and Discussion 
This chapter presents a discussion of the psychometric 
properties of the DAS-A and DAS-B. Included in this presentation 
are (1) data on the linear equating of the DAS-A and DAS-B; (2) the 
reliability findings; and, (3) the results of the validation study. 
Equating of DAS-A and DAS-B Scores
During the last 15 or 20 years, with the appearance of new 
testing programs and the further development of old ones, all 
requiring the administration of interchangeable test forms, many 
new designs and methods have been developed and refined for the 
equating of test scores (Angoff, 1971). If equating is properly 
executed, it becomes possible to merge data even when the separate 
sets of data derive from different forms of a test (i.e., DAS-A and 
DAS-B) with somewhat different item characteristics. It becomes 
possible also to compare directly the performance of two individuals 
who have taken different forms of a test. What is being sought is 
a conversion from the units on one form of a test to the units on 
another form of the same test.
In the method used to equate scores on DAS-A with scores on 
DAS-B, it is assumed that the practice effect on DAS-B (as a 
result of having taken DAS-A first) and the practice effect of 
form DAS-B on DAS-A (as a result of having taken DAS-B first) 
are proportional to the standard deviations of the two tests
100
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(Lord, 1950) . Substituting the data from DAS-A and DAS-B into 
the respective equations (Thorndike, 1971, p. 574) resulted in 
the following linear equation for making the scores on the DAS-A 
equivalent to scores on DAS-B:
Y = .978 X  + 3.43, where
X = score on DAS-A
Y = score on DAS-B
By applying this conversion, one can express all pre- and posttest 
scores in equivalent units, regardless of which form of the DAS 
was administered. This statistical equating of the two forms 
made it possible to perform some of the following analyses. 
Descriptive Statistics
Table 6 gives descriptive statistics for the total group on 
each variable examined in the study. On all scales, pre- and 
post, it is possible for a subject to deviate as much as two- 
and-a-half standard deviations above the mean and from one to 
one-and-a-half standard deviations below the mean. The 
variances are sufficiently large for adequate discrimination; 
and only seven of the nineteen possible extreme scores were 
attained by anyone in the sample of 355 subjects. (See Table 
6). Since users of the tests would be primarily concerned with 
discrimination between high scorers rather than low scorers, the 
positive skew of the score distribution on all the scales is 
desirable. (Notice that the skewness of the Vigor scale of the
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Table 6
Descriptive Statistics for the Assessment Instruments 
(n - 355)
Pretest Poattest
Instrument Mean S.D.
Std.
Error
Max.
Value
Min.
Value
Skow-
noos Mean S.D.
Std.
Error
Max.
Value
Min.
Value
.Skew­
ness
POMSi
T-Scale 13.02 6.99 0.37 35.00 0.00 0.64 12.57 7.37 0.39 36.00 0.00 0.77
D-Scale 11.47 10.43 0.55 50.00 0.00 1.42 11.36 11.12 0.59 50.00 0.00 1.73
A-Scale 8.34 7. 17 0.30 34.00 0.00 1.16 9.19 0.70 0.47 40.00 0.00 1.67
V-Scale 17.14 6.09 0.32 32.00 2.00 -0.19 16.06 6.32 0.34 32.00 1.00 0.00
F-Scale 10.77 6, 52 0.35 20.00 0.00 0.43 10.10 6.60 0.35 20.00 0.00 0.64
C-Scale 9.12 4.03 0.26 23.00 0.00 0.62 0.94 5.56 0.30 20.00 0.00 0.01
DDI 5.91 5.29 0.20 33.00 0.00 1.54 5.74 5.09 0.31 36.00 0.00 1.05
SCT 1.35 2.08 0.11 14.00 0.00 0.59 - - - - - -
DAS 117.75 26.03 1.42 216.00 52.00 0.44 119.36 27.17 1.44 215.00 40.00 0.51
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POMS is slightly negative, however; the pathological end of this 
scale is reversed in that low scores reflect mood disturbance.)
In general, the descriptive statistics for all the assessment 
variables show acceptable values.
Relationship to Demographic Information
Although no specific hypotheses were made with regard to 
demographic variables, I thought it necessary to examine the 
relationships among the assessment variables, sex, race, age, 
and educational level. When the data of the 355 individuals 
included in the research were correlated with these background 
variables, the following findings resulted:
1. Sex. Table 7 presents data on the assessment instruments 
by sex. There was a significantly negative correlation (point 
biserial r_ = -.12) with the scores on the T scale of the POMS 
at pretesting; i.e., males had significantly higher levels of 
anxiety than the females (t^  (354) = 2.19, ji <-05). This finding 
is contrary to that of other researchers (Burnett & Thompson, 
1963; Taylor, 1966; Wheeler, 1965) and to typical clinical 
experience, wherein substantially more females than males appear 
at outpatient facilities for treatment (Jones, 1968). Scores 
on the posttest revealed the same trend, but this was not 
significant.
Males also tended to score significantly higher than females 
on the converted scores of the DAS at both pretesting (a: = -.09,
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p. <£. 05) and posttesting (r = -.13, £<f .01). Additional analyses of 
these data revealed statistically significant differences in mean 
performance on the posttest only (£ (354) = 2.46, £  C .01). There 
is no theoretical basis for predicting differences in frequency 
of depressogenic attitudes, and the obtained male-female differences 
are not directly relevant to the theoretical notions of idio­
syncratic beliefs in depressed persons.
Lastly, gender correlated with the BDI score (r = .11, £<T. 05) , 
with females having a higher level of depression at pretesting than 
males (t (266) = -2.54, £<.01). This difference was not present 
at posttesting. Similar findings, i.e., women having higher levels 
of depression than men, were found by Beck (1967) and appear to be 
quite prevalent in the literature.
2. Race. The correlations between race and each of the 
assessment variables, both at pre- and posttesting, were nonsig­
nificant and close to zero.
3. Age. Older subjects tended to obtain somewhat lower 
scores on the Confusion Scale of the POMS at both pre- and post­
testing (r = -.09 and -.16, respectively). This finding is con­
sistent with those of McNair, Lorr, & Droppleman (1971) in their 
validation of the POMS. All other correlations with age were 
negligible.
4. Educational level■ Using educational level as an index
of social class, I found a significant negative correlation between
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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educational level and SCT score (r_ — -.19), as well as converted 
pre- and posttest DAS scores (r = -.14 and -.20, respectively).
Thus, subjects with lower educational attainment tended to score 
higher on the SCT and DAS than did those with a higher level of 
education. While the reason for this discrepancy is not 
immediately apparent, it may be due to a response set in less- 
educated subjects.
In general, even these significant correlations were small, 
accounting for at most four percent of the variance; thus, 
suggesting that scores on the assessment variables were almost 
independent of background measures.
Reliability of the DAS-A and DAS-B 
Internal Consistency
Two methods of evaluating the internal consistency of the DAS-A 
and DAS-B were used, item-total correlations and coefficient alpha 
(Cronbach, 1951), a generalization of the KR-20 formula. Because of 
the nature of the counterbalanced design that was employed, both of 
these methods had to be calculated four separate times: For Form A
of the DAS when used as a pretest (DAS—A^) and as a posttest (DAS-A2) , 
and then, for Form B of the DAS as a pretest (DAS-B^) and a posttest 
(DAS-B2)-
Initially, item statistics were obtained from the 355 subjects 
(Table 8), and the score for each item was then compared with the 
total score on the scale of which it was a part (i.e., DAS—A^,
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DAS-A2, DAS-B^, DAS-B2) for each subject. The resultant correlation 
coefficients ranged from .25 to .76 (all significant at the .001 
level). Therefore, each item has a significant positive correlation 
with the total DAS score under each of the four conditions. In 
addition, the differences in means on the same items, when used 
as a pre- and posttest, were negligible, in fact, they were no 
more than one-fifth of a standard deviation.
The second method of evaluating internal consistency was the 
determination of coefficient alpha for each form of the DAS. Each 
of the resultant coefficients was judged to be quite acceptable 
(Mehrens, & Lehmann, 1973) : DAS-Aj, = .89; DAS-B^, r = .89;
DAS-A2, r = .92; DAS-B2, r = .90.
Tesb-Retest Reliability
Traditional methods of assessing the stability of depressogenic 
distortions were employed, correlating the initial with the eight- 
week scores on the DAS for the entire group. Because of the nature 
of the counterbalanced design, i.e., the fact that parallel forms 
of the DAS (DAS-A and DAS-B) were administered to the subjects at 
different testings, two analyses were conducted. The first 
investigated whether both forms of the DAS sampled the same domain 
of distortions, as well as their stability, and a second tested the 
overall temporal stability of the converted pre and post DAS scores.
Initially, total scores on the two adminstrations of the DAS 
given eight weeks apart were correlated: DAS-A-^ scores were
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Itea Slalletlcs for Bach fora of U m  DAS Under Varying Condition*
UAS-Aj (ii -185) DAS (n - 185)
Item
Ho All !>.».
I tea*
Hoan 3.0. thTMZWon
1 2.40 1.59 .57 1 2.96 1.43 .20
2 2.51 1.36 .32 2 2.99 1.55 .57
3 3.15 1.55 .52 3 3.82 1.64 . J6
4 2.50 1.63 .64 4 2.40 1.41 .44
5 2.19 1.52 .37 5 2.90 1.43 .37
6 2.14 1.50 .31 6 3.19 1.66 .50
7 1.05 1.65 .60 7 3.30 1.69 .60
U 1.55 0.99 .45 8 1.00 1.17 .54
9 1.96 1.13 .62 9 3.62 1.69 .40
1.7 2.06 1.50 .53 10 3.16 1.40 .46
11 2.23 1.40 .45 11 2.30 1.31 .51
12 2.16 1.23 .27 12 2.06 1.23 .46
1J 1.06 1.04 .46 13 4.S4 1.71 .36
14 2.02 1.35 .47 14 2.96 1.52 .16
IS 2.25 1.49 .49 15 3.22 1.01 .54
16 2.22 1.63 .55 16 3.18 1.73 .49
17 2.63 1.61 .25 17 4.36 1.76 .31
!U 3.72 1.67 .27 18 2.31 1.38 .:n
19 1.49 1.76 .64 19 3.57 1.81 .42
20 4.15 1.94 .45 20 3.60 1.74 .35
21 1.67 1.7/ .65 21 3.81 1.65 .51
it 2.97 1.54 .49 22 1.92 1.12 .58
21 3.68 1.65 .411 23 2.52 1.53 .47
24 2.01 1.57 . 19 24 4.71 1.46 .26
25 4.24 1.61 .33 25 2.51 1.46 .54
.’6 2.04 1.35 .47 26 3.29 1.4b .41
2/ 5.10 1.50 . 16 27 3.01 1.45 .41
211 4.09 1 . /(I .41 28 3.79 1.65 .12
20 2.91 1.50 .211 29 3.27 1.67 .44
10 1.25 1.60 . 15 30 3.60 1.64 .35
11 2.26 1.26 .46 31 2.59 1.35 .40
12 2.91 1.71 .43 32 3.24 1.61 .34
11 2.24 1.26 .40 13 2.30 1.13 .30
14 2.76 1.57 .54 14 2.10 1.02 .58
IS 3. 14 1.711 .46 35 3.20 1.51 .26
10 1.07 1.26 .26 36 2.6) 1.25 .20
17 1.69 1.79 .19 37 2.27 1.43 .47
In 4. SO 1.76 .55 HI 3.02 1.58 .43
10 4. OH 1 .61) .35 J9 1.75 1.09 .14
40 5. IO 1 .711 .25 40 3.17 1.73 .41
' Tito wording of ««clt Ilea tvm UJVS-A ai m! 
»le* All ourrolatlons are algnlfleant at
OAS-n Bay be found 
tins ,001 level,
In Append1ceti E ami f
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T ftb le  8  ( v u n t . )
tu is ~ 0 In  •  17o> IMS-A ( t i -  170)
I l « V
Mean s .U . iorreTaHon
I teat*
Mean S.D. K SST3I
1 3 .2 6 1 .6 6 .2 9 1 2 .2 0 1 .2 0 .3 7
i 3 .0 2 1 .6 7 .6 3 2 2 .3  2 1 .2 0 .32
) 1 .71 1 .8 5 .51 ) 2 .8 5 1 .5 2 .6 9
4 2 .1 9 1 .3 3 .33 4 2 .6 6 1 .4 8 .5 3
5 2 .7 4 1 .3 6 .44 5 2 .4 2 1 .6 4 .3 2
0 2 .6 2 1 .6 3 .51 6 2 .4 2 1 .4 5 .4 6
7 7 .7 6 1 .7 0 .6 7 7 3 .2 3 1 .7 4 .5 6
U 1 .7 5 1 .2 4 .7 6 n 1 .6 6 1 .1 9 .5 4
V 3 .6 0 1 .5 7 .2 7 9 2 .0 0 1 .4 0 .5 7
Ml 3 .1 5 ’ 1 .4 7 .5 7 10 2 .1 8 1 .3 2 .6 8
11 2 .0 9 1 .3 0 .71 l i 2 .C 2 1 .5 3 .6 2
12 1 .9 6 1 .2 6 .45 12 2 .3 0 1 .3 0 .2 7
t ) 4 .5 6 1 .7 8 .32 13 1 .0 9 0 .9 5 .61
14 2 .9 6 1 .6 6 .29 14 2 .0 9 1 .2 6 .5 9
IS 3 .1 9 1.00 .47 15 1 .9 5 1 .2 7 .57
16 2 .9 4 1 .6 5 .51 16 2 .6 2 1 .5 6 .67
17 4 .6 0 1 .9 6 .3 9 17 2 .3 5 1 .4 6 .3 7
III 2 .0 4 1 .2 5 .5 0 10 3 .0 3 1 .3 0 .4 7
IV 3 .1 8 1 .8 3 .41 19 3 .3 5 1 .5 9 .7 1
20 3 .4 7 1 .7 6 .4 8 20 3 .4 8 1 .7 3 .5 0
21 J . 40 1 .6 3 .5 3 21 3 .4 3 1 .7 9 .6 0
22 1 .75 1 .1 1 .5 6 22 2 .0 6 1 .5 3 .61
21 1 .9 6 1 .2 6 .47 23 3 .4 0 1 .6 6 .54
24 4 .  38 1 .8 2 .34 24 2 .6 9 1 .4 0 .3 7
2S 2 .4 0 1 .5 9 .62 25 3 .5 0 1 .6 9 .4 6
?<♦ 3 .2 9 1 .6 1 .41 26 2 .0 5 J . 34 .5 6
27 2 .7 6 1 .4 8 .42 27 4 .5 5 1 .7 0 .51
211 3 .4 0 1 .7 7 .2 6 28 3 .2 6 1 .0 4 .4 6
2*1 2 .6 1 1 .6 1 .3 7 29 2 .0 8 1 .4 6 .5 7
in 3 .4 0 1 .7 0 .4 0 30 3 .0 0 1 .4 5 .5 3
II 2 .3 8 1 .2 6 .6 0 31 2 .1 1 i  .0 9 .5 0
12 1 .2 9 1 .8 0 .1 6 32 2 .7 0 1 .6 1 .7 0
I I 2 .2 8 1 .2 4 .2 7 13 2 .0 9 1 .1 4 .3 9
14 2 .1 3 1 .1 6 .60 34 2 .7 2 1 .6 0 .6 4
35 3 .2 7 1 .6 7 .3 4 15 3 .6 0 1.110 .3 0
36 2 .2 5 1 .1 0 .2 6 36 1 .9 1 1 .2 ) .4 3
37 2 .1 V 1 .3 9 .53 37 3 .7 2 1 .6 9 .2 9
III 3 .5 5 1 .7 5 .52 10 4 .5 4 1 .6 0 .5 4
IV 1.112 1 .2 3 .33 19 4 . 10 1 .67 .41
40 2 .4 1 1 .6 0 .3 9 40 4 .7 1 1 .7 7 .2 9
*TIh» MKtllnq of each ltc» frm* M S -A  *wl DAS-B *«y 
M o lu i All rortnlallona ate significant a t  t l ie  .°O I
be found 
level,
lit A|>peti(11c«t* E aim)  r
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correlated with DAS-B2 for the 185 individuals who took the tests 
in this sequence, and DAS-B^ scores were correlated with DAS-A2 
for the remaining 170 subjects. The resultant product-moment 
correlations were .80 and .81, respectively. Thus a substantial 
degree of trait stability is reflected but these values may 
involve a lower-bound estimate of reliability because of the 
procedure employed, as well as the slight changes in scores due 
to item specificity- Therefore, for the 355 individuals in the 
total sample, converted pretest scores (defined by the linear- 
scaled scores of DAS-A^ and DAS-B^) were correlated with the 
converted posttest scores (linear scaled scores of DAS-A2 and 
DAS-B2) resulting in a stability coefficient of .84. Although 
this result is slightly higher than those obtained by the first 
method, the difference in magnitude is very small.
The obtained stability coefficients are well within the .80 
to .90 levels expected of measures of stable personality charac­
teristics. These results indicate that the rank-orderings of 
scores is approximately the same on repeated occasions, in spite 
of item specificity on each form of the DAS- These indications 
of good stability over an eight-week period could be useful in 
determining experimental or therapeutic change.
In addition, I had decided to analyze the data from item #54 
of the original 100-item DAS, which was included in both the DAS-A 
and DAS-B. Results indicated no significant differences among the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Ill
mean scores for the various testings: DAS-A^: Mean = 3.49,
s.d. = 1.76; DAS-A^: Mean = 3.35, s.d. = 1.59; DAS-B^: Mean = 3.48,
s.d. = 1.63; and DAS-B2 : Mean = 3.81, s.d. = 1.65. The content of
this item seemed to be more closely associated with the domain 
being tested on Form A of the DAS, but the correlation coefficients 
were not significantly different (DAS-A^: r^ = .64, £<-001: DAS-A2:
x_ = .71, ©.<.001; DAS-B^: r_ = .53, p^.OCl; and DAS-B2: r_ = .51,
£<•001). Lastly, correlations for this item over time were 
investigated on the individual level. Each subject's score on this 
item at pretesting correlated with his score at posttesting (2: = .95, 
£<.001) , indicating high temporal stability of this item.
Validity of the DAS 
The American Psychological Association's manual, Technical 
Recommendations for Psychological Tests and Diagnostic Techniques 
(1954) recommends the use of congruent validity and construct 
validity criteria in evaluating personality tests (Beck &
Beamesderfer, 1974). Therefore, the validity results will be 
presented according to these categories.
Congruent Validity
Correlation coefficients were computed between the DAS and the 
six subscales of the POMS, the BDI, and the SCT (see Table 9) to 
evaluate the congruent validity. (In these analyses, the all- 
inclusive term "DAS" refers to the mathematically equated scores 
for Forms A and B. Therefore, every subject has one "pretest
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T a h it i 9
Inkorco iro laL lonu  Among thu Auiiuautnont V ariab lua  
(n “ 355)
Varlabluui T I) A
Prokeuk 
V F
Vai'labloB i 
C DD1 SCT DAS T D
Pouktoet Variablesi 
A V P C ODI DAS
Prukuakt
POMS I
T-Scale 1.00
O-Soalu .70 1.00
A-Soale .60 .65 1.00
V-Scale -.34 -.4U -.20 1.00
F-Scalo .49 .46 . 4 J -.20 1.00 1
C-Scale .65 .69 .51 -.35 .51 1.00
UI3I .59 .70 .51 -.40 .47 .50 1.00
SCT .36 .42 .32 -.30 .25 .29 .44 1.00
DAS .34 .40 . 33 -.23 .31 .30 .36 .52 1.00
Poukluaki
POMS i
T-Scale .63 .45 .36 -.24 .30 .47 .46 .29 .33 1.00
D-Scale .51 .62 .41 -.29 .36 .40 .50 .39 .30 .76 1.00
A-Scalo .45 .49 .57 -.20 .33 .36 .40 .26 .32 .63 .75 1.00
V-Scalo -.26 -.27 -.15 .53 -.21 -.23 - 30 -.22 -.22 -.43- -.45 -.33 1.00
F-Scalu .39 .35 .35 -.19 .56 .33 32 .19 .27 .57 .53 .52 -.37 1.00
C-Scale .40 .49 .30 -.23 .36 .62 45 .27 .35 .71 .70 .64 -.41 .56
1.00
UDI .45 .51 .35 -.30 .37 .39 .66 .37 .37 .65 .73 .57 -.44 .44 .64
1.00
DAS .32 .40 .27 -.22 .27 .34 37 .40 .04 .30 .44 .30 -.25 .20 .39 .47 1.00
Nokui ji (• OS) “ .111 (.01) “ .l!i (i^  " 300)
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score" and one "posttest score," regardless of which form of the 
DAS was actually taken.) Resultant values were examined for 
significance in accordance with the sample size and the a priori 
assumptions regarding the expected relationships.
It was anticipated that the DAS would have a moderate positive 
correlation with scores on the SCT, a purported measure of 
depressive-cognitions. The correlation between the two scores 
was .52 (p. <.001), indicating some similarity between the constructs 
being tested by each of these measures. The data in Table 9 also 
support research hypothesis #1, i.e., that there will be a positive 
correlation between depressive affect and endorsement of dys­
functional attitudes. For the pretest measures, the DAS correlated 
.40 (p. ^ .001) with the D-Scale of the POMS and .36 (p< .001) with 
the BDI. These associations were slightly stronger for the posttest 
measures, r = .44 (p<.001) for the D-Scale of the POMS and r = .47
. CGI) for the BDI. Also supported is the assumption that 
individuals who endorse a greater number of depressogenic attitudes 
or schemas tend to feel more depressed than those individuals whose 
thinking reflects the absence of these negative beliefs.
Scrutiny of the intercorrelations in Table 9 provides insight 
into the dominant characteristics of individuals whose thinking 
contains the idiosyncratic beliefs measured by the DAS. According 
to the correlational data from the DAS and the POMS, these 
individuals tend to be more tense or anxious, to have feelings of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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depression accompanied by a sense of personal inadequacy, to have 
a mood of anger and antipathy towards others, to display lack of 
vigor and low energy, and to be characterized by bewilderment and 
muddleheadedness. However, since the DAS was constructed to assess 
depressogenic beliefs, it seemed important to question whether the 
items on both forms of the scale are unique to depression rather 
than characteristic of emotional upset in general- Although the 
D-Scale of the POMS had the highest correlation with the DAS at 
both pre- and posttesting (.40 and .44, respectively), all the r 
values were significant at least at the .05 level. However, this 
result may be an artifact caused by the high intercorrelations 
among the factor scores for this sample (i.e., depression with 
confusion, r_ = .69 at pretesting; depression with tension-anxiety, 
r_ = .76 at posttesting). In an attempt to control statistically 
for the effects of these other variables, partial correlations 
were performed. Table 10 presents the results (for pre- and post­
testing) when each mood factor score was correlated with the DAS 
and the effects of the other mood factors controlled. The findings 
suggest that, for the pretest sample, depressed mood and confusion 
alone were associated with distortions in thinking when the effects 
of the other mood states were controlled. However, on the posttest 
data, depressed mood supplied the only significant partial corre­
lation. Similar analyses conducted by Krantz and Hammen (personal 
communication, 1978) on the SCT resulted in the finding that
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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distortion, as measured by that scale, is associated -with depressed 
mood and fatigue alone.
Construct Validity
The hypotheses that X tested in my investigation of distortions 
in thinking are: (1) Depressed subjects are more likely to have
dysfunctional attitudes thar nondepressed subjects; (2) Depressogenic 
schemas are more persistent over time than depressed feelings; and
(3) There is a time-related association between depressogenic 
attitudes and depressed mood, possibly quasi-causal in nature.
Effects of level of depression. Of critical interest are 
issues pertaining to construct validity, and the central question 
is the relationship between depressed mood and degree of distorted 
responding. As mentioned earlier (Table 9}, college students who 
endorsed more depressogenic attitudes tended to feel more depressed. 
However, in an attempt to answer this question more fully, the total 
group was divided into "depressed" and "nondepressed" subgroups.
By applying the suggested cutoff score (Schwab et £.1., 1967a), 75 
students who obtained a score of 10 or more on their initial BDI 
were considered to be mildly to moderately depressed. Based on 
this split, scores on the DAS were analyzed (see Table 11).
As hypothesized, the more depressed persons endorsed more of 
the depressogenic attitudes (see Table 11). DAS scores of the 
depressed group were significantly higher than those of the non-
j*
depressed group at both pre- and posttesting (t (353) = 4.634,
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Table 10
Partial Correlations of DAS Responses with Mood 
(Controlling for Remaining Moods)
Mood States a Testing Time
Pretest Posttest
Tension-Anxiety -.01 .05
Depression-Dej ection .10 * .12 **
Anger-Hostility .06 .07
Vigor-Act ivity -.05 -.06
Fatigue-Inertia .07 -.00
Confusion-Bewilderment .15 ** .06
a Mood states were measured by the POMS subscales.
* fi<.05 
** pC.Ol
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
117
CD e
C o
•H
O' J->
C 0
o
Jj
a CXI
a
j j a
XJ a
9) «
0
H & a
*0 h
© e 0
H to a
S i X
0 1 O'
e* © o
u
C t o
£
JJ XI
0 a
a
a o
©
u oo >•
0 9
w cw
cn < Q
3
5
Qa
z|
e
cj 0  —« oOi 
I O O H •<
jz  O a  
o «s a 
>» jj 0o a
a* a  o
cO o
O  m
«m  m «
«
CN
in
r * i
©  (A
r ?  m
n  h
H  H
CD O
O ' cn ««
©  ^ «
r>
CN
O'
r -  cn
O ' ^
f l  TT
H
O  o
vD w
O' in «
CN CN 4
n
©
V0 10
CN ^
O  "T
n  <—i
H  H
W 10
o  © «
«
V  CN «
r*
r*
r>**-t
a  m
o  r - *
r— o
CN
TJ
0
Q
*0 B o
0  © sa  w H
a  a 0
o  © >h  *o
c« s 1
o  o
Q  Z - 1
a
a
o
*ooe o
o
\s
a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
118
£<.301 and t (353) = 5.419, £<.001, respectively). Values of 
coefficient alpha for DAS-A^, DAS-A^, DAS-B^, and DAS-B2 were 
recomputed to see if the more depressed subjects would show 
different internal consistency on the test. In each case, the 
reliability of the test increased in the depressed group, though 
not significantly.
Stability and Change in Distortion and Mood. The simple 
test-retest correlations between DAS scores at pre- and post­
testing reflect a substantial degree of stability. As mentioned 
earlier, in the total group of 355 individuals the test-retest 
coefficient was .84 (£< .001) over a period of eight weeks. In 
comparing this to the test-retest coefficents of the BDI (.6 6 ) 
and the D-Scale of the POMS (.62) , I found the DAS to be a much 
more stable measure (Z^  = 5.50, p<.001 and ]Z = 6.21, p.<-001, 
respectively). This finding can be taken as additional evidence 
of construct validity, as one goal of the research was to design 
a reliable and valid trait measure of depressogenic attitudes.
A closer look at Table 11 reveals that, although distortion 
scores, as measured by the DAS, tend to be relatively stable, they 
also seem to vary according to changes in mood level, as predicted 
by Beck's theory. To further investigate this, subjects whose 
depression level had increased over time were compared with those 
whose level of depression had decreased. Because the BDI scores 
were associated with gender, males and females were analyzed
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separately (see Table 12). Differences in DAS scores at retesting 
were nonsignificant. Whether the male subject became more or less 
depressed was not reflected in his DAS scores; i.e., his dysfunctional 
attitudes remained constant. For females, however, those who became 
more depressed increased in their distortion score (t (78) = 2.78,
P. <.01). This same analysis was then done in reverse, i.e., a 
comparison was made by gender of BDI scores of subjects whose level 
of distortion had increased over time versus those whose level of 
distortion had decreased. These data are presented in Table 13. 
Although all of the fluctuations are in the predicted direction 
(i.e., those who increased in level of distortion increased in 
level of depression, and those who decreased in level of dis­
tortion decreased in level of depression), none of these changes 
were statistically significant.
At this point, one may legitimately raise the question of the 
direction of the relationship between depressogenic schemas (attitudes) 
and emotional affect. Does the greater capacity for distorted think­
ing result in a higher level of depression, or is the progression 
more accurately described as one in which depression influences 
distorted thinking? Probably both of these causal progressions 
operate to a certain degree (see Table 12 and 13); i.e., it's a 
bidirectional relationship. The activation of certain schemas 
might well cause the increase of depressive affect, which in turn 
activates additional schemas, etc. But while some reciprocal
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Table 12
Distortion Scores for Males and Females 
By Changes in Depression Level
Depression DAS Score
Level3 Sex Pre Post t-value
Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Became less 
depressed
Male
(n=41)
121.05 21.32 124.34 21.17 1.17
Female
(n=127)
115.75 26.19 114.15 24.66 -0.83
Became more 
depressed
Male
(n=34)
127.68 28.57 131.47 29.12 -0.90
Female
(n=79)
119.60 29.08 124.86 30.22 2.78 **
a Defined by the score on the BDI at posttesting minus the initial 
BDI score. A negative difference score means the individual 
became less depressed during the eight week testing period.
** p  <.01
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Table 13
Depression Scores for Males and Females by Changes in 
Dysfunctional Attitude Endorsement
Distortion DAS Score
Level3, Sex Pre Post t-value
Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Thinking 
contains 
more dys­
functional 
attitudes
Male
(n=56)
4.64 4.03 5.36 5.25 1.11 (NS)
Female
(n=133)
6.34 5.26 6.79 6.29 0.37 (NS)
Thinking 
contains 
less dys­
functional 
attitudes
Male
(n=38)
5.40 3.34 5.34 4.35 0.11 (NS)
Female
(n=108)
6.14 6.30 5.21 6.15 1.93 (NS)
a Defined by the score on the DAS at posttesting minus the initial 
DAS. A negative difference score means the individual endorsed 
fewer dysfunctional attitudes during the eight week testing 
period.
121
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feedback system of this type is conceivable, it is likely that a 
preponderant causal pattern exists, and the resolution of this 
issue motivated the following investigation.
Data were analyzed by means of the cross-lagged panel 
correlational method, a quasi-experimental design (Campbell, & 
Stanley, 1963; Kenny, 1975). In this method, the inference of 
causality is based primarily upon the rule of time precedence.
In all sciences, when an event consistently precedes the occurrence 
of another, and the opposite does not hold, one of two possibilities 
is entertained: (a) Event 1 is seen as a cause (though possibly
only one of many) of Event 2, or (b) Events 1 and 2 are viewed 
as the effects of some more general causes (Crano, 1973). In the 
experimental arena the controlled application of Event 1 effectively 
precludes the possibility of the second alternative, and thus 
changes in Event 2 (usually termed the dependent variable) are 
attributed to the application of Event 1 (the dependent variable).
In spite of the fact that I was unable to control life stress 
events in this study (i.e., schemas may or may not have been 
activated), I decided to analyze my data by this method to see 
how this trait measure (the DAS) would be affected by changes in 
mood.
Intercorrelations among the pre- and posttest scores for the 
total group on the BDI, POMS (D-Scale), and DAS were employed in 
this analysis- If, as espoused by the cognitive theorists, changes
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in one's cognitive organization precede changes in affect, the 
following should be observed:
—14 >  ^ —13 = £2 4)>*23' where
1 = DAS pretest score
2 = DAS posttest score
3 = BDI or POMS pretest score
4 = BDI or POMS posttest scores.
Inherent in this formula is the assumption that the two simultaneous 
correlations (£13 and £ 2 4) should be stable over time. The results 
are shown in Table 14. The pairs of cross-lagged relationships 
between depressogenic attitudes and depression (£^4 and £2 3 ) were 
not different when either the BDI or the POMS was used as the 
measure of affect (Z = .07 and -.37, respectively). In addition, 
it was found that the cross-lagged correlations were slightly 
lower than the simultaneous correlations for both analyses and, 
the simultaneous correlations were not steady over time when 
the analysis employed the BDI (Z = 2.57, p. <.01). This instability 
itself might have upset rhe predicted inequalities in that oth^r 
factors may be affecting one’s level of depression, i.e., life- 
stress situation, and these uncontrolled factors varied more at 
one time than at another. Perhaps, too, a period of eight weeks 
was either too long or too short to match the causal interval (if 
indeed a causal asymmetry existed).
It became apparent that this scheme was operating under an 
additional constraint, the stability of the DAS over time. One 
of the assumptions inherent in the cross-lagged design is that if
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Table 14
Cross-Lagged and Other Correlations Between 
Depressogenic Attitudes and Affect 
(n = 355)
DAS.84
.37
.36
.37
BDI. S- BDI. 66
Using BDI as measure of affect
.84DAS
.40
.44.40
(D-Scale)
DAS
POMS.
(D-Scale)
Using POMS (D-Scale) as measure of affect
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one variable is highly consistent, then all cross-correlations 
must take very similar values, and the predicted difference in the 
two diagonal correlations has little opportunity to appear. In 
an attempt to free the relationship from this constraint, the 
technique of partial correlations was applied in order to 
investigate: (1) the possible effect of an individual's pre-
DAS score on his post-BDI, over and above what could be predicted 
simply from his pre-BDI, as well as (2) the effect of an individual's 
pre-BDI score on his post-DAS performance, over and above what is 
predictable from his pre-DAS.
Table 15 presents the data for the cross-lagged relationships 
(for both the BDI and the POMS), using the first-order partial 
correlations along the diagonals. Whether the BDI of the POMS 
(D-Scale) was used as the measure of affect, the results were 
in the hypothesized direction according to cognitive theory, 
i.e., schemas affect, but nonsignificant (Z = 1.40 and 1.04, 
respectively).
Based on these data, we truly cannot assert any priority; 
perhaps both depressogenic attitudes and affect influence each 
other, or both are influenced by a third factor. With the 
stability of attitudes or of affect over time (i.e., becoming 
progressively more stable, or less stable), this method runs 
into difficulty. However, since the same analysis, using the 
partials, approaches significance, it leads one to assume that
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table 15
First-Order Partial Correlations Between 
Attitudes and Affect for Cross-Lagged Relationships
(n = 355)
DAS.84DAS
t v
.13
.47
.20
BDI ^
Using BDI as the measure of affect
DAS
.13
.44.40
.13
p o m s 2
(D-Scale)
.62P0MS1
(D-Scale)
Using POMS (D-Scale) as the measure of affect
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affect is subject to the effect of other factors and the extent to 
which they affect it may alter the results. Within Beck's theory, 
this other factor may be the "cognition," i.e., the conclusion one 
draws from the depressogenic attitude and the only thing the 
individual is aware of. Data also tend to support the notion 
that the interval of remeasurement may not match the true causal 
interval since: (1) the cross-lagged correlations (diagonals)
are not always greater than the simultaneous (or vertical) 
correlations, and (2) these simultaneous correlations are not 
statistically equal. However, even if one has selected an 
interval of remeasurement larger or smaller than the causal 
interval, there is reason to believe the predicted inequalities 
will appear, provided that variable A (depressogenic attitudes, 
in this case) is reasonably consistent over time (Pelz &
Andrews, 1964).
In a final attempt to explore further the theory of a 
preponderant causal pattern existing, I repeated the foregoing 
for the depressed (BDI score ^  10) and nondepressed (BDI score 
10) subgroups separately. Analyses based on the zero-order 
correlations, using both BDI and POMS scores, revealed that 
for both groups the pairs of w u o b -lagged relationships were 
not different. However, when the analyses were repeated using 
the first-order partials, results showed a small but consistent 
difference in the predicted direction in the four comparisons
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(see Table 16). The average difference was .21, and all four of 
them were statistically significant. When the effect of the scores 
on the initial DAS were partialled out, the correlations between 
initial BDI score and final DAS score approached zero. Therefore, 
the expected differences do appear when the initial state of the 
"resultant" variable is partialled out. These findings are 
interesting within the cognitive paradigm; however, the results 
are purely suggestive. Further controlled research is needed 
before one can draw unambiguous conclusions about the maintaining 
role of attitudes (or schemas) in depression.
Differences in DAS Scores by Levels of Depression. Because
the DAS was designed as a screening instrument (i.e., to identify
those maladaptive beliefs which are typical of depression), the
cardinal test of its usefulness should involve a determination of
its ability to identify persons with certain characteristics. To
determine the power of the DAS to discriminate among individuals
with varying levels of depression, the total group was divided
into 3 subgroups according to pre- or posttest scores on: (1) the
BDI and (2) the POMS (D-Scale). In a previous analysis, I had
examined the DAS scores by separating the group into depressed and
nondepressed subsamples according to the suggested cutoff scores
for a "normal" population. In this analysis, I decided to apply
the clinically determined cutoff scores (Beck, 1967) on the BDI
for comparison when these analyses are repeated at a later date 
in a psychiatric population.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table 16
First-order Partial Correlations for 
Depressed and Nondepressed Groups
Using BDI as the Measure of Affect
Group DAS, 3DI_ * BDI,
X  ^ X
BDI1 DAS2* DAS-j^ Difference
Nondepressed
(n=281)
.23* .07 .16 *
Depressed
(n=74)
.17 -.08 .25 **
* p£.05 
** p. 01
Using POMS (D-Scale) as the Measure of Affect
Group DAS1 POMS2 • POMS-l POMS1 DAS 2 * DASjl Difference
Nondepressed
(n=281)
.23 * -.06 .29 **
Depressed
(n=74)
.17 .01 .16 *
* ,p<.05
** p.^.01
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When the BDI scores were used as the criterion measure, three 
subgroups were obtained by applying the predetermined cutoff scores 
(Beck, 1967): normal range of depression (0-9); mildly depressed
(10-15); and, moderately to severely depressed (16+). Mean DAS 
scores were determined for each of these groups, and a one-way 
analysis of variance (see Table 17) was performed (F (2,352) =
15.58, 51 001 for the pretest scores and F (2,352) = 38.22,
p  001 for posttest) . Newman-Keuls post hoc analysis of the 
data indicates that: (1 ) the moderately to severely depressed
group has significantly higher DAS scores than both the normal 
and mildly depressed groups at pre- and posttesting; (2) the 
difference in means between the mildly depressed and normal group 
was just short of significance (p. ^ .08) for the pretest scores; 
and (3) the mildly depressed group had higher DAS scores than 
the normal group at posttest (£<.05).
The total group was then divided into thirds based on the 
percentile scores for Scale-D reported in the Instruction Manual 
for the POMS (McNair, Lorr, £ Droppleman, 1971). Mean DAS scores 
were calculated for both pre- and posttests for each of these 
subgroups and then subjected to another one-way analysis of 
variance (F (2,352) = 31.55, £ <  .001 at pretest; F_ (2,352) = 29.35, 
fc.<\001 at posttest). Similar results were obtained from the Newman- 
Keuls post hoc analysis, i.e., the top third had significantly higher 
DAS scores than the middle or bottom thirds of the group. In
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Table 17
DAS Scores by Levels of Depression as 
Measured by the BDI
it.
Pre BDI Score Pre DAS Score
N Mean S.D. Test P
Normal (0-9) 281 114.43 25.14
Mild (10-15) 54 124.72 25.55 F = 15.58 .001
Moderate to
Severe (16+) 20 145.20 34.97
r = .36
Post BDI Score Post DAS Score
Mean S.D. Test £. »
Normal (0-9) 282 114.05 23.55
Mild (10—15) A O•aw 131.94 27.34 F = 38.22 .001
Moderate to 
Severe (16+) 25 154.68 31.76
r = .47
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addition, the lower and middle thirds did not differ significantly 
at either testing (see Table IS).
A closer look at the mean scores in Tables 17 and 18 seem to 
suggest that there may be a curvilinear relationship between the 
DAS and the two measures on affect. This hypothesis will have to 
be tested at a later date with a sample which is not as skewed 
toward the normal end. However, these results affirm the construct 
validity of the DAS by the "known-groups method" (Crano & Brewer, 
1973). In this technique various groups of persons know to differ 
on the attribute being tapped by the DAS were compared. If the 
DAS is really a measure of depressogenic attitudes, groups "known" 
to be different should generate clearly discriminable scale scores. 
The data clearly support this reasoning in a sample of nonpsychiatric 
college students.
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Table 13
DAS Scores by Levels of Depression as 
Measured by the POMS D-Scale
Pre POMS(D-Scale) 
Scores
Pre DAS Scores
N Mean S.D. Test £
0-33rd percentile 
(bottom)
122 108.67 21.01
34th-66th percentile 
(middle)
113 112.24 25.35 F = 31.55 .001
67th-100th percentile 
(top)
120 132.23 27.65
r = .40
Post POMS(D-Scale) 
Scores
Post DAS Scores
N Mean S.D. Test 2.
0-33rd percentile 
(bottom)
122 109.85 22.21
34th-66th percentile 
(middle)
113 114.76 22.53 F = 29.35 .001
67th-100th percentile 
(top)
120 133.45 30.07
r = -44
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CHAPTER V 
Final Comments 
Evaluation of the Dysfunctional Attitude Scale
The primary purpose of this research was to validate as 
measurable constructs the ideas Beck has proposed as dys­
functional attitudes and to design a written instrument 
sufficiently reliable and valid for research purposes to 
measure the extent to which persons hold these beliefs. On 
the basis of the data presented, it appears that this goal 
has been met successfully. Both forms of the DAS, consisting 
of 40 items each, have been shown to exhibit homogeneity and 
stability reliability, as well as content, congruent and 
construct validity.
These findings show that the DAS can be used in further 
research involving cognitive depressogenic attitudes, thereby 
providing a research tool or aid not before available. In 
addition, this instrument could be of considerable value not 
only as a screening device but perhaps also as a way into 
treatment. Many psychiatric populations are remarkably 
disinclined to verbalize psychological discomfort although 
they are more than ready to talk about somatic complaints.
An instrument such as the DAS should be of value in at least 
orienting these individuals towards slightly more cognitive 
appraisal of their current situation and problems. The
134
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exploratory clinical use of the DAS (not incorporated as part of 
this study) has shown many advantages offered by it. Like other 
clinical instruments, it provides an economical and simple short­
cut to greater understanding of the nature of the patient's problem, 
in this case, by providing the therapist with information about his 
patient's dysfunctional thought pattern. Most importantly, the DAS 
affords a means of objectively measuring progress in therapy.
By going into the entire population, one can find individuals 
who may exhibit amounts of depression equal to those exhibited by 
individuals who come for treatment but who themselves never cross 
the threshold of a clinic or a therapist. This was true of 
approximately one-third of the sample investigated in this study.
A knowledge of why they fail to do so may unearth some of the 
hidden factors separating the "ill" from the "well" as well as 
reveal individuals who need treatment but for some reason do not 
get it. Additional studies should be run to determine which items 
on the DAS most clearly distinguish the severely depressed individual 
from the depressed normal. It is hypothesized from the data 
presented that the thought processes will distinguish the two 
groups, not the central mood factor. They can be equally sad, 
lonely, etc., that is, equally depressed in mood, however; it is 
their dysfunctional attitudes which will be most revealing. A 
person experiencing a mild disturbance in his feelings or behavior 
may not be aware of his depressogenic schemas or attitudes - even
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though they are accessible to consciousness- In such cases, the 
attitudes do not attract his attention, although they can exert 
an influence on how he feels and acts. By concentrating on these 
thoughts, however, he can easily recognize them. This phenomenon 
can be observed in people who have recovered from the acute phase 
of a psychological disturbance or who are only mildly disturbed 
(Beck, 1976).
Despite the present usefulness of the instrument as developed, 
a number of possible improvements could be made. Additional items 
should be gathered and analyzed to furnish a larger item pool.
Not only may weaker items be replaced, but both forms of the 
scale may be lengthened slightly. Work should also be done to 
improve the instructions so as to eliminate confusion in responding. 
Many individuals cannot separate how they "think" (which is what 
the directions to the DAS state) from how they "feel" and this 
affects their results. According to Beck (1976), it is important 
for the individual to be able to make the distinction between "I 
believe" (an opinion that is subject to validation) and "I know"
(an "irrefutable" fact). The ability to make this distinction 
is of critical importance in modifying the patient's reactions that 
are subject to distortion.
In short, in spite of the psychometric properties of DAS-A and 
DAS-B which were presented, like any development it should continue 
to be improved for maximum utility.
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Questions Raised by the Data 
Dysfunctional Attitudes and Gender
Both the pre-scores and post-scores on the DAS showed a mild 
relationship with sex; i.e., males tended to get higher scores on 
the tests than females, a finding which was not expected. Although 
these differences were quite small, one possible explanation could 
be that the sample of males (only 27% of the total) was not equi­
valent to the sample of females. One other reason for this result 
is possibly that DAS-A and DAS-B may be testing dysfunctional 
attitudes which are sex related; i.e., success-oriented items 
versus interpersonal ones. Prior research (Beck, 1967; 1976) 
has supported the notion that females are far more sensitive to 
interpersonal situations, i.e., needing to be loved., while males 
are more sensitive to failure, and items related to work situations. 
A detailed content analysis should be performed and the mean scores 
for males and females compared (according to content) to see if 
this explanation is valid. This analysis could be combined with 
the detailed factor-analytic study proposed in Chapter 2. 
Discriminative Validity
More detailed studies must be performed to determine the power 
of the DAS to discriminate among various psychiatric groups. It is 
important to know that not only does the DAS discriminate among 
normals at varying levels of depression (shown in this study) but 
that the instrument is also sensitive enough to discriminate among
137
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depressed psychiatric outpatients, nondepressed psychiatric 
outpatients and nondepressed or depressed nonpsychiatric 
outpatients. If, as Beck's theory predicts, people with 
psychiatric disorders will have more dysfunctiona’ attitudes 
than those without psychiatric disorders, it is important to 
test whether the DAS is sensitive enough to reflect this.
In addition, a specific test of whether dysfunctional 
attitudes can be identified in a normal population and 
subsequently correlated with psychopathological symptomatic 
expression in individuals endorsing dysfunctional attitudes 
has not yet been undertaken. In order to conduct such a 
study, it would be necessary to identify a large subject 
population having the capacity to follow prospectively and 
measure repeatedly both their attitudes and their psycho- 
pathological symptoms. Furthermore, it would be important 
to identify specific life-stresses for the subject population 
in question. A study should be conducted to test the hypothesis 
that dysfunctional attitudes in normal subjects will be pre­
dictive of subsequent psychopathological symptomatology. Based 
on data reported in this study, it would be hypothesized that 
the greater the degree of endorsement of dysfunctional attitudes, 
the more frequent and/or the more severe the psychopathological 
symptomatology to be expected. Also, that specific life-stresses
will interact with previously endorsed dysfunctional attitudes 
to result in psychopathological symptomatology.
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Relationship Between Depression and Distortion
Additional research is required to demonstrate the nature of 
the relationship between depression and schemas, or, more generally 
between affect and depressogenic attitudes. The cognitive theory 
of emotional disorders (Beck, 1976) specifies the nature and degree 
of cognitive distortions in the specific psychopathological states. 
The theory suggests that cognitive changes precede the development 
of symptoms and the relief of symptoms. According to Beck (1976):
"In formulating his approach to depression, 
it is important for the therapist to dis­
tinguish among symptom, technique, and 
underlying attitudes. For example, the 
symptom may be affective, such as crying 
spells, sadness, loss of gratification, 
loss of sense of humor, apathy. The 
therapeutic approach may be behavioral, 
for example, mobilizing the patient into 
more activity and positively reinforcing 
certain types of activity. The under­
lying attitude, however, is the component 
that needs to be changed ultimately if 
the totality of the depression is to be 
influenced. Thus, the goal is cognitive 
modification." (pp. 267-268)
Data from this study did not fully support this view, primarily 
because of a number of methodological problems: (1) I was unable to
control events in this study, i.e., schemas may or may not have 
been activated, and this affected my correlations and therefore, 
the "quasi-causal" conclusions; (2) The DAS was such a stable 
measure that the cross-correlations took on similar values and 
predicted differences in correlations has little opportunity to 
appear; (3) The interval of remeasurement may have been larger or
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smaller than the causal interval; (4) There is the possibility that 
other factors are affecting one's level of depression. Since Beck's 
(1967; 1976) theory is stating that the affect comes directly from 
the cognition (which is a result of the depressogenic attitude), it 
may be this factor which has an intermediate effect; and, (5) the 
cognitive view of emotions may not fully explain the etiology of 
depression.
Additional research on this issue is required, especially that 
which employs seme behavioral indices, rather than exclusively self- 
reports, on depressogenic schemas and their consequences. This 
multimodal approach to research is most likely the best way to 
facilitate one's understanding of dysfunctional attitudes.
Implications for Beck's Position 
To the extent this study was structured to do so, the results 
show confirmation of Beck's theoretical system and position. Kis 
theory of dysfunctional attitudes in depressives was shown to be 
accurate in that they are functionally distinct constructs 
measurable in a normal, college population. Although causal 
relationships were not fully confirmed, the existence of highly 
significant functional relationships as hypothesized between 
dysfunctional attitudes (as measured by the DAS) and other indices 
of psychopathological symptomatology leaves strong implications of 
validity for Beck's approach.
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Data must now be collected from a psychiatric population to see 
if one's dysfunctional attitudes can be changed in therapy and to get 
a better estimate of a remeasurement interval. The DAS has been 
shown to be a valid and reliable measure of dysfunctional attitudes 
in a population of normal college students, the next test is in a 
psychiatric population. The goal of cognitive-behavioral therapy 
is not simply to modify emotional behavior, percepts, and thoughts, 
but to help the individual to discover the operation of his' 
cognitive unconscious so that he may learn how to learn, to 
truly develop, and thus to develop beyond therapy. The process 
of therapy is therefore a cognitive one which attempts to bring 
the patient closer to reality by rational methods even though it 
deals much of the time with the irrationalities of the patient.
Potential Value of the DAS 
A psychotherapy change measure such as the DAS has a number 
of important uses:
(1) Assess how various types of psychotherapies influence 
attitudes.
(2) Identify effective ingredients in psychotherapy; i.e., to 
identify the techniques in various psychotherapy treatment packages 
which produce significant cognitive change and/or symptomatic 
relief. A measure of dysfunctional attitudes is essential to 
determine whether many of the techniques which espouse to change 
faulty beliefs do in fact perform as hypothesized.
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(3) Identify subtypes of depressive syndromes which may be 
more or less responsive to cognitive-behavioral therapy.
(4) Identify patients at risk for relapse from depression. 
Recent evidence (Hauri, 1976) suggests that remitted neurotic 
depressives continued to evidence cognitive distortions (based 
on dream content studies). Beck (1976) suggests that relapsing 
patients continue to hold hypervalent schemas and therefore 
evidence cognitive distortions even when not symptomatic. If
the DAS were used to identify these patients, additional treatment 
could be given to them.
(5) Identify persons who are at particular risk for developing 
depressive states before they are symptomatic (i.e., those with 
specific depressogenic attitudes). If these people could be 
identified, prevention techniques could be developed to preclude 
the onset of these kinds of disorders.
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CHAPTER VI 
Summary
The development and validation of an instrument to identify 
the common assumptions underlying the typical dysfunctional 
attitudes in depression was described. The questionnaire, 
called the Dysfunctional Attitude Scale (DAS), arose from the 
need to operationalize and evaluate Beck's (1967; 1976) hypotheses 
regarding the role of negativistic schemas in the origin and 
maintenance of depression.
Two parallel forms of the scale, each consisting of 40 items, 
elicit information on an individual's dysfunctional attitudes 
which act as schemas by which he construes his world. The 
validation of these two forms was made in a sample of 355 subjects, 
with the following results:
(1) Homogeneity reliability for the DAS-A and DAS-B ranged 
from .89 to .92. Stability based on eight-week test-retest 
correlations of scores was .84.
(2) Within this group of relatively normal college students, 
depressed students have higher DAS scores than nondepressed 
students. Support for this is based on the positive relationship 
between depressive affect (measured by the BDI or the POMS D-Scale) 
and dysfunctional attitudes (measured by the DAS). Individuals 
who had a tendency to think more negatively were likely to feel 
more depressed.
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(3) Depressogenic attitudes were found to be more persistent 
over time than depressed mood, i.e., the test-retest data for the 
DAS was significantly higher than the results for either the BDI 
or the POMS D-Scale.
(4) The presence of depressogenic attitudes was more 
associated with depressed mood than with other mood disturbances.
(5) In the total populations employed there was no strong 
evidence to support the notion of depressogenic attitudes causing 
depressive affect. However, this aspect of the study was affected 
by a number of methodological problems and needs further controlled 
research.
(6) Differences in DAS scores among college students with 
varying levels of depression were investigated and found to be 
highly significant.
(7) The relationship of age, sex, race, and educational level 
to dysfunctional attitudes as measured by the DAS was also 
investigated. 3oth sex and educational level were related to
DAS scores.
DAS-A and DAS-B are sufficiently reliable and valid as a 
measure of dysfunctional attitudes in a normal college student 
population. The next step is to determine the scale's psychometric 
properties in a psychiatric population as well as its utility for 
research and its effectiveness as a therapeutic screening device.
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Additional suggestions for refinement of the DAS were made. 
Beck* s theoretical position concerning the concept of 
depressogenic schemas was substantially confirmed. Further 
controlled investigations are needed to determine causal 
aspects of the relationship between dysfunctional attitudes 
and affect.
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APPENDIX A
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DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION
Subject Code: (First 4 letters of your mother’s maiden 
name, then the first initial of her 
first name. Examole: GROSB)
Sex:
Race:
Male
Female
Black 
Caucasian 
Latin American
Other
( )
Last Grade Completed:
  Less than 7 years school
Junior High School 
(Grades 7,3,9)
Partial High School 
(Grades 10,11)
High School Graduate
Partial College Training
College Graduate
Graduate Professional Training
Age (in years):
Marital Status:
_____  Single
_____  Married
  Cohabitation
_____  Widowed
  Sep/living apart
Divorced
Occupation:
  Housewife
Student
Unskilled Blue Collar (manual 
laborer, waitress, etc.
Skilled Blue Collar (mechanic 
carpenter, policeman, etc.)
Clerk, secretary, office 
worker
Teacher
Executive or owns business
Professional
None
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Religion:
Atheist
Agnostic
Protestant
Catholic
Jewish
Other (
Employment: (Do NOT answer if
housewife or student)
_____  Employed in a regular job
Employed, but in a part-time 
job
Marginally employed (lawn 
cutting, babysitting)
Unemployed
Retired
If you are presently enrolled in any courses, what is your grade point 
average equal to? ____________
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
1. Have you had any contact with a helping professional (Therapist, 
Physician, Social Worker, or Probation Officer) within the last 
month?
  YES
NO
2. Have you had prior inpatient psychiatric treatment? 
  None
  One inpatient experience (How long ago? ___
More than one (How long ago? ____________ )
3. If you had prior inpatient treatment, do you feel it was successful? 
  YES
_____  NO
_____  NOT APPLICABLE
4. Have you ever had prior outpatient therapy?
  NOne
  Single evaluation session only (How long ago? ___________ )
One therapy experience (How long ago? ____________ )
More than one (How long age? ____________ )
5. Was the outpatient therapy successful?
  YES
  NO
_____  NOT APPLICABLE
6. Are you presently involved in therapy?
  YES (What type? _________________________________J______ )
_____  NO
7. How has your life been during th past month? Has anything stress­
ful occurred to cause you to become very sad? Has anything 
exciting occurred to cause you to become very happy? Explain 
these events in detail in the space below.
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APPENDIX B
BECK DEPRESSION INVENTORY 
(BDI)
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BECK INVENTORY
Name   Date
On this questionnaire are groups of statements. Please read each 
group of statements carefully. Then pick out the one statement in 
each group which best describes the way you have been feeling the PAST 
WEEK, INCLUDING TODAY! Circle the number beside the statement you 
picked. If several statements in the group seem to apply equally 
well, circle each one. Be sure to read all the statements in each 
group before making your choice.
1 0 I do not feel sad.
1 I feel sad.
2 I am sad all the time and I can’t snap out of it.
3 I am so sad or unhappy that I can't stand it.
2 0 I am not particularly discouraged about the future.
1 I feel discouraged about the future.
2 I feel I have nothing to look forward to.
3 I feel that the future is hopeless and that things cannot 
improve.
3 0 I do not feel like a failure.
1 I feel I have failed more than the average person.
2 As I look back on my life, all I can see is a lot of failures.
3 I feel I am a complete failure as a person.
4 0 1 get as much satisfaction out of things as I used to.
1 I don't enjoy things the way I used to.
2 I don't get real satisfaction out of anything anymore.
3 I am dissatisfied or bored with everything.
5 0 1 don’t feel particularly guilty.
1 I feel guilty a good part of the time.
2 I feel quite guilty most of the time.
3 I feel guilty all of the time.
6 0 1 don't feel I am being punished.
1 I feel I may be punished.
2 I expect to be punished.
3 I feel I am being punished.
7 0 1 don't feel disappointed in myself.
1 I am disappointed in myself.
2 I am disgusted with myself.
3 I hate myself.
8 0 1 don't feel I am any worse than anybody else.
1 I am critical of myself for my weaknesses or mistakes.
2 I blame myself all the time for my faults.
3 I blame myself for everything bad that happens.
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9 0 1 don't have any thoughts of killing myself.
1 I have thoughts of killing myself, but I would not carry them 
out.
2 I would like to kill myself.
3 I would kill myself if I had the chance.
10 0 1 Don't cry anymore than usual.
1 I cry more now than I used to.
2 I cry all the time now.
3 I used to be able to cry, but now I can't cry even though I
want to.
11 0 I am no more irritated now than I ever am.
1 I get annoyed or irritated more easily than I used to.
2 I feel irritated all the time now.
3 I don't get irritated at all by the things that used to irritate
me.
12 0 1 have not lost interest in other people.
1 I am less interested in other people than I used to be.
2 I have lost most of my interes u in other people.
3 I have lost all of my interest in other people.
13 0 1 make decisions about as well as I ever could.
1 I put off making decisions more than I used to.
2 I have greater difficulty in making decisions them before.
3 I can't make decisions at all anymore.
14 0 1 don't feel I look any worse than I used to.
1 I am worried that I am looking old or unattractive.
2 I feel that there are permanent changes in my appearance that 
make me look unattractive.
3 I believe that I look ugly.
15 0 1 can work about as well as before.
1 It takes an extra effort tc get started at doing something.
2 I have to push myself very hard to do anything.
3 I can't do any work at all.
16 0 1 can sleep as well as usual.
1 I don't sleep as well as I used to.
2 I wake up 1-2 hours earlier than usual and find it hard to get 
back to sleep.
3 I wake up several hours earlier than I used to and cannot get 
back to sleep.
17 0 1 don't get more tired than usual.
1 I get tired more easily than I used to.
2 I get tired from doing almost anything.
3 I am too tired to do anything.
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18 0 My appetite is no worse than usual.
1 My appetite is not as good as it used to be.
2 My appetite is much worse now.
3 I have no appetite at all anymore.
19 0 1 haven't lost much weight, if any lately.
1 I have lost more than 5 pounds.
2 I have lost more than 10 pounds.
3 I have lost more than 15 pounds.
I am purposely trying to lose weight by eating less.
Yes ________ No _
20 0 I am no more worried about my health than usual.
1 I am worried about physical problems such as aches and pains
or upset stomach; or constipation.
2 I am very worried about physical problems and it's hard to 
think of much else.
3 X am so worried about my physical problems, that I cannot 
think about anything else.
21 0 1 have not noticed any recent change in my interest in sex.
] X am less interested in sex than I used to be.
2 I am much less interested in sex now.
3 I have lost interest in sex completely.
Copyright (£) 1972 by Aaron T. Beck, M.D. 
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APPENDIX C
PROFILE OF MOOD STATES 
(POMS)
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The Profile of Mood States:
Permission was not granted to reproduce the Profile of Mood
States (POMS) within this manuscript because of copyright procedures
followed by the Educational and Industrial Testing Service.
Psychometric information on this scale, as well as copies for future
use may be obtained by writing:
Educational and Industrial Testing Service 
(EDITS)
San Diego, California 92107
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APPENDIX D
STORY COMPLETION TEST 
(SCT)
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Story Completion Test
Peggy had joined a particular organization a couple of years ago 
because she was very committed to its goals and practices. She knew 
most of the members by now, and a few had even become fairly close 
friends. Peggy had never considered herself the "leader" type. 
Earlier in school she had been fairly active but had never really 
stood out. Several friends in her current group thought that her 
ideas were sound and they began to urge her to run for president of 
the organization in the upcoming election. Peggy was very reluctant 
at first, feeling she was unqualified, but finally she decided to run 
because she thought she did have energy and ideas to contribute. No 
woman had ever held the position before, but her friends thought she 
had a good chance to win. When elections were held, Peggy ran for 
presidency but she lost.
Put yourself in Peggy's place, trying as vividly as you can to imagine
what she probably thought and felt.
1. When you first heard you'd lost, you immediately:
a. feel bad and imagine I've lost by a landslide.
b. shrug it off as unimportant.
c. feel sad and wonder what the total counts were.
d. shrug it off, feeling I've tried as hard as I could.
2. After the election, you conclude.
a. I feel really depressed about losing, but I'll continue to 
work for my goals once I get my enthusiasm back.
b. I'ts okay that I lost, since it's a useful illustration of the 
inevitable prejudice against female leadership.
c. I ’m  not a winner at anything. I never should have let myself 
be talked into running.
d. The campaign was a good experience even though I didn't win.
3. When you compare the winner's "platform" to yours, you think:
a. Mine was good for a first attempt, and was vastly better than 
my opponents.
b. Despite what my friends said, mine wasn't good at all.
c. I feel badly that I didn't do a better job on it, but I'll 
know next time.
d. Mine showed some inexperience but was pretty good for a 
first attempt.
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Fred had started working in the main office last week. It felt like 
it had taken forever to find this job after he moved to L.A. He had 
grown Tip in a small town some distance away, and since he moved had 
met few people. The others who worked in the same office seemed 
friendly, although most of them were considerably older than he. One 
woman, Carolyn, was about his age, sort of pretty, but she worked down
the hall and he saw her only occasionally. Taking his coffee break in
the snack bar one afternoon, she came over and sat with him. They
talked for awhile. He found her fun and pleasant, and they seemed to
enjoy each other. The break ended and he had to get back to his 
office. He found himself thinking about her that afternoon - fanta­
sizing about going out with her, wondering what she’s like. He looked 
forward to seeing her the next day. At lunch the next afternoon, he 
sat alone in the snack bar and saw her come in. She saw him, smiled 
and waved, but she took her lunch to another empty table on the far 
side of the room.
Put yourself in Fred's place and try to imagine as vividly as you can 
what he might think and feel.
1. Your first reaction was to think:
a. I might consider being a little assertive and pursue her.
b. I'm unhappy that she prefers to eat alone this afternoon.
c. She dislikes me and wants me to get the message.
d. She's playing hard to get.
2. Seeing her makes you think of your romantic prospects in L.A., 
you imagine:
a. I get really discouraged about how hard it is to meet good 
people, but almost everyone has problems with it, too.
b. I feel like I'll never meet anyone who is interested in me.
c. I can't expect the first woman to come along to be the Big 
Romance.
d. Women in L.A. are awfully conceited.
3. Thinking back on your conversation with Carolyn, your judgment is:
a. I know she really was excited by me and I'm mystified about 
why she's avoiding me.
b. I'm afraid it wasn't as interesting as I first thought.
c. The conversation was pleasant; that probably had nothing to do 
with whether she's interested in me or not.
d. I must have failed at making a good impression.
4. Reflecting on your life here in L.A., you think:
a. I'll just have to wait and see what the future will bring; 
it's too soon to tell.
b. I have just about everything I want and I know I'll be a big 
hit in this town.
c. Loneliness is a big problem for me, but then I suppose it's 
also a problem for all newcomers.
d. No one in L.A. will ever really care about me, but at least 
I have a job.
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Lisa and Jason have been dating for the past few months. Lisa is 
neither pretty nor ugly and has a pleasant personality. Jason is 
usually fun to be with and often takes her to nice restaurants and 
theaters. Tonight she seemed to be somewhat unhappy despite his 
attempts to start light-hearted conversations. He asked her if any­
thing was wrong. She replied that she was having some problems at 
work that she didn't want to talk about, but was grateful for his 
concern. She seemed a little more cheerful after that.
Put yourself in Jason's place, trying to imagine as vividly as you can 
what he probably thought and felt.
1. You think about the future of this relationship and you imagine:
a. It's a pretty good relationship, and we're getting to know 
each other better as time goes on.
b. It's a pretty good relationship and I'm generally satisfied 
although I think the relationship has a few problems.
c. I would probably have a hard time finding someone else who 
would care about me, so I want to make this relationship 
work out.
d. It is not what I really want it to be, and that makes me sad, 
so I will leave myself open to contacts with other women.
2. You wonder why Lisa hasn't called for several days.
a. I decide I don't really know why and figure I should ask her.
b. All I can think of is that she must not care about me.
c. I imagine that she thinks so highly of me that she sometimes
is afraid of risking rejection or pushing me too hard.
d. I feel unhappy about it but figure that things sometimes do 
not happen exactly the way one would like.
3. Why do you think her mood changed after you asked her if there was
ci pjTCfclSIS?
a. I feel pleased and imagine I can be very therapeutic for her 
and most others.
b. I don't know why since it may have been due to any number of
things, but I am happy that her mood changed.
c. I just don't understand her moods, which worries and upsets 
me even though I know it's very hard to really understand 
another person.
d. I wish I could believe that I had something to do with it, 
but I rarely have the ability to cheer anyone up.
4. You wonder why she got in the bad mood, and imagine that:
a. I feel badly that I don't understand her, but it's really 
difficult to understand everything about somebody else.
b. Like most people, she has a few problems that bother her.
c. It's because she's extremely immature and moody; but I, on 
the other hand, am calm and happy.
d. It's because she's dating the most bleak, plain man in the 
city.
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Janice is a senior at a large university. She dislikes the lack of 
faculty-student contact, so she usually makes an effort to talk to her 
teachers outside the classroom. So after she received an average 
score on a midterm, she went to the professor. Dr. Smith, to talk over 
the test. Dr. Smith pointed out the correct answers and the reasons 
for them on the questions she missed. He also gave her some helpful 
tips on studying. After about 45 minutes, Dr. Smith said he was quite 
busy and hoped she would excuse him. He then walked her to the door 
and said it was nice talking to her.
Put yourself in Janice's place, trying to imagine as vividly as you 
can what she probably thought and felt.
1. Are you satisfied with your meeting with Dr. Smith?
a. Yes, because he was quite pleased with my visit and will pro­
bably give me a good grade in the course.
b. Although it's upsetting for me to realize it, I probably
needed tips on studying.
c. Yes, he answered all my questions and I made a good contact.
d. No, he probably thinks I'm dumb, which is why he gave me tips 
on study habits.
2. Looking over the questions you missed, you decide:
a. It's not my fault, the teacher should make a better test.
b. Unfortunately, my performance on this test is indicative of
my true ability. I'm a mediocre student.
c. I feel bad that I missed those questions.
d. Now that you've talked to the teacher, you hope you'll do 
better on the final.
3. You thought Dr. Smith was rather nice in walking you to the door.
Your reaction to his gesture was:
a. Embarrassment. He was trying to hurry me out.
b. Appreciation that he realized that it was worth his time to
help me.
c. Appreciation. He seemed interested and concerned.
d. Sort of sad and let down that the meeting had to end.
4. How did your meeting with the professor change your view of the
large, impersonal university?
a. Dr. Smith helped to make the university seem less impersonal.
b. You realize that the faculty is always happy to talk with 
students.
c. Although Dr. Smith was willing to talk to me, I still feel 
lost and a little lonely at the largo impersonal university.
d. Even though the professor was polite, I still felt that he 
resented my taking up so much of his time, and that made 
me feel bad.
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Ellen was a graduate student, and she aspired to be a good teacher.
It was very important to her to communicate well with others, and she 
liked the idea of turning students on to particular viewpoints that 
they may never have considered before. Her father had been a pro­
fessor in a small college and although their relationship was strained 
at times, she had always respected her father and thought that being a 
professor was a good life. Ellen was a sensitive person - perceptive 
and insightful - and she was aware that part of her motivation stemmed 
from the role of being an "expert" and having people be impressed by 
her knowledge.
fin opportunity to test her teaching skills arrived in the form of a 
class presentation that all the students in one of her seminars were 
required to make. Ellen probably put in a bit more than average 
preparation on her topic. When the day came for her presentation, she 
seemed calm and poised (although rather nervous on the inside).
During her talk, students commented and asked questions; no one yawned 
or dosed. One question had been rather hard to answer. No one said 
anything to her afterwards since it was late in the day, everyone left 
immediately afterward.
Put yourself in Ellen's place and try to imagine as vividly as you can 
what she probably thought and felt.
1. You try to judge how well your talk went. You decide:
a. I clearly did the best job of anyone.
b. According to my own standards, I think it went okay.
c. I'm disappointed that no one complimented me.
d. I hoped someone would tell me it went well, but since no one 
said anything, I'm afraid it wasn't very good.
2. When you thought about it afterwards, the thing that mostly comes 
to mind is:
a. I feel good; relieved that the whole thing is over.
b. I feel disappointed that I didn't get feedback about how I'd 
done.
c. I feel bad about that one question I couldn't answer. I think 
it made me look ridiculous.
d. I feel good because now the teacher will see my genius.
3. You're wondering what grade you might be given for the presen 
tation by the instructor.
a. I feel that because of that one question that stumped me, 
he'll conclude that I didn't really prepare well enough to 
earn an A.
b. I saw him nod once or twice, so he was really impressed and 
I'll get an A.
c.~ I'm quite worried about the grade but I don't know how he'll 
grade.
d. I think I'll get an A because it's a graduate seminar and 
because I clearly did as much as anyone else and an A is usual 
under these circumstances.
161
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4. With respect to your future career as a college teacher, you 
conclude:
a. I'm afraid I won't make it because I know the competition for 
jobs is stiff.
b. I'm optimistic because I've always been lucky.
c. Since my seminar presentation didn't go very well, I feel 
pretty pessimistic about my chances.
d. I'm optimistic since my grades are good.
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Lou is a sophomore, living in one of the dorms. He’s moderately good 
looking, friendly, a bit on the quiet side, an A student. He fre­
quently admires men of his age who appear to be outgoing, although 
he's aware of the disadvantages of that personality as well. One of 
his concerns is making friends. In his freshman year he kept busy 
with school work and maintained relationships he'd had in high school. 
But this year he has become more aware that he wants to meet people 
and make friends on campus. He's uncertain quite how to go about it.
Tonight is Friday night, and Lou can't deny to himself that he feels 
lonely. Most of the men on his floor are out for the evening or gone 
for the weekend. At the far end of the hall the men in two or three 
rooms are in tonight as well. While he's in the shower, he hears one 
of them mention plans for going out later for pizza to a place where 
they know some women are going to be.
Put yourself in Lou's place and try to imagine as vividly as you cam 
how he might think and feel.
1. Your first reaction when you hear that they are going out is:
a. Unhappiness. They probably would have asked me to ccme if 
they liked me more.
b. Unhappiness and increased loneliness. Sounds like I'll be 
practically alone on the floor.
c. TO wonder if they'd mind if I'd come along.
d- Relief. They seem unfriendly for not asking me, so I'm happy
since I don't have to be with them.
2. Being alone on a Friday night:
a. doesn't bother me because I figure I'll have a date next week­
end for sure.
b. upsets me and makes me feel lonely.
c. upsets me and makes me start to imagine endless days and
nights by myself.
d. I can handle it because one Friday night alone isn't that im­
portant; probably everybody has spent one night alone.
3. You sit at your desk trying to get some reading done. Your mind 
keeps flashing on:
a. pleasant memories of a recent date I've had.
b. an upcoming blind date which I expect will go very well.
c. I'm lonely and down but everybody is lonely once in awhile.
d. the feeling that not having a date tonight is one of the most 
painful things I can imagine.
4. People have always told you that you have a nice smile. You're 
thinking about your looks now and feel:
a. it's unimportant what people think about my looks or anyone 
else's looks.
b. fairly satisfied about my looks.
c. really ugly and undesirable. When someone compliments my 
looks I think they're just being polite.
d. unhappy because even though I feel fairly good looking it 
didn't seem to be an asset in getting a date tonight.
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APPENDIX E
DYSFUNCTIONAL ATTITUDE SCALE - FORM A 
(DAS-A)
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DAS FORM A
This inventory lists different attitudes or beliefs which people 
sometimes hold. Read EACH statement carefully and decide how much you 
agree or disagree with the statement.
For each of the attitudes, show your answer by placing a check­
mark ( v O  under the column that BEST DESCRIBES HOW YOU THINK. Be sure 
to choose only one answer for each attitude. Because people are 
different, there is no right answer or wrong answer to these state­
ments.
To decide whether a given attitude is typical of your way of 
looking at things, simply keep in mind what you are like MOST OF THE 
TIME.
EXAMPLE:
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1. Most people are O.K. once
you get to know them.
1
Look at the example above. To show how much a sentence describes 
your attitude, you can check any point from totally agree to totally 
disagree. In the above example, the checkmark at "agree slightly" 
indicates that this statement is somewhat typical of the attitudes 
held by the person completing the inventory.
Remember that your answer should describe the way you think MOST 
OF THE TIME.
NOW TURN THE PAGE AND BEGIN
Copyright (6) 1978 by Arlene N. Weissman
165
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
A1 I s {
3
g
S
scu 3
3EH
S
H
B *
s
I
8
§s Sri aK
>
a
8
§w
HQ
ATTITUDES & uMFJw
w
§
w
w
8
rtJCOw
a
HQ
3 £Ed
8
O< N
EU
TR
AL §
$
8
£
8
REMEMBER, ANSWER EACH STATEMENT ACCORDING
TO THE WAY YOU THINK MOST OF THE TIME. 1
i
1. It is difficult to be happy unless 
one is good looking, intelligent, 
rich and creative.
2. Happiness is more a matter of my 
attitude towards myself them the 
way other people feel about me.
3. People will probably think less 
of me if I make a mistake.
4. If I do not do well all the time, 
people will not respect me.
11
-
1 * ^ 1 |
i 5 *  1
Talcing even a small risk is foolish 
because the loss is likely to be a 
disaster.
i
i I
I
!
1
6. It is possible to gain another 
person’s respect without being 
especially talented at anything.
7. I cannot be happy unless most people 
I know admire me.
8. If a person asks for help, it is a 
sign of weakness.
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REMEMBER, ANSWER EACH STATEMENT ACCORDING
TO THE WAY YOU THINK MOST OF THE TIME.
9. If I do not do as well as other 
people, it means I am an inferior 
human being.
•oH If I fail at my work, then I am a 
failure as a person.
1 1 . If you cannot do something well, 
there is little point in doing it 
at all.
12. Making mistakes is fine because I 
can learn from them.
|
13. If someone disagrees with me, it 
probably indicates he does not 
like me.
14. If I fail partly, it is as bad as 
being a complete failure.
i1
1
15. If other people know what you are 
really like, they will think less 
of you.
f
1 "
16. I am nothing if a person I love 
doesn't love me.
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REMEMBER, ANSWER EACH STATEMENT ACCORDING 
TO THE WAY YOU THINK MOST OF THE TIME.
17. One can get pleasure from an 
activity regardless of the end 
result.
18. People should have a reasonable
likelihood of success before under­
taking anything.
19. My value as a person depends greatly 
on what others think of me.
20. If I don't set the highest standards 
for myself, I am likely to end up a 
second-rate person.
21. If I am to be a worthwhile person, I 
must be truly outstanding in a least 
one major respect.
22. People who have good ideas are more 
worthy than those who do not.
23. I should be upset if I make a 
mistake.
24. My own opinions of myself are more 
important them other's opinions of 
me.
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REMEMBER, ANSWER EACH STATEMENT ACCORDING j
TO THE WAY YOU THINK MOST OF THE TIME.
25.
i
TO be a good, moral, worthwhile
person, I must help everyone who
needs it.
26. If I ask a question, it makes me
lock inferior.
1
27. It is awful to be disapproved of
!
1
!
by people important to you. !
S
J
i
28. If you don't have other people
1i
{
" " ij
i
to lean on, you are bound to I
be sad. I
t
j
j
i i
29. I can reach important goals without
j
i ii
1
slave driving myself.
i
t
j
I 1t ;
30. It is possible for a person to be
I
1
1—
ii I ji
scolded and not get upset.
j
• >
L 1
' i 
1
31. I cannot trust other people because ! ij i
they might be cruel to me. I i\ %
1
32. If others dislike you, you 1
i
cannot be happy.
33. It is best to give up your own
1
\
1
interests in order to please \j
other people.
1 |
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REMEMBER, ANSWER EACH STATEMENT ACCORDING
TO THE WAY YOU THINK MOST OF THE TIME.
i i
34. My happiness depends more on
other people than it does on me.
i
35. I do not need the approval of
J
|
i
\
other people in order to be happy. iJ
i
i5
i
36. If a person avoids problems, the
1
i
ii
i
problems tend to go away. :
1
37. I can be happy even if I miss out
i
!l )
n
i»1
on many of the good things in life. !
! i !
j
i !
38. What other people think about me
1 i
! !
j
is very important. s(
. 11
t
39. Being isolated from others is
1
i |
bound to lead to unhappiness. !<t
40. I can find happiness withoug being !
loved by another person.
1 1  L
iii
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APPENDIX F
DYSFUNCTIONAL ATTITUDE SCALE 
(DAS-B)
171
FORM B
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DAS FORM B
This inventory lists different attitudes or beliefs which people 
sometimes hold. Read EACH statement carefully and decide how much you 
agree or disagree with the statement.
For each of the attitudes, show your answer by placing a check­
mark (✓) lander the column that BEST DESCRIBES HOW YOU THINK. Be sure 
to choose only one answer for each attitude. Because people are 
different, there is no right answer or wrong answer to these state­
ments.
To decide whether a given attitude is typical of your way of 
looking at things, simply keep in mind what you are like MOST OF THE 
TIME.
EXAMPLE:
ATTITUDES
H
H
Most people are O.K. once 
you get to know them.
Look at the example above. To shew how much a sentence describes 
your attitude, you can check any point from totally agree to totally 
disagree. In the above example, the checkmark at "agree slightly" 
indicates that this statement is somewhat typical of the attitudes 
held by the person completing the inventory.
Remember that your answer should describe the way you think MOST 
OF THE TIME.
NOW TURN THE PAGE AND BEGIN
Copyright ©  1978 by Arlene N. Weissman
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REMEMBER, ANSWER EACH STATEMENT ACCORDING 
TO THE WAY YOU THINK MOST OF THE TIME.
You can be a happy person without 
going out of your way in order to 
please other people.
2. I have to impress new acquaintances 
with my charm, intelligence, or wit 
or they won't like me.
3. If I put other peoples' needs before 
my own, they should help me when I 
want them to do something for me.
4. It is shameful for a person to 
display his weaknesses.
People will like me even if I am 
not successful.
6. People who have the marks of 
success (good looks, fame, 
wealth) are bound to be happier 
than people who do not.
7. I should try to impress other
people if I want them to like me.
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REMEMBER, ANSWER EACH STATEMENT ACCORDING 
TO THE WAY YOU THINK MOST OF THE TIME.
8. If a person I love does not 
love me, it means I am 
unloveable.
! 9. I ought to be able to solve my 
problems quickly and without a 
oreat deal of effort.
!
I
I 10. If a person is indifferent to me, 
i it means he does not like me.
11. I should be able to please 
everybody.
12. Others can care for me even if they 
know all my weaknesses.
13. If people whom I care about do not 
care for me, it is awful. I
14. Criticism need not upset the
person who receives the criticism.
15. My life is wasted unless I am 
a success.
16. People should prepare for the
worst or they will be disappointed.
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REMEMBER, ANSWER EACH STATEMENT ACCORDING 
TO THE WAY YOU THINK MOST OF THE TIME.
17. I must be a useful, productive, 
creative person or life has no 
purpose.
]
18. A person should think less of 
himself if other people do not 
accept him.
19. I do not need other people’s 
approval for me to be happy.
20. I can enjoy myself even when 
others do not like me.
21. My value as a person depends
greatly on what others think of me.
22. If I make a foolish statement, it 
means I am a foolish person.
23. If a person has to be alone for a 
long period of time, it follows 
that he has to feel lonely.
24. A  person should be able to 
control what happens to him.
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REMEMBER, ANSWER EACH STATEMENT ACCORDING
TO THE WAY YOU THINK MOST OF THE TIME.
25. If a person is not a success, then 
his life is meaningless. i
26. A person doesn't need to be well 
liked in order to be happy.
27. If someone performs a selfish act, 
this means he is a selfish person.
.0004 I should always have complete 
control over my feelings.
29. I should be happy all the time.
30. If people consider me unattractive 
it need not upset me.
31. Whenever I take a chance or risk 
I am only looking for trouble.
32. A person cannot change his emotional 
reactions even if he knows they are 
harmful to him.
33. I may be able to influence other 
people's behavior but I cannot 
control it. ! !
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REMEMBER, ANSWER EACH STATEMENT ACCORDING 
TO THE WAY YOU THINK MOST OF THE TIME.
I 34. People will reject you if they 
I know your weaknesses.
35. People should be criticized 
for their mistakes.
36. One should look for a practical 
solution to problems rather than 
a perfect solution.
37. If I do well, it probably is due 
to chance; if I do badly, it is 
probably my own fault.
I
38. The way to get people to like you 
is to inpress them with your 
personality.
39. Turning to someone else for 
advice or help is an admission 
of weaknesses.
1
40. A person should do well at 
everything he undertakes.
-I---
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INDEX
Accommodation, 4
Affect, 4, 7, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 27, 34, 47, 77, 95, 96, 98, 
113, 125, 139 
and cognition, 4, 13, 17, 19, 33, 36, 96, 139 
depressive, 13, 17, 113, 139 
and schemas, 23-29, 45, 113, 125, 139 
Age and DAS, 104, 144 
Attitude (see Schema)
social psychological definition, 7
Background variables, correlations of, with DAS scores, 90, 101-106, 
118, 144
Beck Depression Inventory, 51, 73, 85 
description, 74-75 
descriptive statistics, 101-103
and DAS, 112, 115, 117, 118, 120-121, 122-128, 129, 131 
factor analysis data, 77 
and POMS, 112, 118, 123, 125 
reliability, 76 
and SCT, 112 
statistics, 102, 105 
used with medical patients, 76, 77 
used with psychiatric patients, 76 
validity, 76 
Behavior, anticipations influencing, 6, 17 
Beliefs, see Schemas
Bryne's Repression-Sensitization Scale, 82 
Cognition
and affect, 4, 13, 17, 19, 33, 36, 96 
arbitrary inference, 21, 28, 53 
assumptions underlying, 2, 18, 45 
automatic, 19
dichotomous reasoning, 29, 53
distortions of reality, 2, 13, 19, 21, 22, 28, 33, 45
and emotions, 3-9, 19, 24, 33, 34, 36
exaggeration, 21, 29
idiosyncratic, 2, 18, 22, 51
involuntary quality of depressive, 19
linguistic labelling, 34
minimization, 29, 53
overgeneralization, 21, 29, 53
personalization, 29
and psychopathology, 2, 13, 17, 36, 51, 138 
and schemas, 23 
selective abstraction, 29, 53 
Cognitive Behavioral Therapy, 32, 141
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Cognitive distortions,
affects related to, 51-52 
characteristics of, 51 
in depression, 45, 51, 52, 55, 62 
Cognitive learning approach, 3 
Cognitive modification, 15 
Cognitive psychotherapies, 37 
Cognitive structures, see Schemas 
Cognitive Triad, 1, 20-21
Cross-lagged panel design, 90, 96-97, 99, 122-127 
Depression
cognitive model, 1, 12, 15, 17, 22, 36, 81, 82, 123, 134, 139, 
140-141 
concept of, 9-15 
definition, 16-17 
historical review of, 9-15 
learning theory approaches, 13-14 
psychoanalytic orientation, 11, 15, 22 
and reinforcement, 13, 31-32 
role of ego, 12, 30 
and schemas, 139-140, 142 
schematic classification of, 11 
signs and symptoms, 10, 14, 15 
therapy, 2, 22, 33, 36 
thought disorders, 12, 18 
Depressogenic beliefs, see Schemas 
Depressogenic schemas, see Schemas 
Design of research, 85, 89, 91 
Dysfunctional Attitude Scale (DAS), 
administration of, 83, 85
and BDI, 112, 115, 117, 118, 120-121, 122-128, 129, 131
congruent validity of, 111
construct validity of, 94-98, 115, 143
construction of, 50-55
content validity, 94
description of, 48, 83, 143
dimensionality of, 55, 83
discriminative ability, 128-132, 137-139, 144 
evaluation of, 134-137 
external criterion, 73
and extraneous variables, 90, 101-106, 118, 144
face validity, 54, 94
and factor analysis, 57-61, 95
hypotheses tested, 95-98
improvements, 136
item statistics of 108, 109
linear scaling, 93, 100-101
methodological problems, 139-140, 144
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Dysfunctional Attitude Scale (continued) 
parallel forms of, 62, 65-72
and POMS, 112, 113-114, 116, 118, 122-128, 130, 133 
processing of data, 89-90 
rationale for, 2, 45, 48, 134, 143 
refinement of, 56-64
reliability of, 62, 92-93, 106-107, 110-111,118, 143, 
and SCT, 112, 113, 114 
subjects, 83-85 
test format, 48-50
validity of, 93-95, 111-133, 143-144 
value of, 141, 142
Educational level and DAS,- 104, 106, 144 
Ellis Scale, 41 
Emotions,
assessment view of, 24 
behavioral view of, 8 
and cognitions, 19, 24, 33, 34, 36 
cognitive view of, 3-9 
and feelings, 7 
and perceptions, 6, 7 
theories of, 5-9 
and thinking, 6, 18, 22 
Enchiridion, The
Errors in thinking, see Cognitions 
Experimental studies of depression, 29-37
Gender and the DAS, 103, 137, 144 
Guide to Rational Living, 41
Hamilton Rating Scale of Depression, 51 
Hostility and depression, 11
Insight therapy, 23 
Irrational Belief Test , 38-39
Learned helplessness, 14 
Likert scaling, 49, 83
Mania, 10 
Melancholia, 10
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI), 42 
Mood,
and reinforcement, 31 
stability of, 118 
Mourning and Melancholia, 11
Perception and emotions, 5, 6
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Personal Belief Inventory (PBI), 39-40 
Physiological arousal, and cognitive evaluation, 34, 35 
Profile of Mood States (POMS), 73 
description, 77-78 
factor analysis data, 78, 79 
norms, 79
relationship to BDI, 112, 118, 123, 125
relationship to DAS, 112, 113-114, 116, 118, 122-128, 130, 133
relationship to SCT, 112
reliability, 79
statistics, 102, 105, 114
used with normal college students, 79, 80
validity, 79
Race and DAS, 104, 144 
Rules, see Schemas 
Schemas,
assessment of,46, 82, 114, 115 
and cognitions, 23, 24, 45 
definition of, 23, 45, 52, 73
depressogenic, 23-29, 43, 45, 46, 47, 50, 52, 73, 82, 96, 113, 114 
115-118, 119, 127, 139-140 
distortions of reality, 26 
idiosyncratic, 25, 26, 28, 113 
irrational, 8, 18 
prepotent during depression, 19 
and psychpathological symptomatology, 119, 138 
relationship to behavior, 23, 48 
stability of, 44, 47, 55 
and thinking, 2, 25 
Self Rating Scale for Rationality, 40-41 
Standards for Educational and Psychological Tests, 94 
State versus trait measures, 44 
Story Completion Test(SCT), 73, 85 
de scription, 80-81 
rationale, 80
relationship to BDI, 82, 112 
relationship to DAS, 112, 113, 114 
relationship to POMS, 112 
reliability, 82 
statistics, 101-103, 105 
validity, 82
Technical Recommendations for Psychological Tests and Diagnostic 
Techniques, 111 
Thinking,
distortions in, 19, 118, 119 
dysfunctional attitudes, 2 
and emotions, 6, 18, 22
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Thinking (continued),
errors in, 2, 28, 36, 52 
and feelings, 136 
irrational assessment of, 37-43 
processes and mood, 135 
and schemas, 25 
self evaluative thoughts, 6 
Two Factor Index of Social Position, 84
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